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November 8, 1983 
CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of today's 
hearing is judicial efficiency and improvement. The problem of 
court congestion and delay continues to concern all of us 
interested in our State's courts. Over the past several years, 
numerous studies and propo s at improving our judicial 
system have been suggested, yet there continues to be a strongly 
held belief by some people that our courts need to be more 
efficient and that the jud ial system moves too slowly. As part 
of the Assembly Judiciary Committee's effort to get an overview 
of the nature of court congestion and delay, the Committee has 
invited parties and organizations rested in the courts to 
identify and discuss the causes of the problem and to suggest 
specific proposals to improve our j ial system. The Committee 
has asked these sted to sent their views on hm..r 
the Legislature can assist resolving problems facing our 
courts. The Committee will then review proposals presented and 
take whatever action may be appropriate. 
I am advised that witnesses will present testimony 
concerning judicial arbitration, use of court commissioners, 
courtroom technology, court fund and pretrial procedures. In 
order to accommodate 1 witnesses who have been scheduled to 
testify, I am asking to be as specific as possible; 
outline the need 1 presented; identify what cost 
would be incurred ; how it would be 
implemented; and, anticipated effect the 
proposal would 1 efficiency. Please 
limit your remarks to s. 
We will start with a pre of a study which is 
about to be released by the Corporation's Institute for 
Civil Justice. The study s court congestion in the Los 
Angeles Superior Court over the last hundred years. The findings 
of the study should of us what kinds of measures 
best address the backlog problems some of our courts. 
Our rst witnesses are Dr. Stephen Carol and Dr. Molly 
Selvin of the Institute for Civil Please come forward. 
As you do, I'd like to make a couple of other remarks. One, we 
are open to all suggestions might emanate from the witnesses 
today. We are deadly serious making some changes. We are 
really interested in creative approaches to the problem. 
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I just left a breakfast meeting earlier this morning 
with people from the Los Angeles court system, both Superior and 
Municipal Court, hosted by the County Administrative Office and 
Supervisor Antonovich. A number of good ideas came from that 
breakfast. We might look at a state buyout of the courts as one 
possible issue. We want to look at poss ile alternatives to 
what we have been doing in terms of standardized procedures in 
the judicial process, increasing the monetary limit for small 
claims actions, or finding more informal methods of resolving 
disputes. We are open to all ideas. 
We hope that your testimony will be creative as to what 
the Legislature can do to meet the challenge. We can no longer 
solve the problem by adding more judges as has been done in the 
past. Fiscal considerations are now preventing that as a viable 
option. So we would appreciate your assisting us with your 
creative thoughts on the issue. 
With that, I'd appreciate your beginning. Thank you. 
DR. STEPHEN CAROL: My name is Dr. Stephen Carol. I'm 
the Deputy Director of the Institute for Civil Justice at the 
Rand Corporation Santa Monica, California. The Institute is a 
private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization which con-
ducts research and pol analysis on civil justice issues. 
We are at the end of a major historical study we have 
conducted of congestion and delay in the Los Angeles Superior 
Court. This study was partially supported by the Hanes 
Foundation and by the California Community Foundation, both of 
Los Angeles. It was conducted cooperation and 
assistance, which I most gratefully acknowledge, of the court 
itself, as well as the County Bar. This study was headed by my 
colleague, Dr. Molly Selvin, who will now briefly describe the 
study and its primary findings. 
DR. MOLLY SELVIN: Good morning. I'm pleased to be here 
to describe the research we've recently completed at the ICJ on 
the subject of civil court delay in Los Angeles. My comments 
this morning 11 be with regard to our conclusions on the nature 
and magnitude of civil delay in Los Angeles, the causes of that 
delay, the Los Ange ior Court's response to that delay 
over the years, the of the court's efforts to reduce 
delay, and our of our research for 
policy makers. 
In brief, we found that de been a long-term, 
persistent problem IJos Angeles for more than 60 years. In 
recent decades we believe delay has been caused in part by 
important shifts in the composition of the civil case load in Los 
Angeles, as well as by a trend towards increased litigation 
activity in individual cases. These changes mean that cases now 
consume more judicial resources they did in the past. 
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The Los Angeles Superior Court has persistently 
endeavored to clear its delayed caseload since the early 20th 
century. Some of these efforts have had transient effects, but 
generally they have produced no long-term reductions in civil 
delay. The court's efforts have been hampered by organizational 
and financial constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and 
by the court's largely crisis-oriented approach to the problem. 
Before I begin, let me say that a written statement that 
elaborates on my comments is available. And in addition, I 
understand you've all been provided with some copies of a number 
of the tables and charts from our report, and I will refer to 
some of them. 
The Los Angeles Superior Court has a reputation as being 
one of the most delayed metropolitan trial courts in the nation. 
As recently as last fall and winter, the court was setting new 
cases for trial at a reduced rate because of the large backlog of 
older cases. We undertook this study of the r.. A. Superior Court 
to provide some empirical foundation for the debate over what to 
do about civil congestion and delay in Los Angeles. We studied 
civil delay in r .. A. since 1880, when the court was founded, 
through 1981. Speci cally, the policy questions we addressed 
were: What has been the nature and magnitude of the delay problem 
in this court; what are its causes; what has been the court's 
response; what has been the impact of that response; and, what 
a~e the appropriate next steps for the court. 
Let's turn to our substantive findings: 
We compiled a record of c delay in the L. A. 
Superior Court from 1920, from when figures are first 
available, through 1981. And you can see that on Figure 5.1. It 
should be the first one the packet you've been provided with. 
We measured delay primarily as median time to trial. That is, 
the interval between the when the parties first requested 
trial to the date when the was scheduled. Our data 
indicate that civil delay is not a recent phenomenon, or even a 
temporary one in Los Angeles. It has been, rather, a long-term 
persistent problem. During the 20th century, time to trial 
fluctuated quite a bit. Since World War II, however, time to 
trial has dramatically increased about 6 months in 1940, to 
40 months in 1981. This rise been particularly dramatic 
since 1970, when time to al was 24 months. With few 
exceptions, the history of civil delay in the Los Angeles 
Superior Court is one of steady and upward increase. 
We've also explored the validity of a number of popular 
explanations for some of the fluctuations in delay that we 
observed, the causes of delay, if you 11. One explanation for 
rising delay is that we are, as a population, more litigious now 
than we were in the past. Our data indicate, not surprisingly, 
that civil filings have sen ly since the early 20th 
century. In 1880, when court first , less than 500 
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civil actions were filed in L A. Superior Court. In 1980, 
in contrast, more than 70,000 new 1 actions were filed. The 
growth in filings can explain some of the recent 
increase in delay, there was delay at time when there 
was a drop 1 as 1930's. In 
addition, the rate rease in s exceeded the 
rate of increase lings. To measure litigiousness, we 
compared changes in civil lings s in the county's 
population. While the absolute number of civil filings increased 
enormously over the years, the rate of filings, that is the 
number of filingE population, remained relatively steady. 
Approximately 1 200 people have initiated a civil action each 
year in the L. A. Superior Court over the past several decades. 
That figure is up somewhat 1970 and 1980, but the 1980, 
rate of filings r popu is still less than the rate of 
filings in 1930. We cone that sing litigiousness does not 
always explain sing de Angeles. 
examine 
L. A. County? 
Well then Doctor, did you 
of judicial positions in 





kept pace with the 
the L. A. Super Court 
1880 when the court was 
addition of new judges 
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filings per judge 
Superior Court. By 
1,300 filings per j 
lower now than at any 
with changes to 







filing and they 
it doesn't 
understatement. 
for rising delay is the 
ic 1 positions, hasn't 
The number of judges on 
enormously. There were two in 
i there are 206 at present. The 
-4-
court to keep pace with 
caseload per judge, the 
somewhat in recent 
approximately 1,500 
-- in the L. A .• 
were approximately 
lings per judge is 
1930's. When compared 
we conclude the changes in 
complete explain increases 
t, wait, wait. You 
s per ling, not filings per 
delay is up. So, in fact, 
explain delay; it 




DR. SELVIN: Yes. 
Our third explanation for delay is that -- the third 
popular explanation is that cases now consume more judicial 
resources than in the past We have, in fact, observed 
significant shifts in the composition of the civil caseload in 
Los Angeles and an increase in the amount of litigation activity 
per case. We've observed that more complex personal injury 
litigation now dominates the civil caseload in Los Angeles 
whereas in the past, say prior to World War II, the L. A. 
Superior Court functioned largely as a debt collection agency. 
Debt cases predominated. Civil law suits in Los Angeles since 
World War II increasingly include multiple parties, especially 
more than one defendant. In addition, cases make greater use of 
discovery as well as more papers filed, more appearances made, 
more motions requested. This means that cases that settle, 
rather than those that go to trial, take longer to reach that 
settlement now than they did in the past. Trials themselves have 
grown longer than they were in the early 20th century. Given 
these findings, it's not surprising that we've observed also a 
slight decline in the number of dispositions per judge in recent 
decades. Therefore, we have some evidence that the delay in Los 
Angeles in recent decades has been caused by a change in the 
composition in the civil caseload as well as an increase in the 
amount of litigation activity per case. 
What has been the court's response to delay? The L. A. 
Superior Court has been concerned and active since the early 20th 
century. It's taken two major approaches. One has been to add 
judicial manpower. The court has acquired temporary judges in 
varying numbers from other superior courts in the state as well 
as other courts in the county. In addition, the court has made 
frequent additions to permanent staff. 
The other major approach has been to impose local rules 
and procedures. Most of these have been directed at the entire 
civil caseload. They've been designed to speed the processing of 
cases, to reduce the length of trial, or to settle cases before 
trial. Other types of innovations have been directed at specific 
types of cases on the docket. They've been designed to divert or 
remove lower value cases from the docket, to induce litigants to 
waive a jury trial, or to waive a altogether. 
We evaluated the major solutions the court has imposed 
and we found that the addition of permanent judges has enabled 
the court to keep pace with its increase in filings; but these 
additions by themselves did not significantly or permanently 
reduce time to trial. Without these additions, however, delay 
might have been worse at any given time than it was. But with 
the changes in the composition of the caseload and the increasing 
litigation activity that we've observed, the addition of judges 
in the same rate as in the past will not produce permanent 
reductions in time to trial. 
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We also found 
adopted have not succeeded 
reductions in delay. These 
further increases in t 
there had been some 
result of the 
to trial has continued 
Why has delay 
was so active, why was 
1 solutions the court 
ing significant or long-term 
may also have prevented 
In , we found that 
to trial as a 
overall the wait 
Los Angeles? Since the court 
to ef long-term reductions? 
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an historical view the 
response was lical and 
efforts during periods 
First, we 1 the court was unable 
nature of s delay problem. Without 
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Financial con 
ability to initiate and 
feel the court's large size 
made things more f cult 
The court 
civil delay prob 
implemented. Why? The 
efforts, in general, on 
part of the prob 
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ical dispersion may have 
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solutions it 
not focus its delay reduction 
rmined to be a large 
ion of the civil caseload 
resources. Since the court 
1 cases, it compounded 
particular solutions, 
as in the past settle 
1 data was not collected, 
of analyzing civil delay 
, the measures that 
1 solutions have not 
solutions. 
long-term problem in Los 
to reduce delay by 
nuously adding new 
Some efforts have 
al. They may also have 
than it was at any 
s did not produce 
The court's 
financial 
1 s, and by the 
problem. 
I think are some 
s research for policy 
makers. We studi 
findings apply to 
.A,nge s 
metropolitan 
but some of our 
courts in California 
as well as elsewhere. 
Our ana , we feel, is not 
unique to Los Ange the 
composition of the civil case the extent of litigation 
activity per case we feel other jurisdictions 
beyond Los Angeles. We feel Los Angeles' large size may have 
made the management and implementation of procedural solutions to 
delay more difficu than in courts, but this court's 
management tradition is s other metropolitan 
trial courts. That tradition is z by judges rotating 
among different branches and divisions and by the frequent 
rotation of pres judges tradition also 
results in a lack institutional memory about the nature and 
success of previous efforts to ss the problem and has 
hindered the court's efforts. 
Our analysis leads 
possible next steps 
us to conclusions with regard to the 
Los les Superior Court, and 
perhaps for other courts, 
court needs to devote 
to reverse the long-term 
Also, the court needs to 
cases that consume the most 
court do this? 
s to reduce delay. The 
to problem of delay 
se time to trial. 
directly on those 
How can the 
We suggest that 
increase. The court 
the court size must 
1 
continue to 
with increases in 
frequently adding 
may well have 
the volume of 1 
permanent judges to its 
kept delay from 
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But the 
personnel, will be 
resources it does 
reductions in de 
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of that caseload on 
in the litigation 
court needs to identi 
predict whether a case 
to settle or try. s 











If the court fails 
worse. 
court needs to know where 
ly occurs. The 
cs that will allow it to 
consuming or lengthy 
essential for the court to 
sting, as well as 
also explore 
as well as analyze 
currently makes little use of such 
Los Angeles may be able to 
and may be able to 
sting resources. 
With a more detailed analysis of its caseload and perhaps the use 
of an automated management system, the L. A. Superior Court may 
choose to adopt one of a number of individual strategies to 
reduce delay. 
The court may decide to a tracking system for 
different types of cases depending on their predicted complexity. 
The court may also decide to impose limitations on 
discovery which many lawyers and judges think is responsible for 
a good part of the delay in the litigation process. 
Finally, the court has recurrently had difficulty 
measuring the true impact of its innovations on time to trial; 
therefore, we suggest that the court might design an evaluation 
as part of any future procedural innovation and collect data 
specifically for that evaluation during the life of the 
proceoure. In addition, the court might choose to implement some 
of its procedures experimentally. 
In conclusion, I'd like to add that we briefed the 
members of the L. A. Superior Court Executive Committee during 
the past summer on this research. Since then the court has asked 
us if we would assist them in designing new approaches to delay 
reduction in Los Angeles based upon our suggestions. We are 
anxious to be of assistance in this endeavor and are currently 
seeking the required financial support. 
Again, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to 
speak to you s morning. And I'd be happy to answer any 
questions. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Any questions? Mr. 
Stirling. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Dr. Selvin, what percentage of 
the superior court's resources are allocated to criminal cases? 
DR. SELVIN: That's one of the most difficult questions 
we had, and we can't answer that. ~udges rotate in this court, 
and have for as long as we can determine, between civil and 
criminal departments depending on need. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So we don't know just by 
courtroom time what percentage of the time is taken up by 
criminal proceedings? 
DR. SELVIN: We that at the present, but we don't 
know that in the past and so •.• 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: All right, at present what do you 
estimate it to be? 
DR. SELVIN: I don't that at the moment, I'm sorry. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, if you don't knmrl 
that, you don't know what percentage of their time is spent on 
sentencing of gui pleas from the muni arraignment. 
DR. SELVIN No. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How much of the civil -- I 
would allege to you that that's reasonably significant, 
especially in light of the court unification debate, because 
logically the court is having to take an insertion of 
the workload that be sposed of at the muni arraignment, 
and in effect having to rel and rereport and all that 
sort of thing, so 's the process and it's creating a 
duplicative process. And frank I'm surprised that the a.mbi t of 
your study didn't cover e since we had the 
proposition on ballot that was designed to attack 
that very problem. 
Hmv much of 
complicatedness was 
hearing the case? In 
the s array of civil case 
discipl or 
responses to 
n the discretion of the judges 
other words, how much would their 
terms of amount of discovery 
ir own delay? 
that were 
and the 
DR. SEININ: We were 
and given that, particularly 
difficult to determine. 
ing with a historical record 
back as we went, that's very 
of your 
of a subj 
l, for example, in the course 
and judges and get kind 
zation of what's going on? 




means that there's 
club decides 's 
year or next year, 
job and at 
management or 
finally get up to 
has to come . And 
There's a lot of wisdom in folks. 
you arrive at -- I think 
made is the institutional 
presiding judge position 
and strength. And the 
s year, or this woman, this 
they're probably great folks and do a good 
frank have no real institutional 
1 experience. And they 
problem. But the course 
move on and the next one 
that that's exactly the 
recoro~endations, did you make 
longevity of the 
accountability of the 
any recommendations to 
institutional memory 
management of courts ? 
made in the past to 
increase to, I think, six years, 
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and we did not investigate those specifically in terms of why 
they weren't adopted ••• 
ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING: Even if it -- I think that's not 
a bad idea. The problem becomes, if you get a good one for six 
years, it's great; if you get a bad one for six years, it's a 
disaster. Is there anything that increases the accountability of 
the courts to the pub c for -- Was there anything in your 
recommendations that would attack that institutional problem and 
make the efficiencies of the court more accountable to the 
public? 
DR. SELVIN: Well, I think if we had a better sense --
"we" meaning the court and the community in general -- of 
specifically what part of the caseload was the problem, how to 
identify those cases. That's something that's clearly is passed 
on from one presiding judge to the next. Part of it is an 
information problem. The court doesn't know how to deal with 
cases as they are filed that will prove to be difficult cases 
down the road. I think in addition to the problem of changing 
people every couple of years, there's a sort of lack of 
information underneath that. I think some of the institutional 
problems would be eliminated if there was a better information 
base ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Yes, but don't you see, it's a 
chicken and egg argument. If you had the resolve and the anxiety 
in the management to account for its productivity, the 
information systems would have long since been demanded and 
developed. So the fundamental question gets to be, how can the 
courts, an independent branch of government independently 
elected, be made more accountable to the public, not for the 
philosophy of their decisions, but the timeliness and 
efficiency of their decisions? 
DR.SELVIN: I think -- From our study we spent a lot of 
time reading the Los Angeles Daily Journal to get a sense of what 
the court did and how the legal community reacted. In my 
judgment, the court has been quite concerned about its delayed 
caseload since the late 1920's, began to be perceived as 
a problem in Los Angeles. And I think -- I'm not sure I 
understand what you mean by accountabi ty, but the court was 
very sensitive, clearly, within the legal community in Los 
Angeles about that problem for a long time. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I've never heard debated in 
a judges election the quality of management of the courts. Have 
you? Therefore, 's not a publicly accountable function. It's 
just a big whale out of water and the normal response to the 
Legislature, when we ask them about their delays is, "Well, if 
you'd give us more resources we'd be able to do a job." But when 
we start examining, they haven't done all the normal management 
things that any institution should do. So the question, the 
fundamental question that still has to answered is, what is it 
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about the institutional arrangement can make the group, the 
court, more accountable for trying to get management systems in 
place and trying to reduce their backlog, and that sort of thing? 
And I guess the answer is that wasn't within the ambit of 
your study or recommendations. 
DR. SELVIN: Do 
what I've said, that the 
sense of what some of 
to proceed, because at 
what I said. 
want me to answer that? I think 
court real needs to have a better 
problems are before it can decide how 
s point it's not -- I would stand on 
ASSEMBIJYMAN STIRLING: 
you, Mr. Chairman. 
Thank you, Doctor. Thank 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. One more thing. Could you 
comment please on record keeping in terms of its impact on the 
problem of trial court ef iency? 
DR. SELVIN: This is something that we've begun to 
explore and I think we're aware of some other trial court 
jurisdictions throughout the that have implemented 
automated management systems and 've been used to do things 
like case tracking, noticing, other parts of the litigation 
process. At present I'm not aware that the L. A. Superior Court 
uses that type of system, and we think that it might. We haven't 
investigated this detail. And it's one of the things that 
we'd like to do if we were able to do some follow-up research in 
this area. We think the L. A. Superior Court might be able to 
benefit from this sort of a managing its caseload, as 
well as analyzing some of 
CHA.IRMAN HARRIS: Any 
questions, 
of your research real was. We 
at what may be the actual causes 
the fact that there s been 
scope of your research, the 
question? 
questions? 
before I ask too many 
sense of what the scope 
it didn't really look 
It simply looked at 
delay. But what was the 
, I suppose, is a better 
DR. SELVIN: Well, we to find out what the nature 
of the problem was nee re have concerns of this as a 
recent problem that it's particularly bad now. We wanted to 
see what it was in the st, whether delay was a real problem, 
for example, or was more of a rhetorical issue. And 
we found that in fact de was a prob in the past and that it 
had a long history Los Ange s. We also wanted to see if we 
could determine some of causes of delay in Los Angeles 
were, given the formation and the historical record that we 
had. We also wanted to see what court has done since there 
have been persistent concerns the court has been inactive in 
this area, or not act also wanted to try and 
determine if the court d a fference. 
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ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: In terms of focusing in on the 
causes of delay, what did you look at? 
DR. SELVIN: Well, we looked at, as I said, some of the 
more popular explanations: litigiousness, whether there had been 
sufficient numbers of judges to cope with the numbers of filings, 
whether there have been changes in the caseload to indicate that 
there have been other causes, whether there have been changes in 
the amount of litigation activity in the county, in the cases 
filed in the county. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: To what extent did you look at 
the actual day-to-day administration of the courts; that is, 
continuances, motion practice, including discovery? 
DR. SELVIN: One of the things we did was to draw and 
analyze a sample of 1,400 civil cases that were filed in the 
court between 1915 and 1940, and between 1950 and 1979. We used 
coders at Rand to code information about these cases. We looked 
at the register of actions rather than the civil case file 
because that would have been an enormous task. We coded things 
like whether there was discovery; how many parties were there; 
whether there were continuances; whether there was a pretrial 
conference held; whether there was a trial held; how the case was 
disposed of ultimately; whether it was settled or tried or 
dismissed. So we used those records as well as information from 
the California Judicial Council memoranda; records of 
correspondence that went back to the founding of the Council in 
the late 1920's. We used records from the County Bar. The Bar 
over the years has been quite active and collaborated with the 
court in efforts to reduce delay in Los Angeles and has had a 
number of con~ittees that have acted cooperation with the 
court. We also -- I'm sorry. 
ASSEMBLY~ffiN CALDERON: Well, I did want you to finish 
your ..• 
DR. SELVIN: We also used legal newspapers, as I 
mentioned before, to try and compile a narrative of how the court 
acted and what the response to was within the community 
locally. 
ASSEMBLY~~N CALDERON: So with respect to those cases 
that you did examine, what were your findings in terms of how 
their handling may or may not have operated on this whole 
question of delay? 
DR. SELVIN: 
the number -- Well, 
We found that there has been an increase in 
terms of handling 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: 
and examined the continuances, 
made including scovery 
You took a look at these cases 
examined the motions that were 
you find anything 
significant in examining those aspects of those cases, that you 
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felt was significant in light of what your task was, which was to 
examine delay in the courts? 
DR. SELVIN: Well, as I said, we found that there has 
been more discovery cases , , second half of our 
sample, since 1950 as compared to 1940 and prior. There are more 
parties in cases, there are more events, individual papers filed, 
hearings requested and so on. But it's difficult to determine 
from that, you know, whether a judge was correct in granting a 
discovery or whether he shouldn't have granted discovery. Our 
record doesn't enab us to make that determination. 
ASSEMBLY~~N CALDERON: Did you examine at all what 
impact if any the fact that there happens to be more lawyers; or 
proportionately are we the same today, in terms of the number of 
courts and judges and lawyers, as we were, say, back in 1940 and 
1930? 
DR. SELVIN: The number of lawyers in the county per 
population has gone up somewhat in the last decade; but it has 
fluctuated somewhat. I think that table may be in the .•• 
CH~IRMAN HARRIS: I'm going to be presumptuous and 
interrupt Mr. Calderon. I think that after your report is 
finalized, we'd like to see about having a briefing for the 
Committee on the report. I think would probably be much more 
productive than trying to explore it in general terms now. I 
have one further question. Wou you say that your study was 
more academic research than a hands-on analysis? It seems that 
most of it was from a storical perspective rather than from 
interviews with judges about their experience. Is that a fair 
characterization? 
DR. SELVIN: Yes. 
characterize it as 
was to determine what 
is the empirical basis 
something new; is it not? 
question. 
The scope -- I wouldn't so much 
versus pol , but the scope of it 
storical background -- you know, what 
current problem? Is this 
And I that's an important 




Okay, are re other stions? All right. Thank you 
much. We appreciate it. We will look forward to sitting 
with you once you have gotten nal report. 
DR. SELVIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Nmv, Mr. Hanst, the 
President of the State Bar. ·Hill you come forward and discuss 
the Bar's and responsibility in resolving litigation 
backlogs and discovery issues? Welcome, it's good to have you. 
I see you're joined by colleagues. Wou you introduce them to 
all of us? 
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MR. DALE HANST: Yes. Chairman Harris -- I don't know 
if we can get this mike close enough to be useful or not. I'd 
like to introduce, on my right, Tom Davis from Bakersfield, who's 
Chairman of the State Bar Legislation Committee, who's committee 
will be dealing with the various s that come through the 
State Bar for our recommendations terms of court congestion 
problems as well as other problems that affect lawyers in the 
state. On my left is Jim Ward from Riverside, who is the 
Chairman of the newly established permanent Board Committee on 
the Courts whose charge, basically, is to deal with the kind of 
problems that we're here today to talk about. And in that 
connection he will be overseeing some other efforts that I'll 
tell you about in a minute, as far as the State Bar is concerned. 
Let me preface my comments by indicating to you that 
these comments are basically my personal comments; that the State 
Bar has not, as an organization, had an opportunity to review 
some of the proposals that I might be throwing out to you for 
consideration today. They are simply ideas and thoughts that 
have come to me in my numerous conversations with people 
throughout the state, since I kind of began my term as president 
by taking on the problem of court congestion, court reform and 
some change in our scovery all of which have been 
very well received, by lawyers throughout the state who I've 
talked to. 
I think it's very interesting to hear the discussion of 
the Rand people. I think the statistics are enlightening. For 
one, I have always felt, as I think a lot of people have, that 
the litigious society problem was one of the principal causes of 
our increasing litigation. them to suggest that there 
are no more filings now than were many years ago on a per 
capita basis in Los Angeles is most interesting. However, I 
don't think -- I have seen figures from throughout the country 
that indicate that in most of the country that those figures are 
not consistent. In other words, a greater percentage 
of filings throughout the country on a population 
basis. 
But the problem is... of all wrapped up in 
one. You can't look at these s and tell what the 
problem is. The problem is that you more complex 
litigation, and that's what 're talking about when they say a 
debtor oriented, you , ••. a debt collection court back in the 
'30's, versus complex litigat now. 
Where does the complex 1 come from? The 
complex litigation comes from the increasing idea that we have 
our society that there must some of redress for every 
wrong that somebody incurs, the expans of the rights to the 
type of litigation. For example, there is a letter that you've 
received from a judge Fresno deals with the problem of 
multiple cross complaints for and indemnification in 
products liabil cases. Well, that's just an example of what 
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happens in these cases. The judges are confronted with rules and 
laws and judicial decisions that allow 14 or 15 cross complaints 
to be filed in a products liabi case, with all of the 
attendant discovery. That turns that case into a case that lasts 
10, 15, 20, 30, 40 times as long as the typical debt collection 
case. So, to me, it's the litigiousness on the part of society, 
but that comes about from the feeling that we have that all of 
these rights have to be addressed. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: President Hanst, let me interrupt you. 
It seems to me that the dispute is not just whether or not people 
should have the attitude that they ought to be able to redress 
their grievances, all grievances through the courts. I don't 
think that is really the problem. I would much rather see them 
using standardized systems of redress in the courts than going 
out and hitting each other over the head, or shooting each other. 
That's, obviously, sometimes very final and very complete in 
terms of resolution. But I'm interested in whether or not there 
are ways that we could allow people to seek redress, but much 
more efficiently, informally. Sometimes right and wrong is very 
clear and we do not need to go through the entire process of 
elongated arbitration and resolution in order to reach a common 
sense result. If somebody hit someone in the head, it seems it 
ought to be fairly clear that, there was an injury and there were 
a thousand witnesses that saw some guy get hit in the head. Now, 
how do we, in fact, determine what's fair as a result of that 
type of grievous action? I'm trying to figure out if there are 
ways that we can reach reasonable conclusions without all the 
complexities and the formalities that have become systematized in 
our justice system. 
MR.HANST: Well, there certainly are ways, and you've 
hit upon some already. I mean, the State Bar, and I think you, 
Chairman Harris, carried some arbitration litigation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. HANST: I mean some legislation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. HANST: And I think that has been working 
successfully. And that is one of the things that we're going to 
be looking at this year in conjunction with, I hope, your commit-
tee and the like committee in the Senate, to explore alternative 
methods of dispute resolution. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: For example, what about directing 
people toward informal arbitration even prior to getting into the 
courts? Now, for example, in marital dissolution cases we ask 
people to go see a counsellor. Quite often they go see a 
counsellor prior to getting involved in the entire plethora of 
issues in dissolution to make sure this is what they really want 
to do. The court's time is not taken up in a situation where 5 
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months down the line they say, "we 
We wish we'd ta to somebody 5 
able to work out our " 
Bar might work on? 
't really want to do this. 
ago. We might have been 
that the State 
MR. HANST: Absolutely. I any effort where you --
any approaches where we can take people away from the courts and 
force them into mediation of their problems, either on a private 
basis -- I think it's worth considering; the neighborhood dispute 
resolution center type of approach that we've had. Now a lot of 
people say that that's not a solution to the problem, because the 
problem is complex litigation. In my ew, it's a partial 
solution to the problem we can take out of a judge's 
time in terms of working to handle this kind of problem is going 
to give him more time to to the complex litigation 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Has the Bar analyzed any of these 
alternative approaches? 
MR. HANST: We cons , I guess a couple of years ago 
before I got on the there was question of a 
neighborhood spute resolution center thing. There are 
pilot studies going on now in Los Ange s in the arbitration 
area, I think, and we're due to receive a report on that 
particular issue within a month or two. 
for the Bar to give us 
an analys s o resolution 
alternatives in California or 
elsewhere in We 1 d viewpoint on those 
issues. That's one of the things I'm ly interested in 
exploring. Are ways to divert people from the system in 
the first place? If people to igious in 
resolving their di are ways that we can 
stop some of the formal. system. 
fti.R. HANST: 
of the solutions to 
system with cases that can 
looking into that 
come up with some 
legislation 
stion about that. One 
people from the 
other ways. And we are 
to work with you to 
area; maybe propose some 
s area. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If you cou that effort and 
might look at by give us some sense of where 
January. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: was cute. 
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(LAUGHTER) 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to 
-- Mr. Hanst, I just wanted to sort of follow up on diverting 
people from the system. It seems to me that in an effort, 
through arbitration and other means, to litigants from the 
courts to a more appropriate form for the resolution of their 
dispute •.• Sometimes we tend to add an extra tier of procedure 
because as long as the alternative hearing, whether it be 
arbitration or some other dispute resolution hearing, is final on 
the merits, which we have problems with, you can always come back 
and you always litigate. And it tends to mean -- in my 
experience, at least in terms of arbitration cases, has been that 
it tends to prolong litigation as opposed to shortening it. 
MR. HANST: Well, that's a very good point, and I think 
-- I have heard, however, that in toto that there is probably a 
substantial savings because while it does expand the time in 
certain cases, the majority of the cases do not go on to the 
trial de novo and you don't have that expansion. But this raises 
another question, too. And let me emphasize that what I'm saying 
now are my just personal comments and we really haven't looked at 
a lot of these things. But I think at some point we have to 
decide what price society is willing to pay to sustain this 
system. And can we have perfect justice at every level 
throughout this society within the system as we now know it? And 
maybe it's time to think about whether some of those approaches 
ought to be made mandatory; whether that isn't a sufficient 
justice at whatever level we're dealing with. I mean, if we're 
talking about a perfect justice respect to every right and 
every issue, from a dollar to whatever, I don't think society can 
afford the price. I don't there is any solution to that 
problem. So I guess 1 I'm saying is that lawyers have to begin 
to be willing to lock at changes their traditional concept of 
how the system ought to work, and we ought to be looking at ways 
to provide maybe not 100% just a particular case within the 
way that we conceive 100% justice I mean there's a lot of 
argument about voir dire; there's a lot of argument about 
unanimous juries in the criminal area, you know. And we can't 
forget the criminal area because the criminal area, unless you 
separate it and then you're going to have two separate systems, 
affects the ability to get the civil cases out because of the 
delays over there. But I don't ow what the answer is on voir 
dire; I don't know the answer is on unanimous jury verdicts. 
But I know one thing, we shouldn't just throw it out because it 
isn't traditionally the way that we've practiced law and it's not 
our traditional system. It's other areas. We have to 
determine whether there's some lesser quality of justice that 
those other areas have. And, you know, at some point we just 
can't afford to continue to go as we presently are. So, you 
know, I think that's a very good point directed towards, is it 
time to make some of these things mandatory? If you do make them 
mandatory, you obviously are going to save time. 
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1\SSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: How about making just -- an<'! J'm 
not by any means attempting to besmirch any of the Judiciary's 
reputation in any way, but to get at, or suggest that they're any 
part of the problem at all, if they are. I don't. know. But what: 
I do want to ask you is just in terms of distributive justice, or 
in terms of determining how just we need to be at every step of 
the case, would it strike you as being a good idea to start at 
looJ.~ing at how 1 ules of civil procedure are simply applied, and 
starting very basically with the continuance? And being more 
forceful in terms of compliance with time requirements for notice 
and time requirements for filing motions? And again, I'm not 
asking tl1at question with any knowledge whatsoever about what the 
practice is out there. I have a suspicion that it miqht be a 
contributing factor; I don't even know how hiq. 
MR. HANST: Sun", it's a contributing factor, but we 
have to recogn ze that judges are human bcJngs just like 
legislators are human beings and just like lawyers are human 
beings, an<'! none of us ... 
CHlHRtJIAN HARRIS: Nobody i zes ~!].Y. of those fact:s. 
MR. HANST: None of us are rfect and you're going to 
hdVl' d roach tluouqhout thP ~Judiciary, hut what we 
nc(~d to do is through legislation. Establish SOJ11C -- discovery 
j s i1 good example. J mc~an, t.here' s a lot of cri1:icism now in the 
discovf'ry area that, W(~ll, juc1gc~s don't enforce the sanctions. 
Wlwn somebody comes up, they're hesitant to fine them $300 for 
doinq something or for not filing a proper interro<Jatory. Well, 
you know, it's human nature, unless the rules are spelled out and 
cast in a little better concrete, and that comes from 
legislation. That comc?s from kind of review that we hope to 
~c a~lt• tn set up in the discovery area this year, with your help 
again. :r 've indirat.ed we have a jc,int committee now, est.ablished 
t1etween the Judicial Council and the State Bar, chaired by Jim 
War<'!, here on my left, whose job is to tell us within the next 
couple oi months how w0 can formulat.e an ongoing statewide 
r·ommission with legislative support and legislative participation 
und judicial part· ipat and attorney participation and public 
particjpation designed to, with the next couple of years, 
hopefully, come up an answer to the discovery problem. I 
1ncan, the discovery lem pervades the whole system. There's 
on argument a~out whether or not it truly causes congestion. 
Well, my own feeli s, re can't be any doubt the fact that 
something that takes tha much time, that gives rise to the 
motions that you heard about from the Rand people today, affect 
~md delay the :;ystem. W0've tr approach this on a 
f'iecemeol, patchwork, handaid over the last three or 
four yPars and have gotten absolutely nowhere. You can make one 
little step at a time which is helpful, but it doesn't really 
address the whole prob 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's very cogent. I have one other 
qtH'Stion, <:~ • St.irling mny have a question as well. 
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• 
Did any resolutions relating to court efficiency emanate from 
your convention this year, ones that we'll be looking at in 1984? 
Do you have a package yet from the State Bar in this area? 
MR. HANST: Chairman Harris, I cannot answer that 
because the packet has not .•. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
right. The answer is no. 
that right? 
So the answer is no. That's all 
They don't have any at this point. 
MR. HANST: Apparently not. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, that's fine. 
Is 
MF. HANST: There will will be suggestions coming from 
us through our efforts to deal with the local Bar associations on 
the court efficiency and administration issue. That was raised 
by the Rand peop It was raised by Mr. Stirling's questions in 
terms of, how do we get the courts to operate more efficiently in 
their own administration. Well, one of the problems throughout 
the state now-- and I can't deal with Los Angeles. It's really 
a separate kind of issue in terms of problems they have here. 
But throughout the state, the courts are not consistent in the 
way they administer their courts and what we're trying to do, 
from the Bar Association point of view, is make the lawyers 
throughout the state aware, in their local Bar associations, of 
these problems of the ways that have been suggested by the 
Judicial Council to properly make your courts work on a timely 
basis, try to make the people in one county upset about the fact 
that their county takes two or three years to get to trial when 
the county next to them only takes six months. And make them 
wonder why that's happening and make them try and work with the 
judges and put some pressure on judges from the other side of 
the bench in terms of doing some of these things. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. HANST: So that's one of the things that we're going 
to do. Now, in doing that, we'll come up with ideas from time to 
time from these various areas in terms of what's worked 
successfully there. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Good. 
MR. HANST: Some type of mediation approach; some type 
of private lawyer working the discovery area and resolving 
discovery disputes -- that sort of thing. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MR. HANST: And we'll bring those to you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
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MR. HANST: But I think, you know, I really think we 
need your help on this discovery issue because, ladies and 
gentlemen, that is a major issue in my view, and everybody I've 
talked to, bar none, has indicated there is a problem in that 
area and we have to deal with it. We can't deal with that issue 
without resources from the state, without cooperation from you 
people in terms of having some kind of ongoing study. Now I 
don't know exactly the right way to approach it .•. 
CHAIR!'flo.AN HAERIS: I think you've made a very important 
point; one that has been noted. Is there anything your 
colleagues would like to offer to us? 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I have a question of Mr. Hanst. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, okay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: First of all, Mr. Hanst, you're a 
great breath of fresh air. My own conclusion is that the judges 
-- the bench in the past has been subject to the workloads of the 
attorneys who, because their cases are not moving along quickly 
enough, have to take more cases and therefore their own 
calendaring and scheduling becomes a problem so they try to get 
the cases delayed to balance more cases. Everybody wins if the 
bench moves along more efficiently; they get their cases resolved 
sooner. But the interplay has been the bench versus the Bar, or 
trying to appeal to the Bar, and in effect be popular and well 
accepted and well respected and that sort of thing. And so the 
real solution will come from the leadership of the California Bar 
Association doing exactly the things you've outlined; and 
creating an atmosphere among the members of the Bar that it's 
good to have an ef , timely resolution of complaints and 
that sort of thing. And the fact that M.r. Ward and yourself and 
the Bar Association self is showing an interest in doing this, 
I think is 90% of the battle. That fact that you're attentive to 
it and that you're thinking about it and talking about it is 
really a fundamental shift in the posture of the Bar versus court 
efficiency. In the past, court efficiency has lain dormant, 
subject only to the energies of the chairman and several others 
and aggressive judges, but when those guys pass from the helm 
then, as the Rand Corporation indicated, it goes back. So I 
congratulate you and the Ca fornia Bar Association. In the last 
two years there has just been extraordinary quality of leadership 
there and I 's rea come a long way and I hope that 
that continues. I'm sure the chairman and the rest of us are 
committed to helping you in that regard. 
MR. HANST: Well the test will be if we can continue on 
beyond this year and keep it going on an ongoing basis. 




ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Yes. The answer is really in the 
soul of the leadership of the California Bar 
and as long as they are there, it will turn around. 
in that. I'm concerned with this notion 
afford perfect ~ustice or fair justice. I 
MR. HANST: I didn't say fair. I said perfect. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Perfectly fair. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: The Supreme Court sophistry in 
that case was enormous, I thought. I think we've got a long way 
to go in terms of the kind of leadership that you're 
demonstrating here before we give up and have to answer the 
question that you posed to us. The information system is in 
place the courts; the institutional arrangement to make the 
courts accountable, in a real sense, for their efficiency; the 
demand and the drive for more efficiency; the technological 
innovations that are available -- even word processing. We find 
our appellate court just went to word processing recently, 
updating procedures. I mean, there's a whole array of 
things that are simply good management, good organizational 
development that have not been put in place. California court 
management has been moribund. And so long before we need to ask 
whether we can afford to allocate this much resources to good 
justice, we'd need to implement all these things. And I'm 
we can do it. 
ific question -- two of them: First of all, half of 
criminal load, we understand is DUI. Isn't it time for DUI 
to an administrative function rather than a judicial function? 
HANST: I certainly think it's time for that to be 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Will your committee look into 
that? 
MR. HANST: Certainly, we can. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Okay. 
MR. HANST: Again, within our limited resources. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I'm not sure we need a full 
Rand study. I mean, I think any attorney -- well I shouldn't say 
that. Most of the old hands in Los Angeles could have told us 
what she us, if they'd just thought it through, without 
major study. 
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MR. HANST: It may be time for us to look at several 
areas. I mean, you know, many years ago we set up a separate 
procedure, a separate process for workman's compensation. 
we have to look at certain areas and deal with them and treat 
them specially in order to give our system more time. But I 
think what I'd like to leave with you is that you shou I 
think, try to look for ways, try to be receptive to changes 
procedure •.• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We're receptive. 
MR. HANST: ••. and process that will bring about 
the litigation process to early resolution rather than the 
problem we now have. Lawyers don't settle cases until 're 
faced with a trial. 
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Right. Which is a function of 
the judges, which is a function .•• 
MR. HANST: No, no ••. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: ... of their popularity ••. 
MR. HANST: Oh, no it's not • 
ASSEHBLY.t-A..AN STIRLING: ... with the lawyers. 
MR. HANST: No, I disagree 'l.vith you. I don't think 
that's a function of the judges. I think that's a problem of our 
system. A judge cannot make a lawyer settle a case until he 
confronts that lawyer with trial, when there are no other teeth, 
or no other •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Right. The setting of 
date, though, is the availability of the courtroom which is a 
function of the management of the court which is a function of 
the superior presidings •.. 
MR. HANST: If it were that simple, Mr. Sti ing, 
answers wou very easy, but it is not a function ••. 
ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING: Well, my superior pres 
the last three years in San Diego County assure me direct 
that simple. They set -- when they have a courtroom, they 
And if they have any doubt that this guy is ready they set 
for trial. And it's funny how quickly the thing gets re 
lmd they've brought their backlog just tumbling down. 
MR. HANST: What we have to do also is make the 
litigants want to solve their problems. You have a bill 
in the Senate right now, Senate Bill 1277, having to do 
attorneys' fees. That bill was approved by the State Bar 
Legislative Committee only, at this point, but the purpose 

















, then you 
case 
that 
approach, I understand, was recently adopted and has 
successfully ... 
MR. HANST: that's the exact opposite •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, no, no. Not at all. 
Specializing -- I mean, in California we have the worst of 
We have process management, which means nobody's accountable 
the case. What the federal courts have, in a way -- their tax 
judges and that sort of thing are specialists in a subject 
also have accountability for the case from filing to deci 
the fact that they specia ze doesn't mean that it's 
with the case's specific calendaring. I think the 
calendaring we have California is an absolute disaster. 
Nobody's accountable for a case. The superior presiding j 
comes and goes and so nobody's there. The feds are 
for their case and they specialize. And I think it's time for us 
to look at that:-too. 
some me 
Well on the face of it, specializ 
across the board, if we can make it work. 
ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING: Individual calendaring, 
does too. But California judges don't particularly 
because it s them more accountab , unfortunately. 
MR. HANST: or Tom, do have any 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Mr. Chairman, I just 
a statement because I think you're the appropriate 
the statement to. And I think ought to be part of 
discuss ly part of the debate in terms 
laws s hearing, or any legislative action. 
I that it is the nature of the adversary 
and advocates function in that system, to do all 
they're red as a professional to do -- required 
profess s in terms of representing their cl 
I think when we talk about doing all we can to 
clients, we're not only talking about doing our st 
researching timely with our motions, 
rapport with the court, we may in some instances even 
about identi the weaknesses of the court and 
those sses I'm not saying every lawyer does 
I wouldn't be surpri if we found some 
I 
that 





there's one: the courts, 
But in reality we're all lawyers in 
think that if we don't develop a commitment, 
of the courts, but also on the part of the 
those courts, that we need --




you made was on 
most important statement 
We 11 focus on that. 
MR. HANST: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS 
add, gentlemen? Thank 
much. 
much for coming. 
All right. Our next witness 11 be Mr. Ralph 
the Administrative Director of the Courts and Secretary 
1 
1 Council. Mr. Gampell. Good morning, how are you? 
MR. RALPH GAMPELL: I'm well, thank you. 
CHAIRY~N HARRIS: I'm I missed the meeting 
We you'll be available on the 19th, 
Mr. full Council meeting. 
Great. bit of housekeeping 
there. 
MR GAMPELL: M.r. Chairman, members, my name is 
Gampell. I'm the Administrative rector of the Courts. And I'd 
like to discuss one or two matters, but before I get into a 
presentation, I'd like to address one matter that Assemblyman 
Calderon raised. I hope the Judie 1 Council at it's November 
the 19th s seal of approval on a project 
It's been a 
be treated very 
set of uni 
other areas 
carefully, 
s, and I 
I hope we will promulgate 
the handling of law and motion. 
s of toes have 
that will be 
11 then go on 




beginning, se ll a lot more ings that 
you want to I'd l to discuss with 
our findi You may recall 
was 1978 s '79 to sunset at 
of '84; and SB 810, of last session, 
continued j cial of December of '8 
That original s requi ial Council to 
examine judicial arbitration to the Governor 
the Legis r of '84. That 
report has Council, will go 
full Council on 11 go to the Governor 
and the s s I believe that 
changes will essentia be cosmetic between now and 





cutoff was cases that were 
le determination, to 
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j '79 and '82. And you'll remember or more 
judges was a statutory size of court which judicial 
However, we that there was no some 
courts, most courts, the 
filing the at issue memorandum and the going to l. 
We believe s is a blip which 11 eventually show a 
reduction. Because 's quite interesting to watch, courts 
that have other techniques in reducing the time between at 
issue trial, you find it along like that and all of 
it drops off. That is, as you attack your civil active 
list there seems to be a critical point. You see it in counties 
1 , Santa Clara, where it drops -- particularly 
Sacramento and then it off suddenly and you get a 
1 24 going down to 7 in months. Quite suddenly. We bel 
may well in Los Angeles. They are on a 
curve as far as civi active st time is concerned. But we 
lieve that mandatory judicial arbitration may show quite a 




that the inc 
courts unanimously tell us that arbitration is a 
tool. Now, what is the opposite si ? 
rate of contested trials, as far as we can te 
at least can't tell whether not the rate 
ls has been reduced because of judicial 
The reason we can't tell that, of course, is we've 
study; we've no double bind: this case to 
case not to Now, it's 
down 
category of PI, 
Between '80 and 
of contested trials has gone down, and 
remarkably. In our statistics we have one 
Motor Vehic : Personal ury, Motor 
's gone down 34%. Contested trials 
34%. In r 
1 complaints, 






s of PI cases, 12.4%. In 
s is gets a bit edgy, 
cases, s of that sort. 
cate that some 
Not neces , Mr. Chairman. It 
le those case are not of 
the settlement of cases 
settl cases. And may 
mean, and I was ginger moving in this area, 
may mean that some k of cases a kind of rather 
tutional amount of work in keeping your word processor 
going. The who handle big contract cases are used to 
flippi and out comes the request for discovery. 
more you have and the more answers you 
the more motions you have, the more you bill client 







, both on the criminal and the civil sides 
I was wondering if the Judicial Council has 
I don't have criminal stati 
s was a civil hearing, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. GAMPELL: It is -- well again, anecdotally. As 
as civil, and I'll discuss criminal within just one moment, s 
largest civil filing category is family law. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. GAMPELL: And that decreased by about 5% in '82, 
th the largest decrease in Los Angeles, Orange and Santa 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
me 
MR. GAMPELL: And our most recent figures, and this may 
not reflect the incidence of Prop 8 because there are so 
other factors involved in that. We find that about almost 90%, 
88.3% of cases are disposed of before any trial. And 
only about 8% red jury trials. And it was until recent 
our experience that criminal only took somewhere, depending on 
the courts, 25% and 30% of all judicial resources. Now 
it is clear, again I must say anecdotally, also as 
figures are , that DUI is putting big pressure on 
municipal courts. But when, I think it was Assemblyman 
a , can be disposed of administratively, or -- I 
it was. 




have in that 
prohibit 
s a mandatory prison sentence. And 
can't be sent to jail by an administrator 
of people on my list that I would 
, but there are certain constitutional 
Could you give us or could 
us a cases that are hitting our system, 
civil , and then, again, the percentage of those 
cases, ly and by percentile? In other words, 
the criminal cases of a certain type, or 25% of them a 
type. I 1 m trying to get a handle on whether or not we need to 
look at a ific course of action, i.e., to deal with 




GAMPELL: Yes. I believe that our annual 





watches very we 
You don't have to watch 
herself. 
that context, there are 
a judge to do. He's an e 
of ssures on judges which I 
ought Any judge who is really tough is 
to have a o troub He's going to be unpopular in Bar 
He may find a contested election with one of these popularity 
polls saying 's not very sweet. And that's run in the 
he 1 s middle of a contested election with a 
people mad at him and he doesn't get the support from 
cow~unity. everybody is ready to take a cheap shot 
judge has really gone on the line to try to help 
along. It's not an easy thing to say to somebody, "I'm 
you cannot a continuance. I know it's your wedding and 
whatever, the court's full of witnesses and lawyers 
you've got to go." 
But Ralph, be realistic. How many 
judges attacked on the issue that re 
too tough? 
MR GAMPELL: It's very hard to tell. It doesn't 
as "too tough," it shows as "not polite," or whatever else 
buzzword is. 
de 
MR. GAMPELL: No. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh. 
But you don't want to be in a 
if a judicial poll, the 
practice 
"understanding," or 
say you're not, whatever the 
something like that. 
1 
CHAIRMAN HARRI : Most of those polls only matter 
MR. GAMPELL: 1 no. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. GAMPELL: Oh, no, Mr. Chairman, with 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, please. 
_...;.__ _ Those polls will be picked up , by the Chronicle, which says, 






MR. Trials de novo tended to be 
amongst contract cases. And again, 
One, dislike of 
process. By the 
I've made to 
that it's 
that a complex case is 
I think a complex case is a case 
and a lot of motion practice and where the 
spute, but where the law is usually quite 
malpractice case, you're not going to 
subrogation case, the asbestos case, 
There are llions of parties. 
which the Judicial Council became 
to be appointed to hear the 
fferent law firms. It's a 
s size, but the lavr is abso 
in that particular case. 
So when Mr. Hanst is 
not necessarily 
MR. GAMPELL: No. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: He's talking physical 
st, Mr. 
those are the 
Why be 
wou go to 




Mr. Gampell, fol 
s 
Have 1 
Yes, not only have 
courts 
1 j has word processing. 
Has their 
i 
now, or are to learn to use 
's more 







Yes, I be so. 
I must add that 
But we have a 
STIRLING: s is a 
GAMPELL: No. Under 












But in trying to have commiss s do 
re really affecting is that you're dumping 
s that otherwise the state would have to 
UNIDENTIFIED Not bad. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Even in traffic court? 
MR Oh no, I'm sorry. When you have a 
commissioner , the problems are rather subordinate. 
time that 's jail hovering over here, no commissioners. Now 
whether or not, for example, the TAB experiment is cost ef 
the islature is going to receive, I'm sure, tons of 
al on from TAB, from analysts, from teamsters 
Everybody is to get into that dispute. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MF. GAMPELL: And we are not in a position, because that 
is not data that we collect ... 
MR. GAMPELL: ... as to whether or not TAB is cost 
effective. n general, whether or not you use a commiss 
or a judge, the actual money saving is $10,000 or $15,000 a 
A commiss in Los Angeles, I think gets 85% of 
salary of a j difference from the state's 









for a judge, you pay or you were 
also you were paying general 
So all you've done there is you've a 
the 1 cost. 
that 
that we 
you take all the 
to the state. 
be dea 
They wou 
fourths of a j s 
of counties 
does, for example. 
traf court 




, sure. It would work well. 
some way is going to be cost e 
out. The cost ef s •.. 
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• 
• GAMPELL ••• and we see jury trials ••• 
s of as an is 
HARRIS: 
GAMPELL: But every one of these -- well, 
tradit hope we'll go on doing it ••• 




Council issues a 
MR. GAMPELL: ••• have gone into submitting it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
For example, discovery: the not 
all of a sudden lawyers began to crank 











It isn't altogether true. There 
we'd have a fairly extended analysis of 
1 Rules of Civil Procedure .. 
HARRIS: 




any member of the Judie 
we back to the old 
s into court blind and 
to an enormous amount of 
of the cases and say, 
Okay. 
s hard, other than ust 
, to come up with a set o answers 
viable. 
I understand. We can 
to see if we can a 
-4 
prioritization of the problems. In other words, we ought to be 
able to come , and to say, "Look, here are the things we 
ought to focus on. Here are some things that we recognize as 
problems. We can't do anything about them, either because the 
Legislature has not taken action, or because the funds aren't 
available to " I'm really frustrated because we can't even 
agree on the problems. Everybody says, "Yeah, well, the problem 
is there's inefficiency. Or, yeah, the problem is there are not 
enough judges." Those are all so simplistic. We keep having 
these hearings and we can never focus on our approach. How are 
we going to tackle the problem? How are we going to eliminate 
the need for more judges as the only solution to dealing with 
backlogs and to dealing with dispute resolutions? 
MR.GAMPELL: Let me see if I can answer that by voicing 
some of my own concern. I said, I think, once before, before 
this committee that there is no question that you can address 
which has a statewide significance. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
l4R. GAM.PELL: For example, I can name you some big coun-
ties in this state that have no backlog problems whatsoever. 
tell you 
CHAI~AN HARRIS: Sure. I understand. 
So, what do I answer about those? I can 
got there. 
CHAIPY~N HARRIS: Right. 
MR. GAMPELL: But equally well, I can also, in just 
laying that out, I can say, look, Los Angeles has some structural 
problems. The branch courts that were imposed on the superior 
court are ly unmanageab 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. GAMPELL: Now, I don't know whether -- it seemed 
that to me. 't presume, with Judge Peetris and Mr. Zolin 
here1 to say that as an article of faith. But it does seem to me 
that re are a great many management difficulties that were 
imposed on that court in which they had no part whatsoever. Past 
supervisors had interest in locating a branch court here or a 
court there. Those are structural problems. 
CHAIFPAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. GAMPELL: Judge Peetris, I'm sure, will discuss the 
management problems that are inherent in a court of that size. 
I'd be sted to discuss with you and with him whether or not 
that court somewhere down the line might be broken down into 
smaller courts. 
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se are very subtle problems. 
that the courts that 
reduced their backlog. 
brought in lots of 
are 10 of you here. 
go to trial. You'd 
point is, those 
se as good management 
a good answer. I want to 
1 doesn't think that 
We've got to solve these 
stion about it. I 
some ipatory, as opposed to 
Council. I look to you and try 
perspective on the issues. But 
I'm going to throw 
if I can get it through 
through. 
to the thing that Mr. Hanst 
lpful if we could talk 
of time to say, look, 
work for this, 
the advance notice. 
's not a question, because 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't want to deal with it from the 
standpoint of hostility or antagonism, because I'm telling you, 
I'm going to do something. I don't even know what yet. But I'm 
going to do something. Because this -- really, this is crazy. 
There's no use in Chuck being here, or Larry, or Sunny, or any of 
the rest of us if we do not see a problem and offer some 
solution, even if it's the wrong one. We've got to get off of 
the dime, and move towards implementing some change, because 
what's going on at this point isn't working. And I'm telling 
you, we can't solve it by adding more judges. That's the only 
thing I realize. 
MR. GAMPELL: I never said that ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I don't say you did, Ralph, and I 
wasn't putting you on the defensive. I'm just saying where I'm 
coming from, that's all. 
MR. GAMPELL: I'm always scared about one thing ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. GAMPELL: •.• and that goes back to my old British 
Royal Air Force days. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. GAMPELL: And that was a commanding officer who 
, "Don't stand there, do something." 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MR. GAMPELL: That always bothers me. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. GAMPELL: And that's why I think we ought to look at 
to what extent is the system already righting itself. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. GAMPEL: And it may very well be in the process of 
doing a lot of very good things. 
CHAIID""..AN HARRIS: Well, I'd like to hear that from 
Judicial Council, too. 
MR. GAMPELL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: If the system is righting itself and 
all I need to do is stand by and observe, then I'm willing to be 
on the sidelines. 
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Well, clearly, it's doing it in a lot of 
All right. Oh yes, I mean, Alameda 
question about that. But I'm 
the state. 
Sacramento County's better; San 
small. .• 
GAMPELL: Mr. Chairman, these are not small 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. We're going to have a 
week to see how Larry Stirling puts 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Mr. Chairman. 
They're scared of Larry. He knows 
--~--~~----C~A~L~D_E_R_O~N_: Let me just make a statement 
que , and maybe the question will be all. 
need to answer. But this whole conversation that 
last 10 minutes reminds me of this 
sement that I saw about this medium sized 
sing for a lawyer -- a one-armed lawyer. This 
called -- because I thought that was unusual 
was some handicapped federal provision 
with but -- When he called back, I said, why 
one-armed lawyer? He said, because every 
the past always, when we asked him a 
an answer and then says, however, on the other 
This translates into a legitimate 
at a minimum. Do you believe that 
of addressing these problems that we 
solutions to, with respect to the 
courts and a more efficient administration 
Yes, but I don't believe -- I believe it's 
And I'm not -- this is just not a 
lieve that lawyers will be tugged from two 
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directions. For some lawyers, it's a public service. For other 
lawyers, it's a rice bowl issue. Obviously, if you're in a law 
firm that makes a lot of money by grinding out discovery 'til 
it's this high, you don't want to see civil discovery reduced. 
However, the organized Bar, it seems to me, is making, I mean, a 
very determined effort. It will need the cooperation of the 
judicial branch; it will need the cooperation of the Judicial 
Council; most importantly it will need the cooperation of the 
Legislature. And there will be some very tough people trying to 
stop you from doing it, because a lot of people like a lot of 
discovery. A lot of principals, not lawyers, a lot of principals 
back East want a lot of discovery. And they're going to bring 
pressure on you not to reduce it. 
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much, Ralph. We 
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Davies. All right, Mr. Campbell, 
would you please have a seat. You're going to talk to us about 
electronic recording, is that right? 
MR. CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL: Well, as among a number of 
elements in the new technology. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Great. If you could summarize and 
then if you have anything to add for the record, we'd appreciate 
it. We've gotten our general statements now from the State Bar, 
from Judicial Council, and from the Rand Corporation. We're 
going to move very rapidly now and you're going to be the first 
one to demonstrate that principle. 
MR. CAMPBELL: I will try my best, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the 
Assembly Judiciary Committee, my name is Christopher Campbell. I 
am a consultant to the Edmund G. "Pat 11 Browr.. Institute of 
Government Affairs. Prior to this, I served in a full-time 
capacity as the Institute's associate director and general 
counsel for a period of three and one half years. 
On behalf of our Honorary Chairman, former Governor 
Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, our Chairman of the Board, Mr. Russell B. 
Pace, Jr., and the Chairman of our Criminal Justice Committee, 
Dr. Walter Zelman, I want to thank you on behalf of the Institute 
and the members of our Criminal Justice Committee for this 
opportunity to address you today. 
The Edmund G. "Pat" Brown Institute of Government 
Affairs is a fully recognized 501C3, nonpartisan, tax exempt 
educational organization. Through programs such as conferences, 
seminars and independent research projects, we attempt to bring 
people together and involve them in the discussion of many of the 
important issues facing the people of California. We wish to 
commend you for your ongoing search to find new ways to make our 
judiciary and justice systems more efficient. 
-45-
An area which we have been vitally concerned with for 
some now deals with the role that technology can play in 
search. With the quantum leaps that are taking place in 
s area, it is incumbent upon all of us to consider what these 
logies hold as potential for our future. For the past 
several months, under a grant awarded by the Los Angeles County 
of Supervisors, we have been looking specifically at: 
(1) How telephones might be utilized to facilitate 
greater counsel representation; 
(2) how computer-aided transcription and electronic 
recording may be employed so as to lower overall 
court transcript costs; and, 
(3) how the justice system might benefit by the use of 
expanded applications of face-to-face video. 
The key to our approach has been to seek out means which 
encourage cooperative effort between bench, Bar, public and 
sectors. We found at the outset that any attempt to 
reduce change involving technology stands a much greater 
chance of success if those who are potentially impacted have the 
opportunity to plan for its implementation. We have been pleased 
with the willingness of these parties to participate in seeking 
to develop the most effective applications for these various 
logies. 
Beginning next week we will issue the first in a series 
dealing with our research efforts. While discussion 
our specific recommendations will, as I'm sure you can 
rstand, have to wait until such time as we formally make our 
sentation to the Board of Supervisors, I do wish to share a 
thoughts today on those issues I just mentioned. 
We believe that telephone technology represents and 
lized resource for addressing justice system needs. The 
physical presence by counsel, while obviously an 
sirable situation under many circumstances, has very little 
others. We have identified a number of areas where 
telephonic conferencing could be employed with the goal of 
client charges and maximizing attorney and judicial 
ciency. Among these areas are: law and motion hearings; ex 
e hearings; pretrial conferences; discovery motions; and 
s conferences. 
Similarly, expanded video applications are becoming more 
apparent. 
How far are you along in the analysis of using the 
as a way of dealing with those kinds of problems? 
MR. CAMPBELL: We are substantially moved forward on it. 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: So we can look forward to some pros 
and cons on those ideas and a list of a number of areas where a 
telephone might be useful ••• 
MR. CAMPBELL: Right. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Good. 
MR. CAMPBELL: With the rapidly growing availability of 
technology, video contacts can be used in many circumstances 
without prejudice to an accused's right of a fair and public 
hearing. Among systems currently in use are video arraignments 
in misdemeanor matters and, under the terms of AB 177 enacted 
earlier this year, for felony arraignments on a limited basis, 
where all parties agree. 
Video teleconferencing is also being used successful 
for public defender and probation officer/client interviews. 
Among the benefits realized by these systems are lower 
transportation costs, increased frequency of client contact, and 
reduced client hostility. 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in conjunction with the search to 
find alternatives for traditional shorthand reporting methods, we 
believe that the time has come for greater use of both electronic 
recording and computer-aided transcription in the production of 
official court records. We believe that a combination of all 
three systems is warranted; but while the technology exists, 
issue presents complex questions of a labor and management nature 
as well. The overriding issue in this area is whether the 
reporter associations and court administrators can form effective 
compromise programs. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You think that the biggest problem, 
then, as it relates to court reporting is the labor/management 
problem and not the technology? 
~-1:R. CAMPBELL: Yes, sir. In remarks to this committee 
in March of 1981, you, Mr. Chairman, stated that the time was 
coming soon for the greater use of electronic recording and that 
it was up to court administrators and the reporting community to 
develop new approaches. Our research has found, unfortunately, 
that very little of the necessary compromise has indeed taken 
place. 
As I said at the outset, next week we will be offering 
some specific recommendations. We would hope you and the membe 
of the committee would watch closely in the efforts that we 
believe will ensue. And again, I want to thank you for this 
opportunity to talk to you today, and we look forward to worki 
with you in the future. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. We will look forward to 
that advice. I did think that something was going to have to be 
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get a scholar and 
lp us all. 

















CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any estimate of cost 
savings? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Pardon? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any estimate of cost 
savings? 
MR. SULLIVAN: The prior estimate in the prior example, 
GAO talked about a $10 million cost savings nationwide, if 
adopted. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: That's what percent of the actual cost 
now? 
MR. SULLIVAN: I'm not aware of the ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
a $100 million. 
You don't know if it's $15 million or 
MR. SULLIVAN: So, with those additional pieces of 
evidence, I want to conclude; but, again, as Chris Campbell noted 
earlier, the real issue is not so much of proof on one side or 
the other, whether or not savings occur in particular tests or 
not, but it's really whether or not the Legislature is going to 
keep on the books an anticompetition law, in effect. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Your perspective is the state of the 
art is not the problem. The question is whether or not, in fact, 
the Legislature is going to meet the concern of the court 
reporters that their jobs may be jeopardized as a result of the 
increased technology. Is that right? 
MR. SULLIVAN: Right. Absolutely. There's great 
tradition in this area of recording the printed word. In the 
14th century we had the calligraphers. They probably had an 
association. They got on the books a law which took on the 
threat of woodblock carving that was going on then. And they had 
a law that forbid the duplication of images. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: That's a very cute analogy. 
MR. SULLIVAN: And evidently that was eventually 
overcome, although some of the early testimony on what word 
processors are doing to us, your committee may want to analyze 
the repeal of that ••. 
CHA.IRMA.N HARRIS: We would appreciate seeing one if your 
association does any analysis of estimated costs savings. That 
would help us, I think, in understanding the balance between the 
jobs that would be eliminated and the benefit to the public in 
terms of cost. If the cost difference is minuscule, then I think 
that would, in fact, be a very weighty conclusion. 
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to ju 
MR. SULLIVAN: Right. 
CHAIRP~N HARRIS: If the cost is substantial, then I 
will be a much harder burden on the court reporters 
their continued dominance in this area. 
MR. SULLIVAN: We don't really think it has to be a 
matter of job elimination. It's a matter of really converting 
the same people. In many instances, just changing the kind of 
equipment that they use. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, all right. 
SULLIVAN: That happens all the time in many 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I appreciate it very much. Thank you. 
right, now I'd like to have Mr. Gene Lokey and Mr. Dennis 
rth. Come forward please. Gentlemen, welcome. 
MR. EUGENE LOKEY: Thank you. 
MR. DENNIS PEBWORTH: Thank you. 
MR. LOKEY: My name is Gene Lokey. I am the Legislative 
Advocate and the Executive Director of the Electronic Reporting 
Association, and wish to make some brief comments and a few 
sugge And I have Dennis, who is a live electronic 
currently in practice in Los Angeles County .•• 
CHAIRP..AN HARRIS: This is a "live" electronic reporter? 
MR. LOKEY: Let me explain that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You have dead electronic reporters? 
MR. LOKEY: Well, there's a .•• 
MR. PEBWORTH: And that maybe tells you what you asked 
me to say 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right, all right, go ahead. No 
MR. LOKEY: I appreciate the comments of the previous 
re to the notion that the argument is no 
focused on the technology: do we have the equipment? The 
entertained a bill two years ago at which time experts 
the country were invited to present the evidence 
to committee on that matter. And furthermore, electronic 
reporting California is not something new, because since 1976, 
Government Code §72194.5, has authorized proceedings in 
ipal or justice courts provided that there is no court 
r available. So in a sense, we're only talking about 
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expanding the use of electronic reporting, not starting the use 
of e 
This year a bill was enacted which goes into effect 
1st, which provides that in the Administrative 
Procedures Act that if all the parties agree, under the 
Admini Procedures Act you may have electronic reporting. 
And f ly, in the omnibus bill that dealt with the 
whole area of education, a provision was inserted into the 
conference report in SB 813 which said: "A record of the hearing 
shall be made and the record may be maintained by any means 
including electronic recording, so long as a reasonably accurate 
and complete written transcription of the proceedings can be 
It 
At this point I'd like to turn over the testimony to 
Dennis Pebworth, and then at the conclusion, I have about four or 
five speci suggestions. 
CHAI~mN HARRIS: Do you have any cost estimates, Mr. 
? 
MR. Pardon me? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any cost estimates as to 
the amount of money that could be saved? 
It depends upon whether you mean a full 
c system ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MR. LOKEY: That is almost -- no numbers there. Where 
savings is the difference in two areas, and 
would pay a person, be it a certified shorthand 
or a certified electronic reporter or a monitor. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. LOKEY: There is a cost savings there. 
CHAIRM..l\N HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. LOKEY: The second thing is whether or not you pay 
for dictation process. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. LOKEY: And finally, whether or not you modify the 
rate. 
CHAIR~Jill HARRIS: Okay. 
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MR. LOKEY: So those are the three variables that you 
cost. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Can you give us cost figures on those? 
MR. LOKEY: We will try. 
CHAIRY~N HARRIS: All right. 
MR. LOKEY: Under separate cover. 
CHAIR¥~ HARRIS: Thank you. Mr. Pebworth. 
MR. PEBWORTH: Thank you very much. I approach this a 
little bit differently because I earn my -- I actually attempt to 
pay my bills with this business. I do these hearings of -- I do 
principal federal work. 1 do this type of hearing for the U.S. 
House of Representatives two or three times a week, and I'm in 
court at least every day. 
problem when I listen to this debate is that we keep 
·talking past other. We're using the same words, but they 
mean different things to different people. ER is almost a 
generic term, or electronic reporting, and it means different 
things to different people based upon the arguments being made. 
It can be anything from a shiny 128 channel machine with bells 
and whistles buttons and somewhere the tapes get sent out and 
transcribed perhaps as if it were a robot. It could be a 
portable thing perhaps. For example, like we have here, 
which is s lar to the equipment I use as a matter of fact. 
I work lly in the federal system. I report for some 25 
different 1 agencies. And I do understand electronic 
reporting, because I do it every day, and the problems. 
But we have is, there's no central control in ER. 
It takes a of forms. The format that I use is an exact 
paral 1 to what a CSR (Certified Shorthand Reporter} does. I go 
to a courtroom; I bring my own equipment. My kit, my complete 
rig, costs less $1,000. I'm a subcontractor to these 
different I go in, I record it, I take it home, I 
produce the transcript, I sign off on it. I am responsible for 
it. And I rear end, so to speak, on the line saying that 
this is the record and I'm responsible for it. It's thousands of 
pages. Tens of thousands of pages are produced electronically in 
the federal system. It's very, very extensively used. And 
actually successful. 
ASSEMBLY~~N CALDERON: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr. Calderon. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Explain to me: Whenever in 
situations where a portion of the record needs to be reread at 
some later in the proceeding perhaps an hour later and it's 
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a particular reference to a conversation occurring between two 
parties that has now become a paramount issue in whatever 
proceeding, and you need to go back and find that. How do you do 
that? 
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes, that happens all the time. I do 
that routinely, yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: And so you just have to go back 
there and keep listening to the tape until ••• ? 
MR. PEBWORTH: While the proceedings are being recorded 
electronically, of course they're monitored witn a small ear 
piece, and I take copious notes, which is being done over here. 
I hope anyway. I take copious notes, and the notes identify 
every speaker each and every time he speaks and it also performs 
a structure of the hearing: direct and cross and voir dire and 
the marking of exhibits. I can find any portion of the testimony 
in a matter of minutes. If it was an hour ago or if it was even 
yesterday, I can find it, based on my system of taking notes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: So ••. 
MR. PEBWORTH: I can read back the pending question, 
which happens a lot. "Reporter, could we have that question back 
again?" I can do that in about 10 seconds. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: All right, if you were recording 
s hearing and I said, "All right, now what was that statement 
~4r. Hanst made with respect to the State Bar's position?" And 
you were recording this hearing. 
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes, I could find it. 
AS SEMBLY:t'..AN CA.LDERON: And I could say, you know, "Could 
court reporter please relay back that •.• " 
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes, I could find it. 
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: And how long would it take you to 
that? 
MR. PEBWORTH: Three or four minutes -- if it were way, 
way back in the testimony. That doesn't happen that often, but I 
could find it in a few minutes. 
I want to explain, define the word "reporter," because 
s is what's causing an immense amount of passion and confu-
sion. I spoke at a conference of shorthand reporters last April 
Newport Beach, one of their annual meetings. And a young lady 
afterwards approached me and she said, "How dare you call 
yourself a reporter?" And she was gesturing as if typing on a --
you know. She said, "You don't report, you record." Well now, 
"ree-cordn and "wreck-urd" (phonetic) are the same word. It's a 
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verb or it's a noun, okay? And I asked her, I said, "Well, what 
is it you produce?" And she , 11, I produce a verbatim 
record." And I said, "Well, I do too. I mean, we make the same 
product, don't we?" It's a di without a difference, 
whether you report it or you record it, because actually on a 
stenograph you are indeed recording the proceedings. 
difference is the device we use, because the stenograph is indeed 
a recording device. And it's a distinction without a difference. 
We produce the same product; we only use different ces. And 
my question to all of you and to anybody is, if I could do in 
cuneiform and bake the little clay tablets in my portable battery 
powered microwave, as long as I could do it quickly and 
accurately, what possible dif would it make? 
UNIDENTIFIED: I'm just sed we're not. 
MR. PEBWORTH: In other words, why don't we talk about 
the product instead of fussing about the method? There's an 
emphasis on technology that is sturbing to those of us who work 
on it. To cast a debate as man versus machine is vic , 
because the record -- only a ng can be re le for 
the record. You can't take a machine leave it. You can have 
a whole range of disasters that can occur if you've got an 
unattended machine. Only a human can take the 
responsibility for the record. The reporter, in our definition, 
is the individual who goes to courtroom; goes to get and 
bring back the record and signs off on it and says, " s is the 
record of proceedings." And I , whether it was 
cuneiform or whether it was written in Sanskrit, who cares? If 
it's accurate, that's what we're after, that's the 1 thrust 
the product. The emphasis on technology, I submit, is complete 
splaced, or discussions about state of the art, and so forth. 
CHAIRMAN HARRI Excuse me. 
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The reason that we talk about 
technology is that we're talking about the cost savings that 
technology brings. We're not looking at it from the standpoint 
of man versus machine. We're looking at it from the standpoint 
of cost. Does it cost less and does produce the same product? 
This, I think, is very re Because the central question 
is, can we get a record that , can we get a record that 
is reliable, and at the same save money? If both of them 
cost the same, then that's a argument. 
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes, of course, but they don't cost 
same, which is the point I'm coming to, that this 
preoccupation with expensive and sophi cated equipment with 1 
kinds of gadgets and protections buzzers and whistles and 
things is completely misplaced. I do about 10,000 to 15,000 
pages a year for the federal and I do it a that 
costs less than $1,000. You -- routine court report 
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can be done with very modest equipment, the claims of some 
notwithstanding. The government -- instead of 
specifying people, they're trying to specify equipment, and this 
is where I think the emphasis is misplaced. If you had certified 
court , certified electronic reporters, who met all the 
same the stenograph reporters had in terms of 
academic requirements, in terms of schooling and spelling and 
grammar legal terminology and courtroom format -- I'm sorry, 
transcript format -- courtroom procedure and so forth, if all of 
these qualifications were met and you had certified people, you 
could the job and you wouldn't need multimillion dollar, 
fancy, sophisticated equipment. But it is, of course, 
politically difficult because of all the jobs that are involved, 
and I realize that it's very sensitive and that's somebody else's 
domain; not mine. But it's misplaced to worry about all of this 
comp equipment. For example, a stenograph doesn't have a 
little dashboard on it with blinking lights that says the 
ribbon's getting dry. Or a little blinking light that says the 
paper's almost run out. Or it doesn't have a little shock device 
for the fingers that says you're tired and you're getting shadows 







CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You've made the point. 
MR. PEBWORTH: Okay. There's not a law that says you 
put them in metal containers in case your house catches 
In other words, you certify the people and you say, 
job. You know it. You're trained. We trust you to 
're being paid to do." lmd that's all we're asking on 
, see. vze v1ant to compete. And if you open it to the 
, this is where the cost savings will occur. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Anything else you'd like to add? 
. PEBWORTH: I bel I've done it . 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Anything you want to submit for the 
11 be part of the hearing transcript. 
CHAI!Uf,AN HARRIS: Mr. Lokey, you have .•• 
MR PEBWORTH: Thank you. 
MR. The committee has before it a bill that will 
be dealing with the certification procedure. It 
bill, and we requested that the discussion take 
opponents and the proponents during the interim 
taken place on many occasions -- and we 
hope that the committee will look upon that bill talking about 
the certification. 
The second one is relative to the Government Code. A 
simple amendment would provide the expansion via the Judicial 
Council other courts. 
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MR. CRAMER: I think you should -- I suspect that you 
our written documentation. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. CRAMER: And we'd just like to add a few comments 
couple of comments first in regard to the proponent's of 
recording in terms of accuracy. If indeed electronic 
were all that accurate, it is clearly legal to be used 
lance field; and there's almost no electronic 
of depositions in this state anywhere. That's not to 
isn't any; however, we have a great deal of 
finding any place where indeed it is being used. 
Court reporters do indeed do more than routine 
And I suggest to you that perhaps the proponents of 
c recording weren't quite as totally candid with you as 
have been, to the extent that I suspect they have some 
costs for a transcript; what they would want to 
for a transcript and indeed how much money they would 
be paid to monitor that sa~e equipment. And I suggest 
I suspect, that it is exactly the same amount of 
I'm presently being paid if they're going to do it 
courtroom I'm doing it in. 
I last statement was that the same person 
it. Well I suggest to you, that's what's 
recording devices. If you're in the 
six hours a day and then you have to go home and 
cannot type it as fast as you hear it, because 
at 200 and 300 words a minute, most of the 
transcript is going to be paying that person the 
to take for preparing that transcript. And there 
savings that you may have had. 
to make a couple of comments on our written 
I notice that in several instances, by several of 
who have appeared here, they indicated that there's a 
complex cases. And I guess maybe our 
wherein we indicate that the cost of transcripts 
mostly as a result of long cases is really substantiated 
complex" cases should have been used instead of 
cases. 
I think it's important to indicate that we believe the 
Court is probably one of the very few courts in 
has an adequate monitoring system of reporters in 
they file transcripts in time. And that's why 
small number, percentage-wise, of reporters 'Vlho 
particularly those who file late chronically. 
I think the statement with regard to the Judicial 
on its own. We believe their present method of 
with us is terrible. Just to give you an example, 
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a proposal was supported by our association in San Diego -- I 
ieve it was a San Diego court -- had suggested 
there should be a Judicial Council change in rules to relate the 
size of the transcript to how to le it. As it 
stands now, whether the transcript is 10 pages or 10,000, we have 
exactly the same amount of to that transcript. And we 
suggest that's unreasonable. We that we be supported in a 
change. The Judicial Council re apparently to accept our 
arguments and to move on that issue. 
I think it is to 
study indicates that it re 
recorders. I think 's 
to provide documentation that would 
federal ER study is fatally flawed, 
specifics of that. 
that the federal ER 
for utilizing tape 
And 'd be happy 
to you that the 
not get into 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you want to submit something? 
MR. CRAMER: Yes, I' be 
We believe we are 
transcript regardless of 
whether you are using a tape 
reporter -- and that if the law 
use of tape recorders we 
official record. And I'd 




or a live shorthand 
changed to expand the 
the ones to type 
that a little bit 
With regard to -- and if I 
can refer that as CAT -- I' just a little bit 
about what we see coming, this is the area that 
you're probably going to be This is technology. 
This is technology , both now and in 
future. We did a , fie , but a study. 
Based on the results of our have about 25% of the court 
reporters -- the official is, those that work in 
the courtrooms across the State of ifornia -- who are 
utilizing CAT, computer-aided transcription. But I think the key 
is what is going to be happening the very near future in terms 
of interfacing with the court. CAT will allow us to provide a 
great deal of additional ce to without any 
additional expense to those court at state 
expense or at local expense. to be able to do, 
as an example, is col the rest of 
court area needs, department, the 
clerk's office, the myriad of people 
who are staff peop to that same 
data. With computer-aided take that 
information we're collecting the court and 
provide that information to other areas. That is, we 
have to collect who the are, what case they're on, the 
sposition of the cases. information that I heard 
Mr. Gampell refer to cou be collected by court reporters 
who are utilizing equipment. 
The hearing impaired has become a serious problem in 
some areas. Over the last couple of years, we've had about one 
hearing impaired defendant a month who we have had to provide a 
method whereby they can satisfy the legal requirements. We have 
doing that utilizing computer-aided transcription. That is, 
we have the ability to write on a modified stenotype machine 
11 instantaneously put the transcript on a screen for those 
are hearing impaired. 
I think that one of the major items, in terms of cost, 
is the fact that there is literally millions and millions of 
dollars being spent on the latest state of the art computer 
equipment for the efficient operation of the court without one 
dime of taxpayers money. This computer-aided equipment ranges 
anywhere from approximately $12,000 to $14,000 to about $50,000; 
between $50,000 and $60,000. These are expenses that are be 
absorbed totally by the court reporters. You'll notice a copy of 
a proposal from the Los Angeles Municipal Court reporters to the 
Los Angeles Municipal Court asking that court to participate in 
purchase of that kind of equipment. The theory is that by 
buying one master, or large system, we can generate sufficient 
to drive the cost down. The purchase of that equipment 
would result through a payment by the reporters for utilizing 
that equipment, a profit, as in private industry profit, that 
would help to offset the current and present cost of providing 
court reporting services. 
I think one of the issues to be concerned about is 
we're looking to save money in terms of providing court 
services; however, I think we have to look in terms o 
rnatives to what the present method costs. And I'm 
sting that where you have transcripts being generated, 
cost effective method of preparing transcripts is to utilize 
reporters, particularly who are utilizing computer-
transcription. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Have you done any cost studies? 
MR. CRAMER: Well, not in a dollar and cents method; 
however, what I'm suggesting to you is that a court reporter 
tionally takes about three times as long to prepare a 
transcript as he does to report it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. CRAMER: Utilizing this computer system, he would 
to utilize just one hour for each hour. A transcript out of 
a court, we generally figure it's about 35 pages an hour. What 
I'm suggesting to you is that a pretty good typist working from a 
is good for about 35 pages a day, not 35 pages an hour. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I see. 
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MR.CRAMER: We have a proposal here on the bottom of 
Two, where if you would, in one of our recommendations 
rhaps I should touch on this, because I think there's a 
ficant savings here. At present, in providing a daily 
that is, where the proceedings from the morning are 
for you this afternoon; the afternoon's proceedings are 
lable the following morning. The way the law is presently 
constructed it requires two reporters and the cost of those two 
to prepare that kind of a transcript. We're suggesting 
that if you amend the law so that there could be some 
logy fee, perhaps about half the cost of a per diem, at 
in r .. A. County, that would -- L. A. County presently pays 
reporter $150 a day. If we were able to get the law changed so 
we could receive a $75 additional in remuneration, we would 
in a position to prepare daily transcripts utilizing one 
reporter, resulting in a savings of $75 a day. We calcu-
there's approximately, and it varies from day to day, but 
approximately 15 criminal dailies going on per day in the L. A. 
Court. That translates into a quarter of a million 
a year in savings. We think that can be done 
ately, probably at the opening of the session. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: Wait a minute, how do we spend an 
75 and save $250,000? 
MR. CRAMER: Because you're presently utilizing $300 
of court reporting services because you're utilizing two 
reporters to generate a daily transcript. This would allow 
court reporter with an additional $75. So you're saving $75. 
're having a little problem with the tape recorder, are we? 
(Laughter) 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: That's cute. 
MR. CRAMER: One of the other problems we see in the law 
s you might be interested in addressing, is the fact 
according to the Legislative Counsel, there is a prohibition 
court, at least as viewed by the Legislative Counsel, in 
of this proposal we have to the L. A. Municipal Court. 
Counsel is telling us it is illegal for the court to 
ipate in the purchase of that equipment, and perhaps that's 
area you may want to address. We're obviously not asking 
you mandate that by any means, but perhaps some enabling 
slation in that area ••. 
CHAIR¥~N HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. CRAMER: We think that the communication between the 
Council and ourselves needs to be improved significantly 
we think that there is some harm to the system as a 
of the Judicial Council's unwillingness or inability to 
ly communicate with us and understand reporter problems. 
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not 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. Anything else you'd 1 to 




s area. It is one is 
we want to be constructive 
the realities that are being 
one of your very tell 
able to respond to it, but I can' 
of time. Your telling argument is 
it's not mandatory, people 't use 
depositions. Most of the 
Yes. And all requires is a 
ze ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I was interested in that because I 
o of the time, in my own law of , 
court reporters rather than electronic recording. I 
1 perhaps because it might be more cost effie 
MR. CRAMER: I think that what you would find in the ER 
because that's always controversial, but I think -- I 
that we can give you somewhat of an objective view 
what you would find is we could probably give you it 
demonstrating that, you know, we're terri 
are lousy and I suppose the proponents of 
give you it by the pound demonstrating, you know, 
and we're awful. I think what it really comes 
ask the fiscal officers in the courts where 
tell you it's working great. If you ask 
ze the transcripts, they'll tell you 's 
And if you ask the judges, you'll probably 
Those that are familiar with the 
you it's not working terribly well; 
court but transcripts are hardly ever 
to tell you it's working pretty good. 
MR. CRAMER: And I think that's really the bottom 1 
terms of information. 




ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Is the technology there so that 
--what's that kind of machine 
MR CRl\_MER: 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: ..• directly to a computer •.. 
MR. CRAMER: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: .•• on line and as you punch in 
MR CRAMER transcript. 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: .•• text? 
MR. CR~~ER: That's correct. 
ASSEMBLY~4AN STIRLING: Then it seems to me that would be 
enormous savings in transcription. Nowhere, though, have you 
cost of the transcripts is going to go down. 
s. 
CFAMER: Well isn't yet. I hope I'm correct when 
cost of this equipment is so expensive 
, that ... 
Why is it so expensive simply to 
1, the vendors have got us by the 
t very many of them, and for me to go out and 
would provide that service will cost me 
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING: What vendor, what brand name? 
MR CRAMER: Exscribe, down in San Diego. 
Exscribe. Oh, down in San Diego! 
MR. CRAMER: Yes, down in San Diego. 
Well, we're trying to help the economy of 
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large states of 
is telling us they want form 
're lling to piecemeal the 
assist local courts. And the courts have 
slature with legislative requests asking 
ssments; special fees. I know our courts in San 
before your committee within the last year 
to know where the money is going to be 
the firing line and we need to make sure 
we have for advancing, such as 
because of the budget considerations 
on a year-to-year basis. 
some comparisons of costs, and indicated in a 
Diego County that over a four-year period 
Court contributed $1.5 million to the 
of County of San Diego; and $19 million 
San Diego, just as one indication of the 
of P.C. 1463. 
being in the active role of 
ling generally an 
of judicial branch. But 
ing confusion, too much disparate impact 
courts are willing, I think, to through 
ff to begin to work with the 
a sensible solution on this. We do 
solution is, but we're more than 
reasons that perhaps the courts have 
as could have in areas such as 
technology is one of the first things to go 
ority of any court's budget has to do 
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I add one thing to that? 
been meet with district attorneys 
on this exhibit problem, especially the 
an to the federal matter of keeping 
•• destroying the rest, and I have gotten 
Okay. Well, if you can give us some 
s rational, then that might lp us to get 
I'd be glad to. 
Well, if you'd let us know as a 
these things are used, I think that 
lancing point, because it's not the district 
We've heard that before, you know: "All we 
want the records stored, and how they're stored 
're stored isn't our problem." 
I think their general attitude is the law 
, you know, we really don't care. 
But I 11 provide you that 
That would be great. We look forward 
much. 
, can you tell us why or what the ial 
s re to a study of the automation issue 
GAMPELL: Yes, sure, I'll be happy to. There's no 
secret about automation that's going on. 
at presiding judges' meetings, at 
' meetings. We know of automation in Los 
San Bernardino County; almost every big county 
cannot mandate automation, Mr. Chairman, 
a state mandated local cost. It's that 
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
All right, our next witness will be 
Peetris, the Presiding Judge of the 
Mr. Frank Zolin, the Past President of 
Association and the Executive Officer 
the Los Ange Superior Court. 
sticking it out through 
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s, Judge and to my right is 
Officer and Jury Commissioner. And at 
assure you that although the Los Angeles 
to limit to one which 
no means indicates that we're not 
sted, with you on any and 
Your name been in vain all 
wou want to ••. 
Well, IS I want to save a 
topic which do want to address 
of courts of the 
a point now the courts' costs 
available revenue is decreasing and we're 
more towards users' s. And although our 
ition -- not against the users' fees if 
effective and shifting the burden 
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rman fied to do 
the other testify here 
more qualified than we are. And we 
provide that kind of input so we're 
dark and we real the best kind 
we can have. So I want to encourage 
Committee and work with Chairman, and 
you're going to do 
Yes, I want to that my 
than next, put forth a 
11 lude a number of 
committee bills that will look at a whole 
, again, if you really are interested in 
'11 help with I want you to know 
we're ready to some things. And if 
We're going to play devil's advocate. 
, but if we can't kill them, we're going to 
going to see some changes. 
JUDGE PEETRIS: All right. We'll be glad to cooperate 
you. 
MR 
you, Thank Mr. 
Thank you very 
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s to honor 
answer, of course, is 
was the basis for 
the "squire." And 
view. Okay. I don't want 

~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
by Professor Langbine in 1981, University 
, called "Plea Bargaining and Torture." And 
plea bargaining to the old days when you 
witnesses or a judicial confession, and now 
"Let's Make a ," is 
thinks we have "Cut 'em Loose, Bruce" 
We don't! He's a j in New We 
CHAI~~ HARRIS: I know Bruce 
MR. CLEA.RY: He's a sweetheart. But, point is, in 
i , l!Je 've got "Godzilla, 11 "The Hammer of God, 11 11 The 
Prosecutor's " " Policeman's Friend," and I have not seen 
of i and the Legislature by se 
-- What you need to develop is a of 
you get some accountability of prosecutors on the 
they're bringing to criminal court; because you 
shouldn't the taxpayers with these fantastic costs for 
prosecuting "Mickey fvlouse" cases. And there's a lot of "Mickey 
Mouse" cases through the system. The uniform determinate 
sentenc has established the fact that we send more check 
writers thieves to the Joint than we did before. A 
great the Legislature can be proud of in handling our 
criminal system on the basis of priorities. 
want to 
Pre 
to also suggest an expanded escobar motion; 
where you have now, with the P.C. 17 reduction 
a misdemeanor, I would suggest that it also apply 
which the judge could determine realistically 
is not going to go to the Joint for more than a 
sent law, the judge has total discretion in 
which includes up to a year's time. It's only 
sentences that are regulated by the Legislature. 
st that that might be another alternative. 
hearing. I ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: How many of these have you got? 
Just two more. I'll be quickly, okay? 
you to sleep but that's all right, I've got •.. 
No you have not put me to sleep, I 
.HR I just want to make my and I 
ize ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, you ve got a lot of good points, 
is. So I want to make sure ... 
MR. CLEARY: No, this is condensed. 
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(Laughter) 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Alright. 
MR. CLEARY: Mr. Chairman, I have condensed it ... 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you! Thank youl 
MR. CLEARY: And I'm speaking at a rapid rate. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You are! 
MR. CLEARY: So that my record is protected .•. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. CLEARY: .•• but at the same time you're not 
burdened •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS Right. 
MR. CLEARY: With my voluminous comments. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Alright. 
MR. CLEARY: Preliminary hearing is the distillation of 
the case in the real sense. We have, in California, the leading 
thing. In criminal justice, California was the leader in getting 
this early shakedown cruise: look at the case, a minimal. Now 
you excuse certain witnesses from the preliminary hearing under 
the laws of California, but you get a look at the case, what it's 
really worth. Is this really a heavy-duty case, lightweight, 
multi; how it looks. You look at it early on. But now we want 
to get rid of it. 
And see, I come from the federal system. Welcome to the 
federal system. what do we have over there? Have you ever 
seen a preliminary hearing in federal court? How many have ever 
seen a preliminary hearing? First of all, they're rara avis: 
rare birds. They don't t. Because if you get a grand jury 
indictment, you never have one. And then if you have one, hear-
say upon hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay. That is 
to say, an agent gets on the stand and testifies to extracted 
report, and that s hearing. Sick. Illegally 
seized evidence which cou otherwise be attacked for (inaudible) 
can't be heard. Preliminary hearings are nothing. And so what 
you have to do is save up and say, if you•re going to roll the 
dice, you've got to go to trial. You're taking a tremendous 
burden when you could have had early resolution by looking at the 
case through a liminary hearing pushed up to the trial date. 
Grand j The federal grand jury was designed as a 
shield to protect the accused. It's been turned into a sword. 
And ironically, a state prosecutor has led the reform in the ABA, 
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because he himself was object of a grand jury investigation. 
And I only pray every night that our State Legislature would too 
be the subject of a grand j investigation, because then they 
would know what it's really they wou:!_dn't be so 
quick to issue it out izens of this state. And 
therefore the ABA s now 4 Illinois and New 
York adopted at least the right counsel be present in the 
thing. And you want to bring s anachronistic vestige of 
the past, this antediluvian device of the federal system and use 
it in the California procedures. I think it is 10 steps 
backwards, and call that progress. 
The last , and you heard from the 
D.A. from San I happen to be from your 
district and I'd into the problems 
there, they're selling you a bill of goods. That stuff could 
make defense lawyers "puke," and we don't have the time here to 
give you an itemized rejection of each and every point. But 
summing up very simply , 's adopting the federal system. 
And the ironic thing, in the federal system they look to 
California fede models. Why? Because 
usually the came from the state 
system, have , that is now sold to the 
rest of the We a system where we 
couldn't get of that motion 
suppression. We finally got -- when did we get them? 1886? 
1936? 1 August 1983. rst time, the McCarthy era Jenks 
Act was modified to g statement that early to examine 
police officers to say went on at arrest. 
The 
Legislature's 
go forward with 
consider some 
is, you shou 
worked in 
defense in 
simply for this 
strongly urge that as you 
the prosecution that you 
the fense, and that 
adoption of that which 
itions for the 
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a revolutionary here! 
How come you don't wear a 
in federal hearings 
pub , you know. I've 
to change your name on 
(Laughter) 
You're in big trouble. 
Alright. No, I appreciate your testimony. A lot of 
what you said has a great deal of validity. We'll look at it 
seriously. I also would like for you, if you can, either through 
the Association or you personally to give us some reaction to the 
District Attorneys' proposal on discovery. 
MR. RICK SANTWEIR: Can I say a couple of things about 
that? We did not receive -- I'm from the California Public 
Defenders, okay? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. SANTWEIR: The first time we saw it was basically 
this morning. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. SANTWEIR: There are just, in first blush, an 
incredible number of problems with it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. SANTWEIR: I might just point out three very brief 
areas that you might want to even think about. I'm not sure that 
your particular committee is the appropriate committee to be 
considering or concerning itself with criminal discovery. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MR. SANTWEIR: But this deals basically with superior 
court criminal discovery; not municipal court; not really 
preliminary hearing -- prepreliminary hearing, although he says 
it does. It doesn't give you most of the things that a defense 
attorney should be concerned with in a serious case; and it does 
not even touch juveni Those areas aren't even mentioned in 
this so-called comprehensive statute. I would suggest to you 
that maybe the reason why the District Attorneys' Association 
calls this a comprehensive statute is because that gives them, 
based on the U.S. Supreme Court, the basis on which to ask for 
alibi information, which otherwise they would have no right to 
get. And that's basically what they're doing with this thing. 
But we will give you some feedback. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'd appreciate that. 
MR. SANTWEIR: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We'll look forward to it. Okay, 
gentlemen, thank you very much. 
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Now, the next witnesses will be Donald Walter and Paul 
Cyril. 
MR. PAUL CYRIL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walter 
isn't here. I'm Paul Cyril from the Northern California 
Association of Defense Counsel. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes. 
MR. CYRIL: Briefly, to mention a matter that I heard 
one of the representatives of your Committee talk about on a news 
program: complex litigation, complex cases, and pretrial aspects 
of those. We think, in agreement \vi th our colleagues on the 
other side of the fence in the CTLA, that the system in general 
vlOrks pretty well. We are getting to trial very rapidly in many 
counties. There are obvious exceptions, and fine-tuning is 
necessary all over; and perhaps more than fine-tuning in some 
places. 
But to address the subject of complex cases: We think 
that discovery procedures should minimize disputes which bring 
cases into law and motion for various types of orders. We think 
that discovery should not get in the way of trial dates, so that 
the trial calendars can be maintained as much as possible. We 
think that discovery should be conducted in such a was as to 
maximize the ability of counsel on both sides to evaluate cases 
at the earliest possible time, to get settlement conferences --
to have meaningful settlement conferences -- and get the cases 
settled if they shouldn't be tried. We believe all those things. 
We have submitted an example of one way, perhaps, of 
assisting, and that is a minor revision of §2037, dealing with 
experts, which gets involved with complex cases. Every complex 
case has one, two, three, 10 experts, perhaps. Some modification 
of that, we think, is necessary to advance the time when these 
experts are disclosed so that some of these things can happen 
that I just mentioned. 
That's all I have to say. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Great. I appreciate it. Those are 
good comments. 
MR. CYRIL: Thank you. 
CHAIRM~N HARRIS: We'll certainly take note of them. 
Thank you very much for your testimony. 
Okay, next will be Ms. Virginia Jung Lum. Welcome. How 
are you? 
MS. VIRGINIA JUNG LUM: I'd like to submit this for the 
record. 
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CHAI~~N HARRIS: Okay, would you like to submit that 
first? Thank you. Thank you very much. 
MS. JUNG LUM: I'm here on behalf of the California 
Young Lawyers' Association, 
their first years of 
and younger. They're automatically 
to practice in California. 
up of young lawyers in 
lawyers 36 years of age 
members when they're admitted 
I'd like to emphasize some of the pretrial matters which 
would address a problem that I hear about over and over from 
lawyers, and that is that it costs too much to prepare a case and 
it takes too long to bring a matter up for trial. Very often, 
the major complaint of clients and lawyers is that they get ready 
for trial -- that costs plenty -- then they sit around and 
wait for assignment out to court And they're put over for a 
month; six months; sometimes a year. This is very frustrating 
and it's difficult in terms of developing creditability for our 
system of justice, which we believe to be basically a very good 
one. 
So we submitted a total of suggestions, and I'd just 
like to go over brie 
First of all, e shment of a panel to evaluate 
cases after they are filed, or soon after they are filed. The 
person who spoke just fore me emphasized the need to move cases 
toward settlement. In fact, most cases when they get to trial 
are settled by the judge. Why not have cases evaluated early 
after filing to determine whether they can be placed on a slow or 
a fast track? If we were to e a panel made up of a 
judge, or a judge and several lawyers, we might be able to have a 
good basis for evaluating a case and then assigning a case out 
for an early mandatory settlement conference. In many cases we 
think that this would probably be quite effective. The pressure 
from a judge, particu a good j , is very effective in 
moving counsel towards sett of the case. This panel 
should, of course, have the di to permit other cases to 
proceed with substantial scovery before mandatory settlement 
conference is set up; but all cases, a settlement conference 
should be mandatory, and should be held earlier than 
immediately before , ch is current practice. 
A second single assignment of 
cases. Currently, a case goes to the judge at 
the very beginning and stays judge until it's tried. 
In state court, we might be able to this where discovery, 
pretrial matters, settlement conference, and the trial would all 
be held before one judge. Currently, practice •.• 
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: So 
consolidation? 
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be an argument for court 
MS. JUNG LUM: Yes. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by 
consolidation. I-- we call it •.• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I'm talking about cooperation 
between municipal and superior court. You're going to have 
things that are now heard at the municipal court level heard all 
the way through. Then you obviously need -- If you're going to 
have one judge do it, then he 1 s got to be able to both hear the 
preliminary, do the preliminary, and also ultimately decide the 
issue at trial. 
~iS. JUNG LUM: Well, I'm speaking more in terms of civil 
matters ..• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, I understand you • 
MS. JUNG LUM: ••• where you file a case ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay • 
MS. JUNG LUM: 
matters that are heard. 
••• there's discovery, there are pretrial 
Before the trial there's law and motion. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay, I understand. 
MS. JUNG LUM: ••• there's a settlement conference and 
then the trial. And currently 1 the practice in most courts is 
that a different judge will hear law and motion; a commissioner 
might hear discovery; generally settlement conferences are heard 
by a judge who will not hear the trial. In federal court, 
however, the same judge hears the case from beginning to end and 
can schedule settlement conferences and status reports from all 
counsel. It's suggested that this might be an experimental 
program, or at least a subject for study, to be implemented in 
state courts. There are several advantages which might be had: 
One, the judge's liarity with the case would be enhanced. 
This would probably make for very effective settlement 
conferences. The judge would be able to monitor the case. If 
the case isn't moving he could set it up for a status report; 
urge counsel to if they're not getting anywhere in terms 
of discovery; but in any event, move the case forward. I've 
listed other advantages, but I won't go over them because I know 
that you want to move on. 
The third proposal would be to authorize courts through 
a statutory enactment to ect to venue. Very often cases are 
brought in the wrong district. And currently the Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that a court may, on its own motion, stay or 
dismiss a case if the case is brought in the wrong state; but the 
judges do not have authority to move a case to another 
district where the venue is clearly improper. Very often counsel 
simply does not realize that the case is brought with wrong 
venue, or they ze but 's more convenient for them, and 
for what ever reasons they waive But there could be a more 
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equitable distribution of civil cases if the judges have the 
power to move cases out. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Who would review that? 
MS. JUNG LUM: Well ... 
CHAIRP~N HARRIS: The appel court? 
MS. JUNG LUM: Either the judge, or -- Well, initially, 
it's suggested that an administrator might review cases to make 
sure that they're led the proper district~ or a court might, 
a judge might review if it's challenged by counsel. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MS. JUNG LUM: A special panel to replace juries in 
complex litigation is another suggestion. Very often cases are 
so complex that takes longer to try cases before 12 lay 
persons than it would to try a case before, say, three judges, or 
a couple of judges and some lay persons with expertise in that 
particular area. This special sort of panel might be viewed as a 
jury. 
CHA.IRMAN HARRIS: Have you looked into any of the 
constitutional problems with that? 
MS. JUNG LUM: 
problem in 
might be viewed 
certainly ... 
Well, there is arguably a constitutional 
to a jury; but a special panel 
a jury. In any event, it would 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It's a unique idea. I don't know of 
any precedent for it, that's why I was asking. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. 
MS. JUNG LUM: But se are suggestions. 
CHAIRY~N HARRIS: Sure, 
approaches. 
I want creative 
MS. JUNG LUM: So that ei they could be approached 
on an experimental , or they could be a subject for study 
by the appropriate body. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
MS. JUNG LUM: Finally, Assembly Bill 781, which was 
considered by your Committee and through the foresight of your 
Committee was , but unfortunately was rejected by a Senate 
Committee last ld reconsidered. This would require 
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that there be mandatory tentative rulings in law and motion. And 
that would basically result in several advantages. One, it would 
encourage, or actually require, the judges to be prepared, to 
have read the papers, and to issue a tentative ruling. Second, 
upon issuance of the tentative ruling, counsel could avoid 
appearance if they have nothing new to say. Very often counsel 
have said everything they have to say in their papers; they're 
prepared to go with a tentative ruling. It saves them an 
appearance and it saves the clients a lot of money. Finally, it 
just frees up the court's time. A lot of time is saved through 
the tentative rulings. Some courts have it but not all courts 
do. If they were required to do it, I think you'd find an 
overall savings in time of the court as well as money for the 
client. 
Finally, I think consideration should be made toward 
raising the jurisdiction for small claims court. I've just 
picked an arbitrary amount here, but $15,000 is often what it 
costs in terms of preparing a case for trial and seeing it 
through. Cases, right now, up to $1,500 may be filed in small 
claims court. That amount should be raised so that people can 
have their day in court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: To what level? 
MS. JUNG LUM: Well, I honestly can't say. I think that 
that's something that should be studied. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just think we ought to review the 
current level toward the eye of making it more realistic with the 
current cost of litigation? 
MS. JUNG LUM: Yes, I think $5,000 or $10,000 is 
certainly reasonable. The fact that many lawyers are now 
volunteering as pro tern judges in these sort of cases also adds 
to the effectiveness of permitting litigants to have their day 
heard in court through what is basically alternative dispute 
measures, and yet the enforcing authority of the court still 
exists. So, small claims jurisdiction should be raised so that 
more people are allowed to get in and be able to afford having 
their grievances heard without going through the very costly 
measures of going through litigation with counsel. 
CHAIRl>lAN HARRIS: Well, thank you Ms. Jung Lum. First 
of all I want to commend you for your testimony. I'm very 
pleased that the Young Lawyers' Association of the California Bar 
is taking an interest in these issues. It's nice to see that 
lawyers, before they get a vested interest in the system, are 
willing to make some very creative approaches to problem-solving. 
All of these are unique ideas. We hope that as we approach the 
problem of judicial efficiency that you'll not only continue to 
give us input on these ideas, but will expand your views into 
some of the other areas you have heard discussed today and that 
will be part of the transcript that we'll issue from this 
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I 
hearing. We want to get a handle on the problem. Young lawyers, 
until they get a vested economic interest, are able to be much 
more pragmatic, much more objective in their analysis. I think 
the ideas you have put forth certainly are worthy of great note 
and we will be studying them careful 
MS. JUNG LUM: Great. If there's anything we can do, 
please let us know. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We will. We'll be talking to you. 
'l'hank you. 
We have one more witness. Miss Halperin, would you like 
to come forward, please. Thank you. I'd appreciate it if you 
could have a seat, introduce yourself, any affiliation you care 
to make, and then, in brief, give us some understanding of why 
you're before us. 
MS. HALPERIN: First of all, I'm very grateful that 
you've let me speak in front of you. I just learned yesterday 
about this hearing. I would like to tell you that I hope I am an 
exception. I am someone who's superior court civil suit is seven 
years old. It is still alive. It was filed October 26, 1976. 
CHAIRJV'.tAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
MS. BETTY HALPERIN: I have been in pro per for 14-1/2 
months against one of the biggest, most powerful law firms in the 
entire country. I have had one semester of law school at night, 
10 years ago, but I have consulted professors of the law schools 
and I have consulted the law books. I want to tell you that I 
have taken notes from your witnesses about the backlog of the 
courts; on accountability. I'm here to tell you that I am not an 
exception for a long case in the Los Angeles Superior Court. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Your case has not been adjudicated 
since the date of filing? 
MS. HALPERIN: That's right. Let me tell you something 
else ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What is the status of the case now? 
vJhere is 
MS. HALPERIN: case is now being -- there's a 
pending hearing on court reporters' and clerks' transcripts which 
need correction for the court of appeals. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: But there's been no decision in your 
case yet? Or ••• 
HALPERIN: No. I would like to tell you that there 
has been my case and I ••• 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I can't get into that 
(inaudible) • 
MS. HALPERIN: No, I don't mean it that way. I don't 
mean it that way. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. 
MS. HALPERIN: 
sent documents down to 
1983; but the district 
closed it. 
Superior. Court Presiding Judge Peetris 
the district attorney's office January 10, 
attorney's office sat on my case, and then 
CHAIRY~N HARRIS: Oh, so your case has been closed? 
MS. HALPERIN: But they never investigated it. I want 
to ask if this committee has any authority to pass legislation so 
that an ordinary person like me can have criminal charges 
investigated. I want to also say that if my case had no merit, 
it would have been thrown out by now. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, we're going to --We will try to 
inquire as to what happened in your case. 
MS. HALPERIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And see what we can find out. It 
sounds very unique, but we'll try to at least get some 
explanation. 
MS. HALPERIN: I would like to say one more thing, for 
which I have proof, that on June 3, 1983, I sat outside of Judge 
Peetris' office with documentation asking him if he would please 
ask the district attorney to make an investigation on this 
altered document, which a forensics expert verified. And Judge 
Peetris had his secretary come out with a hand written message, 
which I have in front of me, that there was nothing he could do; 
but why didn't I try the D.A. or the city attorney. So I checked 
out what with the City Attorney, Ira Reiner. He's not supposed 
to be the one to take care of it. Someone along the way is 
stopping my case. 
My last statement is that I have a feeling that as one 
of your past witnesses said, there is a need for neutrality, 
because the defendant in my case are a giant entertainment 
corporation. 
I sincerely thank you for letting me speak with you; but 
I think that somebody was pulling your leg about how the superior 
court works. And I would like to know, for instance, does the 
superior court judge have the discretionary authority, or the 
mandatory authority to take judicial notice of a fraudulent docu-
ment? Because ••• 
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, he has the determination of 
whether or not he thinks it's fraudulent, obviously. But I don't 
want to get into that. 
MS. HALPERIN: Okay. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: We've got your testimony. 
MS. HALPERIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We'll see what we can find out about 
it. 
MS. HALPERIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We appreciate you're being before us. 
MS. HALPERIN: Very much. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And again, I'm sorry that it's taken 
so long to resolve your dispute. I'd like to find out why. 
MS. HALPERIN: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You're welcome. Okay, does anybody 
else have anything they'd like to add? Yes ma'am. 
MS. PATRICIA GAZIN: I'm from the Grand Jurors' 
Association. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, I thought so. 
MS. GAZIN: Right. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I knew I hadn't gone crazy. Go ahead. 
MS. GAZIN: I'm Patricia Gazin. I'm President of the 
Grand Jurors' Association of Los Angeles County; and I'm also 
representing today Val Cavey, who's President of the California 
Organization for Grand Jurors. 
We simply want to remind this committee that both these 
groups have an abiding concern in increasing the efficiency and 
speed of court processes. 
And also we have an abiding interest in watching the 
Legislature sometime, someday, merge the marshal and sheriff's 
office. 
CHAI~~N HARRIS: Okay. 
MS. GAZIN: And we will be vigilant. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Good. 
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MS. GAZIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you afso, if you have any 
further thoughts, please let us know. I know you patiently sat 
through most of the hearing. If there's anything that comes out 
of your Association that that would aid us in our work, we'd 
certainly appreciate any specific recommendations that you might 
care to offer. 
MS. GAZIN: Indeed. We will send you copies of the 
recommendations of the grand jurors. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Fine. 
MS. GAZIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: On behalf of Assemblywoman Mojonnier 
and myself I want to thank all of you for coming. And, again, we 
look forward to any additional testimony any of you care to 
offer. We're going to be looking at court efficiency very 
seriously and hope to make some legislative initiatives in 
January. We will continue unabated until we get some changes 
that we think are appropriate. Thank you. 
* * * * * * 
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Los Angeles, ifornia 
Chairman Harris and committee members, I want to express Cal-
Tax's appreciation at ing invited to participate in this 
hearing today. Our appr to f iency in the judicial system 
is the same that we t to bring to other areas of government 
activity. That is to press maximum productivity with the 
tax dollars available, while ing the best level of service 
that the public, through the political process, has expressed a 
desire to have. Regarding the judicial system this approach 
recognizes that basic constitutional rights of individuals and 
constitutional restrict on government are prominent. 
I want to confine my to one area of 
efficiency which continues to attract attention. This is the 
ever-growing evidence that both increa savings and improved 
service can be achieved by iminating the statutory 
restrictions that in many situations prohibit electronic 
recording equipment from be used to make an official record of 
judicial proceedi s. 
Cal-Tax cannot bring 
this issue. But we can 
research and comments arguing 
to use electron methods to 
costs. 
ta to the continuing debate on 
taking note of the body of 
that the courts ought to be allowed 
ove reporting and to hold down 
In this regard I want to 1 attention to recent 
developments at the federal level: 
*In June 1982, the u.s. General Accounting Office reported to 
the Congress that "electronic recording systems are a proven 
alternative to the traditional ice of using court reporters." 
In the digest of its 68-page report (137 pages, if various letters 
of comment attached as appendices are included) the GAO states 
that numerous state and foreign court systems are using 
electronic recording terns, achieving substantial savings, and 
also providing excellent se to the courts and litigants. In 
addition, electronic recordi ovide a better record of 
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court proceedings and enable greater management flexibility and 
control over recording activities." The report took note of the 
assertions of opponents of electronic reporting and stated that 
"GAO's evaluation of these arguments showed they have little 
merit because electronic recording machines have features 
designed to eliminate most of these problems, and by using proper 
procedures, the remaining problems can be readily overcome." 
*In July 1983 the Federal Judicial Center distributed an 
executive summary of the front pages of the report (A Competitive 
Evaluation of Stenographic and Audiotape Methods for United 
States District Court Reporting) it produced for the Judicial 
Conference of the United States as part of meeting the 
requirements of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. The 
report's conclusion is summarized there in one sentence: "Given 
appropriate management and supervision, electronic sound 
recording can provide an accurate record of United States 
district court proceedings at reduced costs, without delay or 
interruption, and provide the basis for accurate and timely 
transcript delivery." 
As in every other study of electronic reporting, these 
studies are bound to offer targets for challenges and rebuttal by 
the other side. But the real issue is not whether a particular 
test showed X dollars of savings. The real issue is whether the 
Legislature is going to persist in outlawing recognition of 
technological advance. 
Incandescent lights did not have to be statutorily freed in 
order to compete with kerosene lanterns in the courtroom. 
Ballpoint pens did not have to overcome protection granted to 
fountain pens used in judicial record keeping. 
Anti-competition legislation regarding the written word seems 
to have a long tradition. In the 14th Century, organizations of 
calligraphers dealt with the advent of woodblock printing by 
securing laws to prevent the "duplication of images." (Warren 
Chappell: "A Short History of the Printed Word") Obviously, 
technology eventually won out. 
What we are urging are not prohibitions or mandates in 
any direction, but simply a change in laws that will let all 
forms of reporting compete on the basis of effectiveness and 
cost. This change should not focus on people losing their jobs, 
but on people converting to improved equipment. This is a 
process going on continually in many occupations and even 
occurred once not too long ago in court reporting when stenotype 
machines replaced pen and ink. 
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In closing, I want to emphasize that we recognize the 
question of efficiency and performance in court reporting 
involves more than equipment. At the same time that it moves 
toward opening the door to competition in reporting methods, the 
Legislature may want to address related questions such as 
reducing the need for full transcripts. There may be more 
situations in which entire proceedings may be stored 
electronically to be transcribed only if needed. The technology 
may permit identifying and transcribing only selected portions 
of a proceeding. 
One thing is certain, there is neither the abundance of 
government revenue nor the lack of evidence to permit postponing 
any longer the legislative changes to permit courts to improve 
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CONGESTION AND DELAY IN THE LOS ANGELES 
SUPER lOR COURT, 1880-1981 
Testimony by ~lolly Selvin 
Introduction 
I'm pleased to be with you this morning to describe to you research 
we have recently completed at the Institute for Civil Justice on the 
subject of civil court delay in Los Angeles. My comments this morning 
will focus on our conclusions concerning the nature and magnitude of the 
civil delay problem in Los Angeles, the causes of delay, the Superior 
Court's response to this problem, and the impact of these efforts on 
fluctuations in delay. Finally, I will share with you our sense of the 
policy implications of this research. 
In brief, our study of the court since its founding in 1880 
demonstrates that civil delay has been a long-term, persistent problem 
in Los Angeles for more than 60 years. Our analysis indicates that in 
recent decades delay may have been been caused, in part, by important 
shifts in the composition of the civil caseload as well as by a trend 
toward increased litigation activity in individual cases. These changes 
have meant that cases consume more judicial resources now than they did 
in the past. The Superior Court has persistently endeavored to clear 
its delayed caseload since the early twentieth century. But while some 
of these efforts to reduce delay may have had transient effects, neither 
the addition of judges nor the introduction of new rules or procedures 
have produced long-term reductions in time-to-trial. The court's 
efforts to reduce delay have been hampered by organizational and 
financial constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and by the 
court's largely crisis-oriented approach to the problem. 
Before I begin, I would like to mention that the Haynes Foundation 
and the California Community Foundation partially supported our research 
on civil delay in Los Angeles. In addition, we received excellent 
cooperation on this project from Frank Zolin, Executive Officer of the 
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Los Angeles Superior Court and from the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association. 
Study Objectives and Methodology 
As many of you may know, the Los Angeles Superior Court has a 
reputation as one of the most delayed metropolitan trial courts in the 
nation. As recently as last fall and winter, the court was setting new 
cases for trial at a reduced rate in order to hear a large backlog of 
older cases. 1 There is at times in the Los Angeles legal community a 
perception of a crisis in the court, a sense of frustration over how 
best to solve it, as well as a belief that civil delay and congestion is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. 
In undertaking this study, we sought to provide an empirical 
foundation for the debate over what to do about civil delay and 
congestion in Los Angeles. Specifically, our research addressed the 






What has been the nature and magnitude of the civil delay 
problem in Los Angeles? 
What are the causes of delay? 
How has the Los Angeles Superior Court responded to increases 
in civil delay and congestion? 
What impact have these efforts to reduce delay had? 
What are the appropriate next steps for the court? 
To examine these questions, we adopted a case-study methodology, 
analyzing the court over a century, from its founding in 1880 through 
1981. We examined records from the court and the California Judicial 
Council, reviewed legal newspapers, and analyzed a sample of 1400 civil 
cases. These sources enabled us to compile a narrative history of the 
court's response to delay and to evaluate the impact of those efforts. 
We also compiled a number of economic and demographic growth indicators 
for Los Angeles County to help us identify the changes in the area's 
social and economic climate which may have contributed to changes in 
civil filings and delay. 
1 CCP Sectiofi 583 mandates trial or dismissal of civil matters 
still pending five years after the lawsuit was filed. 
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The Historical Pattern of Delay in los Angeles 
Let me turn now to our substantive findings. We compiled a record 
of delay in the LA Superior Court for civil cases from about 1920, when 
the figures are first available, through 1981. We have measured delay 
primarily as the median time-to-trial. 2 
Our time-to-trial data indicate that civil delay is neither a 
recent phenomenon nor a temporary one. Rather, it has been a long-
term, persistent problem in Los Angeles. During the early twentieth 
century, delay fluctuated quite a bit. But since World War II, time-
to-trial has increased dramatically from 6 months in 1940 to 41 months 
in 1981. 3 The increase has been particularly spectacular between 1970, 
when time-to-trial was 24 months, and 1981. With the exception of two 
decreases during the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, which we believe were 
the short-term effects of procedural changes, the history of delay in 
Los Angeles has been one of generally steady and overall increase. 
The Causes of Delay 
We explored the val of a number of popular explanations for 
the fluctuations and increases in delay that we observed. One of most 
commonly-heard explanations for these increases is that we are, as a 
population, more litigious now than we were in the past. Our data 
indicate, not surprisingly, that the number of civil filings 4 has grown 
dramatically since the late nineteenth century. A scant 446 civil cases 
were filed during 1880, the court's first year of operation. By the 
1920s and 1930s, between 10,000 and 20,000 new civil cases were filed 
each year. During the early 1970s, more than 40,000 such cases were 
2 Time-to-trial is the most common measure of delay used in the 
California courts. It is calculated from the date the parties request 
trial to the date the trial is scheduled. Note that the parties 
frequently file their request for trial some months or even years after 
initiating the lawsuit. 
3 The draft of the report from which the statistics I am presenting 
today are drawn is currently under revision. It is possible that this 
revision will result in the modification of some of these figures. 
4 We have excluded from the category of "civil filings" family law 
and probate litigation. 
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filed annually. By 1980, that figure had jumped to more than 70,000. 
This growth in the number of civil filings certainly explains some of 
the recent increase in delay, but there was rising delay at times when 
there was a drop in filings, such as during the late 1930s. In 
addition, the rate of increase in delay has sometimes greatly exceeded 
the rate of increase in filings. 
To measure litigiousness, however, we also compared changes in 
civil filings with changes in the population of Los Angeles County. We 
found that while the absolute number of civil filings increased 
enormously over the years, the rate of filings (the number of filings 
per capita) has remained relatively steady. Generally, over the past 
several decades no more than one-half of one percent, or 1 in 200 
people, has filed civil suits. Between 1970 and 1980 filings per 
population steadily increased, but in 1980 the rate of filings per 
population was still lower than in 1930. The 1940s, 1950s and 1960s all 
experienced persistent and significant increases in delay while the rate 
of filings per population remained relatively steady. It seems that 
rising litigiousness does not always explain rising delay, particularly 
since the 1940s. 
Another commonly-heard explanation for rising delay holds that the 
number of new judgeships -- permanent judicial positions -- haven't kept 
pace with increases in filings. The number of permanent judges on the 
Los Angeles Superior Court has grown substantially over the years from 
just 2 when the court was founded to 206 at present. The frequent 
addition of new permanent judges to the Superior Court bench has enabled 
the court to keep pace with the growth in filings in the county. As a 
result, the number of filings per judge -- the caseload per judge 
has, in fact, declined in recent decades. In 1965, there were 
approximately 1500 filings per judge; by the 1979 that figure had 
dropped to about 1300. 5 The number of filings per judge is lower now 
than at any time since 1935 and is currently much lower than during the 
1920s or even the late 1940s. When compared with changes in the time-
to-trial in Los Angeles, we conclude that changes in the rate of filings 
5 We used total Superior Court filings, including all civil as well 
as criminal litigation, for this calculation. By doing so, we can 
incorporate changes in the volume of other types of litigation that 




per judge do not explain increases in delay, particularly in recent 
years. 
A third prevailing explanation for increases in delay holds that 
cases now consume more judicial resources now than in the past; that it 
takes longer to dispose of individual cases now than in the past. of 
the litigation process may also result in more judge-time per lawsuit. 
We have, in fact, observed shifts in the composition of the civil 
caseload in Los Angeles as well as an increase in the amount of 
litigation activity per case. We have found that more complex, personal 
injury litigation now dominates the civil caseload. In its earlier 
years, the Los Angeles Superior Court, like many metropolitan trial 
courts, functioned largely as a debt collection agency. Now, however, 
it is preoccupied with personal injury suits. Moreover, we found that 
civil lawsuits since World War II increasingly include multiple parties, 
especially more than one defendant. In addition, we found that 
individual cases are characterized by a greater use of discovery as well 
as more papers filed, appearances made and motions requested. This 
increased activity has meant that even cases that settle rather than go 
to trial, take longer to reach that settlement now than did cases that 
settled in the early twentieth Finally, we found that on 
average, those cases in which a trial is held, have a longer trial now 
than in the early twentieth century. Given these findings, then, it is 
not surprising that we have also observed a slight decline in the number 
of dispositions per judge in recent decades.' 
The Response to Delay 
The Los Angeles Superior Court has by no means ignored the problem 
of civil delay. Rather, it has been concerned and active since the 
early twentieth century. The court's efforts can be divided into two 
major groups. First, the court has consistently increased its judicial 
personnel: The court acquired the services of a number of temporary 
judges over the years from both outside the county and from the lower 
courts in Los Angeles and, as we noted above, the court also frequently 
added new permanent judges to its staff. Second, the court also imposed 
6 As with filings per judge we have included both civil and 
criminal dispositions in this calculation. 
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local rules and procedures aimed at reducing delay. Some of these were 
directed at the entire civil caseload; they were designed to speed the 
processing of all civil cases, to reduce the length of the trial for all 
cases that went to trial, or to settle cases before trial. These 
procedures include alterations in the court's calendaring system, 
continuance restrictions, and the imposition of mandatory pretrial and 
settlement conferences. The Superior Court also devised a number of 
innovations directed at specific types of cases on the civil docket. 
The court instituted a variety of personal injury panels, induced or 
mandated arbitration for certain types of disputes, and pushed for 
increases in the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. These efforts 
were designed to either divert or remove the lower value cases from the 
docket or to induce litigants to waive a jury trial or, preferably, to 
waive trial entirely. 
We have evaluated all the major solutions the court implemented 
since the 1920s. While, as we noted above, the addition of permanent 
and temporary judges enabled the court to keep pace with growth in the 
volume of civil filings, these additions, by themselves, did not 
significantly or permanently reduce the time-to-trial in Los Angeles. 
The effect of the addition of judicial manpower on delay has been 
overshadowed by the increase in litigation activity we have noted. 
Clearly, without these frequent increases it is likely that the Superior 
Court would be even more delayed than it is or has been. But it also 
seems clear that as long as both the volume of cases and the amount of 
litigation activity per case is increasing the addition of judges at the 
same rate as in the past will not by itself produce a permanent 
reduction in the time-to-trial. 
Procedural solutions have also not succeeded in producing long-
term or significant cuts in civil delay. As with the addition of 
judicial manpower, the imposition of these procedures could well have 
prevented or tempered subsequent increases in delay. In some instances, 
moreover, we have found short-term reductions in civil delay following 
the implementation of a particular rule change or procedure. But none 
of these changes resulted in long-term reductions in delay. Overall, 
the wait to trial continued upward in the Superior Court, particularly 
since the 1930s. The only exception to this trend occurred during the 
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early years of the current mandatory settlement program, between 1973 
and 1977; time-to-trial was declined by 33 percent and remained less 
than it had been in 1971 when the current program began. By 1978, 
however, time-to-trial again began to rise. 
Why Has Delay Persisted? 
Our his~orical review also suggests possible conclusions as to why 
the court was unable to devise or implement procedures or solutions that 
effected long-term reductions in delay. 
First, the Superior Court, like most metropolitan trial courts, 
generally failed to recognize the persistent nature of its delay 
problem. Without a historical view, the court's pattern of response to 
delay has been somewhat cyclical or episodic. The court's efforts and 
those of the local legal community to rectify the problem intensified 
during periods when delay rose steeply. 
Second, financial constraints also hampered the court's ability to 
initiate and sustain procedural reforms or to acquire additional 
personnel. 
Third, the court's consistently large size relative to other 
metropolitan trial courts, its geographical dispersion, and its 
management organization have also limited the court's ability to 
effectively combat delay. 
Fourth, we believe that this court, like all metropolitan trial 
courts, has had difficulty effectively analyzing the nature of its civil 
delay problem or the impact of the solutions it implemented. As a 
result, the court has often not focused its delay-reduction efforts on 
what we think is a particular problem -- that is, that portion of its 
civil caseload that has consumed the most judicial resources. The Los 
Angeles court, like most all courts, has little institutional memory 
perhaps due to its size and the regular rotation of its leadership. As 
a result, the court has introduced some procedures more than once 
seemingly without understanding why that innovation wasn't particularly 
successful. Furthermore, the court directed many of delay-reduction 
efforts at all civil cases rather than focusing on the portion of the 
caseload that has consumed the most judicial resources. This strategy 
has compounded the difficulty of analyzing the impact of a particular 
-117-
- 8 -
procedure since most civil cases, currently as well as in the past, 
settle rather than proceed to trial. Finally, much of the court's 
statistical data, in the past as well as at present, has not been 
collected primarily for the purpose of analyzing civil delay or the 
efforts to mitigate it. Consequently, the measures the court has 
frequently used have not allowed it to accurately evaluate a procedure's 
effectiveness. 
In sum, then, the historical record reveals that civil delay in the 
Los Angeles Superior Court has been a long-term, persistent problem. 
Since the 1920s the court has diligently endeavored to reduce delay by 
imposing a variety of special procedures and by continuously adding 
temporary and permanent judicial manpower. Some of these efforts may 
have had transient effects. Moreover, the court's efforts may well have 
prevented delay from rising even higher than it was at any given time. 
Yet, our analysis indicates that the court's efforts to reduce or 
mitigate delay have not succeeded in effecting substantial or long-
term reductions in time-to-trial. The Superior Court's attempts to 
reduce delay have been hampered by organizational and financial 
constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and by the court's 
largely ahistorical or crisis-oriented approach to the problem. 
Policy Implications 
Let me conclude my comments by suggesting what I think are some of 
the more important policy implications of our research. 
In the first place, although we intensively studied the Los Angeles 
Superior Court, we believe that some of our findings apply to other 
metropolitan trial courts as well. Specifically, we suggest that our 
analysis of the causes of delay -- the changes in the composition of the 
civil caseload and the pattern of litigation activity we observed may 
not be unique to Los Angeles. w~ile the large size of the Los Angeles 
Superior Court may have made the management and implementation of delay-
reduction procedures more difficult than in other courts, this court's 
management tradition' is similar to that of other metropolitan trial 
7 This tradition has included the frequent rotation of judges 
through different departments and different branches of the court, and 
the election, every two years, of a new presiding judge. 
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courts. This management tradition, which often results in a lack of 
institutional memory about the nature or success of previous efforts to 
address the problem, has hampered the court's efforts. 
Our analysis, then, has lead us to a number of conclusions 
regarding possible next steps for this court, and perhaps other 
metropolitan trial courts, in their continuing efforts to mitigate 
delay. Basically, the Los Angeles Superior Court needs to devote 
sustained attention to the problem in order to reverse the persistent, 
historical pattern of delay in Los Angeles. At the same time, the court 
needs to focus its delay-reduction efforts on those cases that consume a 
disproportionate share of the court's limited judicial resources. How 
might the court proceed in this direction? 
First, we believe that the court's size must continue to increase 
with the caseload. Our analysis indicates that the court has 
successfully kept pace with increases in the volume of civil filings 
during the past several decades by frequently adding judges to the 
court. We believe these additions may well have prevented further 
increases in delay locally. If the court fails to keep pace with future 
increases, delay might be much worse than it is at present. 
But the court's supply of resources -- particularly judges is 
and will continue to be limited. Consequently, the court needs to apply 
the resources it does have in ways which will produce long-term 
reductions in delay. To do so, the court must become better informed 
about the nature of its civil caseload and the demands that caseload 
places on its current resources. Careful analysis of the caseload may, 
for example, reveal where in the litigation process delay most 
frequently occurs. Such an analysis may also help the court identify 
characteristics that would predict whether a case will be particularly 
lengthy or time-consuming to settle or try. This information is 
essential in order for the court to determine how its resources are 
currently being spent, to assess the current balance between case 
"needs" and court "services," and to develop more efficient strategies 




We think that the court might also explore automated management 
systems to help it better analyze as well as manage its civil caseload. 
The court currently makes little use of modern automated record 
management systems in monitoring the enormous volume of documents and 
case files in the system. In recent decades, a number of metropolitan 
trial courts across the nation have installed automated information 
systems to assist with the management of their caseloads. In some 
courts, these automated systems enable judges and court administrators 
to more effectively control their calendar and to regulate attorney and 
judicial practices that are believed to contribute to delay. 
With a more detailed analysis of its caseload and, perhaps, with 
the addition of an automated information system, the court could adopt a 
number of individual strategies to reduce delay. The court might, for 
example, decide to introduce a tracking system for different kinds of 
civil litigation. The court might also decide to focus its 
delay-reduction efforts on the discovery process which many judges and 
attorneys see as a major source of delay. 
Finally, we found that the Superior Court has recurrently had 
difficulty measuring the true impact of its procedural innovations on 
civil delay. For the most part, the court has relied on changes in the 
its aggregate measures to indicate the success or failure of a change in 
rule or procedure. We suggest that an evaluation be made part of future 
delay-reduction innovations. Moreover, the court might choose to 
implement future procedural changes in an experimental fashion thus 
providing comparative data for a more accurate analysis of the impact of 
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On November 8, 1983 the Assembly Judiciary Committee will hold an 
interim hearing in Los Angeles on judicial efficiency and 
improvement. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. in 
the Seminar Room of the Museum of Science and Industry, 700 State 
Drive, Exposition Park. 
Recently, much public attention has focused on the problem of 
congestion and delay in the California court system. Both 
critics and defenders of the courts note that increased costs and 
delays restrict the ability of aggrieved parties to gain access 
to the state's judicial system. (Committee staff has enclosed 
·several recent news articles regarding court congestion. The 
articles exemplify the continued concern over the problem of 
court delay.) Despite the great amount of attention this problem 
has received and various .attempts to deal with it, many of our 
courts continue to have more work than they are able to handle 
in a timely fashion. This hearing is being held to provide 
interested individuals and organizations with an opportunity to 
present their views on how the Legislature can assist in 
resolving the problem of delay and congestion in our courts. It 
is anticipated that an overview of the problem and proposals as 
perceived by these interested parties will enable Committee 
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members to better analyze and review specific 
legislative proposals aimed at improving judicial efficiency. 
The Committee has invited approximately 40 organizations 
and individuals who have expressed an interest in the California 
court system to identify and discuss the causes of court 
congestion and delay and to suggest proposals for reform. 
Committee staff has received responses from 16 parties who plan 
to present testimony at the hearing. The Committee will receive 
testimony from representatives from the Judicial Council, the Los 
Angeles Superior Court, the State Bar, several lawyers groups, 
and other experts in the operation of the state's court system. 
Witnesses have contacted the Committee with an interest in 
presenting testimony on judicial arbitration, court funding, the 
use of subordinate judicial officers, courtroom technology and 
pre-trial procedure. · 
In addition, a report on a soon to be released study by the 
Institute for Civil Justice (the Rand Corporation) on court 
congestion in Los Angeles will be presented. The study, which 
reviews the nature of court delays in Los Angeles over the last 
hundred years, was intended to offer insight as to what types of 
measures may be helpful in addressing the current problem of 
backlog facing some California courts. 
Although witnesses were asked to submit a brief outline of their 
testimony for distribution to Committee members, staff has 
received relatively few actual written responses. Therefore, 
witnesses have been asked to testify as specifically as possible 
and to: 
clearly outline the need for their proposals in 
furthering the Legislature's efforts to promote judicial 
efficiency; 
identify any anticipated cost in implementing proposals 
they suggest; 
identify the mechanism for implementing proposals (e.g., 
experimental project, statutory authorization or 
statutory mandat.e); 
identify the anticipated effect of proposals in 
increasing judicial efficiency. 
Committee staff has been advised that witnesses will be providing 




In 1978, mandatory judicia was enacted as an 
alternative to traditional dispute resolution in an effort to to 
ease the burden on the courts. Di s lving $15,000 or 
less were to be submitted to arb ration. In the counties of Los 
Angeles, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara and Ventura the amount-
in-controversy limit was raised to $25,000. In 1983 the 
Legislature enacted AB 186 (Harris, Chapter 978, Statutes of 
1983), which authorizes all counties, other than those with the 
higher limit, to increase the arbitration limit to $25,000. 
Although 1 s diss sfied arbitrator's decision 
may request a trial de novo, i.e., one at which the outcome of 
the previous arbitration has no bearing, several proponents of 
judicial arbitration contend that extending the use of 
arbitration wou be invaluable reducing court congestion. 
(A copy of the report "Judicial Arbitration in California - the 
First Year", prepared by the Institution for Civil Justice 
is enclosed.) 
The Judicial Council will formation on a report it is 
preparing which evaluates success of mandatory judicial 
arbitration. It is also expected that testimony will be offered 
which encourages enactment of slat to extend the use of 
mandatory judicial arbitration. 
COURT FUNDING 
Several witnesses have 
funding. Many parties 
concerned that the sent 
state and county , breeds 
inequity. Proponents of state 
it would judie eff 
necessary resources to reduce 
fiscal planning. 
st in discussing court 
trial court system are 
arrangement, a mixture of 
iency, insufficiency and 
ing of the courts argue that 
giving the courts the 
by allowing long range 
Under existing law, the state major portion of the 
salary of each Superior It also pays the employee's 
contribution to judge' fund for both superior and 
municipal court judges, · the employee's contribution to the 
Superior court judge's health The counties pay for a 
portion of the salaries of munic 1 and justice court judges 
and the total salary benefits entire court support 
staff. The counties pay the bulk of the courts' operating 
expenses from fines, fe s and fees they collect. The 
state also pays for a portion of the courts' operating expenses. 
The chart below outlines percentage of the court budget 




COURT FINANCING SUMMARY 
Total Court Costs by Funding Source (State and Local) 
State Judicial Operations~/ b 
State Assistance to Trial Courts-1 
Total State Costs 
County Costs (Trial Courts) 
Total Court Costs (est.) 
$ 39.4 mill. 
60.4 








Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, the funding of the 
trial courts has received a great deal of attention. Governor 
Brown established the Commission on Government Reform, known as 
the Post Commission, which issued a report on the fiscal 
alternatives and implications on the state's assumption of 
financing all or selected elements of the existing trial court 
system. In 1981, the Judicial Council recommended state funding 
of the trial courts and this Committee held an interim hearing on 
AB 1820 (Berman), a bill which would have enacted the Judicial 
Council's recommendation, in the same year. AB 3231 (Farr) of 
1981-82, authorized an Assembly Office of Research study of all 
local government programs and finance, which resulted in AB 2100 
(Farr). The AOR recommendations, including state funding of the 
trial courts, are contained in AB 2100, which is pending in Ways 
and Means Subcommittee #1. This bill will be available at the 
hearing. 
SUBORDINATE JUDICIAL OFFICERS 
It has been suggested that one way to significantly reduce the 
burden on the courts is to broaden the powers of court 
commissioners and referees. Currently, the superior courts 
employ about a hundred commissioners and juvenile court referees. 
Although the majority of these judicial officers hear cases 
related to juvenile and family law, in some courts they sit as 
temporary judges in both civil and criminal cases. In Los 
Angeles, where nearly 60 of these officers hear cases, they are 
involved in all areas of the trial courts' docket. 
A representative from the Court Commissioners Association will 
propose enabling legislation which would broaden the authority of 
commissioners. Committee members will receive a copy of this 
proposal under separate cover before the hearing. The Committee 
will also hear the results of a Judicial Council study on the 
current use of subordinate judicial officers. The report 
examines the wisdom of using subordinate judicial officers as 
temporary judges. (Enclosed is the section of the Judicial 
Council re?ort which discusses the legal authority of 




The Committee will hear several proposals relating to court 
reporters and courtroom recording technology. Currently, the 
majority of the court transcripts in California are generated by 
traditional stenographic reporters who type shorthand notes onto 
folios. They then read these notes aloud into tapes which are 
played back and transcribed by other personnel. A small fraction 
of court reporters use Computer-Aided Transcription (CAT) 
technology. These reporters type their stenographic notes onto 
magnetic tapes which are fed directly into computers. The 
computer automatically generates a rough draft which the court 
reporter can edit on the computer screen producing a transcript 
quickly and without additional personnel. The third method of 
court recording, electronic audio equipment, produces audio tapes 
of proceedings. The tapes must be transcribed in order to 
produce a written transcript. This equipment must be supervised 
by trained personnel during proceedings. 
Existing law provides that all civil proceedings in municipal and 
justice court must be taken stenographically by a court reporter 
at the request of either party or the court. Criminal 
proceedings in those courts must be taken stenographically by a 
reporter on the order of the court. If an official or temporary 
court reporter is not available to report a civil action in 
misdemeanor criminal proceedings in municipal or justice court, 
the court may order that the proceeding be electronically 
recorded. 
sting law also provides that all civil proceedings in superior 
court must be taken stenographically by a court reporter at the 
request of either party or the court. Criminal proceedings in 
superior court must be taken stenographically on order of the 
court, the district attorney or the attorney for the defendant. 
The Committee will hear testimony on the virtues of both CAT and 
electronic recording technology. Very few court reporters 
presently use CAT technology because the reporters, who buy and 
maintain their own stenographic equipment, are unable to purchase 
the expensive, sophisticated computers necessary. Legislative 
Counsel has opined that while, under Government Code Section 
68073, "the counties are responsible for maintaining rooms and 
equipment necessary for the transaction of the business of the 
courts," this section "excludes from this supervisorial 
responsibility all stenographic and transcribing equipment and 
other personal property and supplies of court reporters used in 
the preparation of transcripts." The Court Reporters Association 
will present a proposal which would authorize the trial courts to 
buy CAT equipment. A copy of the proposal is enclosed for your 
information. Other groups will advocate extending the use of 
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JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 
STATE BUILDING, ROOM 3154 
350 McALLISTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO 94102 e (415) 557·3203 
LEGISLATIVE OFFICE 
100 LIBRARY AND COURTS BUILDING, SACRAMENTO 95814 e (916) 445-7524 
October 31, 19 83 
Rubin Lopez, Consultant 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
John W. Davies, Assistant Directo 
Administrative Office of the Cour s 
SUBJECT: November 8 Interim Hearing 
Pursuant to your request for materials for the 
November 8th interim hearing meeting, please find attached a 
copy on legal authority which will be included in an upcoming 






1. Legal Authority 
As of June 30, 1983, the superior courts employed 117 
commissioners and juvenile court referees to perform subordinate 
judicial duties.£/ Of these officers, 95 serve full time, 22 
part time. They function largely in the area of family and 
• 
juvenile law. In certain courts, they regularly sit as 
temporary judges in civil and criminal cases, hear matters 
involving probate, mental health, writs and receivers, domestic 
violence prevention applications, attachments, and post-judgment 
creditor-debtor remedies. In the Los Angeles Superior Court, 
~ 
which employees just ov~r one half (59) of these officers, they 
11 The superior courts are Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno, 
Imperial, Kern, ·Los Angeles, Marin, Napa, Orange, Plumas, 
Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Bernardino, San 
Diego, San francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San 
Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Siskiybu, Sonoma, 
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section confers the following powers on a commissioner: 
(1) Hear and determine ex parte motions for orders 
and alt~rnative writs of habeas corpus; 
(2) Hear and report findings and conclusions to the 
court for approval rejection, or change on all preliminary 
matters, includi family law matters, and issues of fact 
in contempt proceedings in divorce, maintenance, and 
annulment of marriage cases: 
(3) Take proof and make and report findings of fact, 
'• 
subject to the court rehearing the issue on the exception 
of any party; 
(4) Hear, report on, and determine all uncontested 
actions and proceedings other than actions for divorce, 
maintenance, and annulment of marriage; 
(5) Act in connection with bonds and undertakings, 
oaths and affirmations, fees for the performance of 
official acts, and an official seal; and 
(6) Act as a temporary judge when otherwise qualified 
I 
and when appointed for that purpose. 
Subordinate judicial duties under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 259 generally involv~ issuing routine ex 
parte orders and orders to show cause, primarily in the area 
family law. They also require reporting to the court for 
il (continued) 
meaning of •subordinate judicial duties.• The words were 
intended as an •appropriate constitutional phrase 
sufficiently broad to permit specific details to be later 
enacted or adopted by the legislature or rulemaking 
agencies.• (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1971 10 
Cal.3d 351, 362. Before 1966, the section authorizing he 
use of commissioners (Cal.Const., former art. VI, § 14). 
referred to commissioners' duties in relation to the 
•chamber business the judges of the superior court.• 
Chamber business has been defined as business •limited to 
the subsidiary and incidental steps in practice and· 
procedure, leaving to the court the judicial determination 
of the issues presented by the pleadings.• (Estate of 
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Perrone (1979) 26 Cal.3d 49.)!/ Second, the referee's 
findings and order are subject to review by a judge of the 
juvenile court, with the possibility of rehearing. (See Welf. 
& Inst. Code, §§ 248, 252-254.) 
Like a commissioner, a referee may hear a juvenile 
court case sitting as a temporary judge. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
S 248.) In that instance, the constitutional prohibitions of 
Jessie w. v, Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 41 and In re 
Perrone, supra, 26 Cal.3d 49 do not apply. Nor do they apply 
when referees hear matters involving fitness {Welf. & Inst. 
Code, S 707) or dependency (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300), as 
these hearings do not amount to jeopardy in the constitutional 
sense. (See Charles R. v. Superior Court (1980} 110 Cal.App.3d 
945, 957.) 
!/ Jeopardy attaches in juvenile court jurisdiction 
proceedings, despite the advisory nature of a referee's 
findings and orders (Jesse w. v. superior Court, supra, 26 
Ca1.3d at 44}. Consequently, a referee's determination 
favorable to the juvenile cannot be reheard under Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 254, which provides for a •de 
novo• rehearing before a judge. Inasmuch as the acquittal 
becomes a final determination rather than a subordinate 
judicial act, it is impermissable under article VI, section 
22, of the California Constitution. (Id., at p. 47, fn. 
5.) Since a referee could not acquit under the juvenile 
law, but only convict, a juvenile would require two 
separate trials -- one before a referee, the second before 
the judge -- before being finally acquitted. That, t~o, 
would be unconstitutional. (In re Perrone c., supra, 26 
Cal.3d at p. 49.) 
Whatever the merits of legislatively curing Welfare and, 
Institutions Code section 254, the Legislature has + 
apparently adopted an opposite approach. It has respon~ed 
to the Supreme Court's decision by amending Welfare and. 
Institution Code section 248 to adopt explicitly the · 
prohibition against a referee conducting a hearing if •the 
state or federal constitutional prohibitions against double 
jeopardy apply unless the parties thereto stipulate in 
writing that the referee may act in the capacity of a 




fommissioners and referees as temporary judges 
Commissioners and referees acting as subordinate 
1 officers are to be distinguished from those acting as 
judges. Code of Civil Procedure section 296(5) 
rs a commissioner to •act as a temporary judge when 
ise qualified to so act and when appointed for that 
.11 Referees may sit as temporary judges even in 
le court cases where double jeopardy attaches (Welf. ' 
. Code, § 248), and their •orders• become final in the same 
as orders made by a judge.• (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 250.) 
The commissioners and referees surveyed in this report 
more frequently as temporary judges than as subordinate 
icial officers. Most sit entirely as temporary judges. 
perform purely subordinate judicial duties generally 
on when it is unnecessary to act as a temporary judge, 
n ex parte or uncontested matters. Otherwise, if the 
r ires the finality of a judge's order, commissioners 
I 
eferees typically act as temporary judges in most courts. 
An individual acting as a temporary judge must obtain 
lation of the parties litigant. (Cal. Const., art. 
tion 21.) If the temporary judge is to sit in the 
le court, the stipulation must be in writing. (Cal. 
Ct., rule 1316(b}.) Commissioners, in contrast, are 
ired to obtain a written stipulation in order to hear a 
a temporary judge. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 244(a).) 
, the parties' conduct may be •tantamount to a 
tion• if their partipation was voluntary and without 
ion. {Estate of Soforenko (1968} 260 Cal.App.2d 765, 
People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 153, 165.) ,~his 
t 
appointment may be in the form of a blanket order 
ssigning specified duties to named commissioners or a 
al rule providing that all commissioners of the court, 
r a commissioner assigned to a particular department, may 
xercise specified powers under Code of Civil Procedure 
tion 259, such as acting as a temporary judge. (Rooney 
. Vermont Investment Corp., supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 368.) 
9 
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rule, which applies only to commissioners, was recently stated 
as follows: 
Under the •tantamount stipulation• doctrine, 
the parties confer judicial power not 
because they thought in those terms; had 
they done so, the stipulation presumably 
would be express. Rather, an implied 
stipulation arises from the parties• common 
intent that the subordinate officer hearing 
their case do things which, in fact, can 
only be done by a judge. (In-re-Mark L. 
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 179, fn. 6.) 
Once clothed with the authority of a judge, the 
commissioner or referee is governed by the laws applicable to a 
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I. COURT REPORTING - FUNCTION: 
Court Reporters perform two distinct functions: 
collecting the record (reporting) and preparing verbatim 
transcripts. Transcripts are remunerated separately. 
MYTH: The increase in the cost of transcripts is 
due to a dramatic rise in reporters' transcript 
fees. 
FACT: In 1880 Reporters' transcript fees were $.20 
per folio. In 1983 reporters' transcript fees are 
$.60 per folio. The intense growth in 
transcript volume is mainly responsible for the 
increased expenditures. 
MYTH: Late filing of appeal transcripts by 
reporters is the major cause of appellate delay. 
FACT: Only a very small percentage of court 
reporters are the cause of appellate delay. The 
Los Angeles Superior Court reports 1% of their 
reporters are chronically delinquent in filing 
transcripts. 
The Judicial Council's present method of 
communicating with the court reporting community is 
inadequate. As an example, the Judicial Council 
refuses to adopt rules which provide for a 
correlation between the length of a transcript and 
the time required for its preparation. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: - Provide for the appointment to the 
Judicial Council of one court reporter. 
- Establish effective monitoring 
procedures so that reporters 
filing transcripts late can be 
identified quickly. 
- Impose existing sanctions to 
adequately deal with reporters who file 
transcripts late: Government 
Code 69944, Business and Professions 
Code 8025 (d), and contempt power. 
-144-
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II. UTILIZATION OF TAPE RECORDERS: 
The ability to produce verbatim transcripts and the 
quality of transcripts produced from tape recorders is 
directly related to the quality of the equipment, the 
courtroom environment, the monitor of the tape and the 
commitment of those requested to utilize tape recorders. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: - If there is to be an expansion in the 
use of tape recorders, that it be 
under the direction and control of the 
court reporters. 
- The preparation of transcripts from the 
tapes be done by court reporters. 
- The utilization of tape recorders 
be proscribed. 
III. COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION, (CAT): 
CAT is the utilization of a computer to assist 
shorthand reporters in the preparation of verbatim 
transcripts. A court reporter reports proceedings 
utilizing a modified stenotype machine which produces, in 
addition to the reporter~ usual paper notes, an electronic 
duplication of the notes. The electronic notes are fed 
into a computer which matches the electronic notes to the 
rter's indiviual writing style (dictionary) and 
nslates the notes into English. The reporter then 
i s, proofreads, prints and binds the transcript into a 
final document ready for filing. 
The court reporter's ability to enter data at 200 
to 250 words a minute combined with advanced computer 
technology can offer many added services to court systems 
without additional cost to the tax payers: the entry, 
retention, retrieval, transfer and archival of electronic 
data; word processing; "sanitizing" of jury instructions; 
the rtunity for the hearing-impaired to participate in 
the judicial process. Tape recorders eliminate the 
utilization of computerization. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: - Provide for a technology fee to enable 
a single court reporter to provide a 
daily transcript. 
(Estimated savings to Los Angeles 
County: $250,000 per year.) 
- Abolish prohibition against a county 
providing CAT equipment. (See 




- Provide reporter orientation for judges 
in order to utilize CAT more 
effectively. 
- Provide funding for 
purchase of CAT equipment by courts. 
(See attachment B, proposal from L.A. 
Municipal Court Reporters.) 
Based on a survey taken by the California Court Reporters 
Association, approximately 25% of the official court 
reporters in California are now utilizing CAT -- literally 
millions of dollars of state-of-the-art computer equipment 
without any expense to the tax payers of California. 
CONCLUSION: The California Court Reporters Association 
supports the appropriate use of technology to increase the 
efficient production of the verbatim record. 
CAT is the future for the most efficient and 







rable Willie L~ Brown, Jr. - p. 2 - #8919 
The authority of the court to order the purchase or 
ase of equipment is circumscribed by Section 68073 (Ex oarte 
dber, 91 Cal. 367, 369). Thus, even thou<Jh it mightotherwise 
argued that equipment used by court reporters in the 
reparation of transcripts is necessary for the transaction of 
business of the court, the Leaislature has preempted the 
ect. 
Accordingly, a trial court is without authority to 
or lease special C.A.T. equipment. Moreover, there is 
revision of law which would authorize a court to charge court 
rters a fee for the use of court equipment. 
dW: j f 
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Very truly yours, 




Clinton J. deWitt 
Deputy Legislative Counsel 
MUNICIPAL COURT REPORTERS COMMITTEE 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY COURT REPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. 
546 COURTHOUSE 
110 NORTH GRAND AVEN 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
(2 13) 485-1519 




THE LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL COURT 
THE MUNICIPAL COURT COMMITTEE, LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY COURT REPORTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
C.A. T. 
THE FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSAL FOR THE COURT AND THE 
COURT REPORTERS OF THE LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL COURT 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PURCHASE AND USE OF COMPUTER-
AIDED TRANSCRIPTION EQUIPMENT. 
(NfTACHMENT "B") 




XSCRIBE IS RECOMMENDED. THE MAJOR ADVANTAGE OF XSCRIBE 
IS THE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THEIR SERVICE CENTER IN CASE 
OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE; ALS0 7 AVAILABILITY OF OPTICAL-SCAN 
TRANSLATION AT THEIR SERVICE CENTER. WHILE OPTICAL-SCAN 
IS MORE COSTLY 7 IT WOULD ELIMINATE EXPENSIVE STORAGE PROBLEM 
FOR "OLD" NOTES. THE OPTICAL-SCAN CAN ALSO BE USED FOR 
PREPARING TRANSCRIPTS FROM NOTES OF UNAVAILABLE REPORTERS. 
ADVANTAGES OF C.A.T. AND COURT OWNERSHIP OF COMPUTERS: 
- WILL ALLOW COURT REPORTERS TO PROVIDE SERVICES NOW 
UNAVAILABLE; I.E. 7 KEYWORD INDEXING, ON-LINE TRANSLATION 7 
DISKETTES, ETC. 
- CAN REDUCE AND/OR CONTAIN COURT REPORTER TRANSCRIBING 
COSTS. 
- WILL PROMOTE THE USE OF C.A.T. BY COURT REPORTERS. 
- WILL HELP OFFSET THE COURT REPORTER'S FINANCIAL BURDEN 
OF GOING ON C.A.T. 
- CAN REDUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORTERS NECESSARY TO 
COVER COURTS. 
- CAN REDUCE TIME REQUIRED FOR PREPARATION AND FILING OF 
TRANSCRIPTS. 
ASSUMPTIONS: 
1. COURT WILL PURCHASE MASTER SYSTEM. HAS ALL CAPABILITIES 
OF EXPERT SYSTEM EXCEPT DIRECT INPUT, WHICH IS NECESSARY 
FOR TRUE-TIME TRANSLATION ONLY. (MASTER SYSTEM MAY BE 
UPDATED LATER FOR $11,396.) COMPUTER LOCATED IN C.C.B. 
2. REPORTERS ON SYSTEM AVERAGE 600 PAGES PER MONTH. 
3. COURT'S MAIN FRAME WILL PROVIDE TRANSLATION SERVICE 
ONLY. PRINTER PROVIDED WITH MAIN FRAME WILL BE USED 
FOR BACKUP ONLY. MAIN FRAME TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY 
BY COURT REPORTERS. 
-1-
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4. COURT WILL ALSO PURCHASE A FOUR-TRACK MODEM AFTER 
EIGHT USERS ARE ON THE SYSTEM. 
5. COURT WILL PURCHASE MAIN FRAME OUTRIGHT; RATHER THAN 
LEASING, SAVING 16% INTEREST OVER FIVE YEARS. 
6. EACH REPORTER, OR GROUPS OF REPORTERS, SHALL PURCHASE 
AN EDITING STATION AND PRINTER. EDITING AND FINAL 
PRINTOUT WILL BE DONE BY THE REPORTERS ON THEIR OWN 
EQUIPMENT. 
7. ALL EQUIPMENT (COURTS AND REPORTERS') SHALL BE 
DEPRECIATED OVER FIVE YEARS. 
8. AN OPERATOR FOR MAIN FRAME OPERATION ONLY WILL BE 
NEEDED PART TIME (APPROXIMATELY 25 HOURS A WEEK) 
AT 10,000 PAGES PER MONTH; AND FULL TIME AT 18,000 
PAGES. THE OPERATOR SHALL BE AN INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR, COMPENSATED AT $6 AN HOUR BY THE USERS. 
9. COURT WILL PROVIDE PHYSICAL LOCATION, TELEPHONE AND 
PARKING FOR OPERATORS. 
10. A CONTRACT WOULD BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE REPORTERS 
ASSOCIATION AND BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS AND 
THE COURT. 
11. OWNERSHIP OF THE REPORTER'S DICTIONARY SHALL REMAIN 
TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY WITH THE COURT REPORTER. 
12. THE USE OF C.A.T. WOULD BE VOLUNTARY ONLY. 
13. REPORTER MANAGER TO BE DESIGNATED. 
TELEPHONE MODEM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE PURCHASE 
(WHEN AVAILABLE) FOR OFF-SITE TRANSMISSION OF DATA. COST 
TO COURT $500; COST TO REPORTER $500. 
nBn DRIVE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PURCHASE IF REPORTER 
EQUIPMENT WIL BE SHARED. 11 B11 DRIVE ALLOHS EQUIPMENT TO 
EDIT AND PRINT SIMULTANEOUSLY. COST TO REPO iER Sl,500. 
-2-
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XSCRIBE MASTER SYSTEM 
COUPT Is cosTS 
VOLUME ON SYSTEM 
REPOPTERS 4 8 9 
PAGES PER ~10NTH 2,400 4,800 5 I Lf 0 0 
I NVESH~ENT BY COURT 
MASTER SYSTEt"\ 39,885 39/885 39,885 
FOUR-TRACK t.JiODE tv\ 7,500 
PLUS 6 !2 9o TAX 2,593 2,593 3,080 
EQUIPMENT TOTAL 42,478 42,478 50,465 
COST TO COURT 
DEPRECIATION 8,496 8,496 10,093 
AT FIVE YE/l.RS 
OPER/HING C 0 S T /~10NTH 
DEPRECIATION 708 708 8 4 1 
~1A I NTENANCE 180 180 230 
::oPERATOR 
TOTAL $888 $888 $1,070 












841 8 4 1 
2 30 2 3 0 
600 1.000 
$1,670 $2,070 
RECOMMENDED FEE STRUCTURE FOR 
MAIN-FRAME TRANSLATION 




3 0 1-6 0 0:: 
601-900 
900-UP 
• 2 5 




. 2 5 
. 2 5-. 2 2 5 ;: 
.225-.20 
.20 -. 175(901-1200 
::sINCE \·JE ESTH'\ATE THE JWER/l,GE USER 1 S VOLUfv'E TO BE 500 PAGES 
PER MONTH, THE AVERAGE CHARGE PER PAGE WILL BE 22.5¢. 
COt'KLUS I 01\lS 
THE MASTER SYSTEM, 
UP TO EIGHT USERS. 
PAY FOR THE COST. 
OF $192, FOR A 229s 
AT A MONTHLY COST OF S888, WILL ACCOMMODATE 
THE FEES FOR THE FIRST 3,947 PAGES WOU~D 
THE t\J EXT 8 5 3 PAGES \-/0 U L D G E i ~ E RATE: A P R 0 ::' I T 
RETURN ON INVESH1ENT. 
THE MASTER SYSTEM WITH A FOUR-TRACK MODEr1, AT A MONTHLY COST 
OF $1,070, IS NECESSARY FOR NINE OR MORE USERS AND WILL 
ACCOI'WtODATE UP TO 30 USERS. PRODUCING 5,400-13,000 PAG::S 
PER MONTH, THE FEES AT THIS VOLUME WOULD PAY FOR THE COST 
PLUS GENERATE A PROFIT OF $145 $2,980 A MONTH, FOR A 14 -279 
RETURN ON INVESTMENT. 
A TELEPHONE MODEM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE USE (WHEN 
AVAILABLE) FOR REPORTERS LOCATED OFF-SITE FROM ENVIRONS OF 
COMPUTER. COST TO COURT, $500; COST TO REPORTER, $500. 






California Court Commissioners Association 
John D. Harris 
President 
Rebert Axel 
1 st Vice President 
Steven C. Burtnett 
2nd Vice President 
Kevi' "Chip" Martin 
Secretary 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
Joseph N. Gruber 
Ralph J. Flageollet 
Donald D. Rosenberg 
Rebert F. Baysinger 
Terrance R Duncan 
James F. Me Kiernan 
Phil C. Bunde 
Sam E. Collins 
Bobby R. VII1Cent 
Irwin H. Garfinkle 
Abraham Gorenfeld 
Herbert M. Klein 
Harold Crowder 
Joseph A. Ruffner 
Ronald W. TISChe 
Helen Rice Frederick 
John Murphy 
Thomas A. Peterson 
110 N. Grand Angeles, California 90012 · (213) 
November 1, 83 
Rubin R. Lopez, Chief 
California Legi 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear !-ir. Lopez: 
Enclosed please find the recommendations to the 
Committee, proposed the California Court 
Commissioners Association. 
Commissioner Nyby and myself will, hopefully, 
be present at the Committee meeting on the 
8th of November. I wi be calling you to 
request a specific time that we would appear 
to answer questions regarding the suggestions. 
RBA: spd 
Enclosure 
cc: James Simpson 
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RECOMHENDATIONS TO THE COHNITTEE 
out the State. At the present time it is designated for 
Los Angeles County, wherein alL of the· superior court 
commissioners sit pro tern in a variety of areas, but there 
appears to be no reason why that should not be extended to 
all counties in the State. In addition, following along the 
designated lines of handling matters that amount to something 
less than a final determination of any contested issue, 
commissioners should preside over discovery proceedings with-
out a stipulation, as well as other pretrial motions, 
excluding 1538.5 PC hearings, which are not a final determi-
nation of any contested issue. 
Assignment of Retired Commissioners by the judicial Council 
At the present time the Judicial Council does not include 
retired commissioners for consideration for assigP~ents state-
wide to hear matters as magistrates or other uncontested or 
ex parte hearings throughout the State. If the legislature 
adopts the expansion of areas listed above, it would follow 
that retired commissioners should be included in the Judicial 
Council assignment of judicial officers throughout the State, 
which would enable an individual court to more efficiently 




.. EXHIBIT F 
RICHARD D. HUFFMAN 
Assistant District Attorney 
OFFICE OF 
THE DISTRICT A lTORNEY 
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 
EDWIN L. MILLER, JR. 
Cf>UNTY 20l'RTHOL'SE 
SAN DIH;o, l 
lQX-KXJ5JtX:X 
WILLIAM H. KENNEDY 
Chief Deputy, District Attorney 
WAYNE A. BURGESS 
Chief Investigator 
October 31, 1983 
Ms. Linnea Kehlet 
Conmittee Coordinator 
CDAA 
1130 K Street 
Suite 200 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Linnea: 
(619) 236-238 
DISTRICT A TIORNEY 
Enclosed is a copy of the discovery statute I Kill be dis-
cussing at the interim hearing on Judicial Efficiency and 
Improvement on November 8th. 
I plan to discuss the current problems with discovery 
practice, the effect of that practice on courtroom time 
and the enclosed proposal for codifying criminal discovery 
law. 
Could you let me know the time limits involved in this 
presentation? 
Sincerely, 
EDWIN L. MILLER, JR. 
District Attorne~~ 
oLL~ ~/J - ~'-
DUANE E. SHINNICK 








The general ose of this statute is to regulate 
criminal discovery. The sta te s tended to codify j icial 
decisions in the areas a and to make criminal discov-
ery largely a statutory matt r 
There is no intention to r eal, directly or by im-
plication, existing st te regulating discovery, e.g., 
grand jurv prccee2ings with n P 8 6; municipal court disc ve 
within PC 859, 1430; police ersonnel records EC 1103, 1043-45 
PC 832.5-17; official inf rmat EC 1040, 1042; informant id n 
tity EC 1 41 ?rocedures; s po a procedures; and de 
facto discoverv prcced e 
and affidavits. 
uch a f 1 ng of search warr nts 
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S~ARY OF THE STATUTE 
DISCOVERY 
DISCO'~~y BY DEFEND~NT 
(a) Prosecutor's Obligation 
(b) Collateral or Exculpatory ~1atter tvi thout Request 
(c) Scope 
(d) Matters Not Subject to Disclosure 
(l) Work Product 
(2} Statutory Privileges 
(e) Discovery Before Superior Court Arraignment 
DISCLOSURE TO THE PROSECU~ION 
(a) The Person of t~e Defenrant 
(b) Medical and Sc1entific Reports 
(c) t'iit:;.esses 
(d} Documents and Tangible Objects 
(e) Notice of Withheld Infor::-.ati on 
REGr~ATION OF DISCOVE?Y 
(a) Conti:;.uinCJ Duty to Dis close 
(b) Custody of Items or rn:or.r.ation 
(c) Protective Orders 
(d) Excision 
(e) In Camera Proceedings 
(f) Sanctions 
(g) Costs 
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on shall state the 
person claiming 
l054.l{b) Colla': 
The prose ~~~~~==~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
sonable time of learning 
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(1) whether 
guilt or innocence whi 
(2) whe 
ceedings which have not 
( 3) whether there 
lance of material 
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( 4} all 
possession favorab 
guilt, punishment, 








l054.1(c} The prosecuting 's obligations under 
subdivisions and (b) of section extend to all items 
or information to which a defendant is entitled under these 
statutes and which is in the possession of the prose=uting at-
torney or members of the pr~secuting attorney's staff. 
l054.l(.d) Matters Not Subject to Disclosure. 
(1) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be requ~red 
of 1 research or of records, correspondence, reports, or 
memoranda to the extent that they contain the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the prose-
cuting attorney or members of his legal staff. 
(2) Statutory Privileges. All existing statutory 
privileges against disclosure are not to be affected by this 
section. 
1054.1~) Discoverv Before Sunerior Court Arraic~ent. Discov-
ery pursuant to section 1054.l(e) s~ll be the exclusive means 
of discovery by the defendant or his attorney prior to the pre-
liminary examination. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose 
a:1d make available for ins:;:>ection and copying: 
(1) items furnished pursuant to Penal Code sections 
859 and 1430; 
(2) all substantial material evidence known to t~e 
prosecuting attorney and within his possession, custody, or 
control favorable to the defendant, whether relating to quilt, 
punishment, or the credibility of a prosecution witness; and 
(31 the results of a line-up when ordered by a court 
where eyewitness identification is a material issue and where 
re exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken id~~tifica­
tion that a lineup would tend to resolve. 
* 1t * 
1054.2 Disc~osure to the Prcsec~t:on. 
(a) The Person of the Defe~dant. 
{1) The prosecuting attorney may require the 
defendant to: 
(A) participate in lineups; 
(B) speak for identification by witnesses; 
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(C) be fingerprinted: 
{D) pose for photographs; 
(E) try on articles of clothing: 
(F) permit the taking of specimens of 
material under his fingernails; 
{G) permit the taking of samples of his 
blood, hair anC!. other bodily items 
which involve no unreasonable intru-
sion thereof; 
lH) provide specimens of his handwriting; 
(I} submit to a reasonable phys 1 or 
medical examination; 
(J} submit to a reasonable mental examina-
tion, if a plea of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity has been entered, or 
if notice of intent is given, as de-
scribed by subdivision (c) to rely upon 
a defense related to mental disease, 
mental defect, mental disorder, intoxi-
cation or other cause tending to negate 
the existence of a mental state essen-
tial to guilt, or to mitigate p~~ishrnent. 
Statements of the defendant made in the 
course of such an examination s~ll not 
be admissible except to disclose ~~e in-
formation on which the examiner based 
his opinion, or to impeach the testimony 
of the defendant given at trial cr L~ a 
hearing related to the case: an= 
(Kl participate in the taking or prcd~ction 
of other non-testimonial evidence. 
(2} Reasonable notice of the time and place of 
any personal appearance of the defendant required fer the 
foregoing purposes shall be given by the prosecuting attor-
ney to the defendant and his attorney. An order adrr~~ting 
the defendant to bail or providing for his release may be 
made conditional upon the defendant's appearance for ~~e 
foregoing purposes. 
. . (3) Failure of the defendant to comply wit~ 
th~s ?ectlon shall result in an instruction to the judge 
or jury hearing the case that such refusal may be con-
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(3) names and ad 
upon which the de 
tive defense, 
to incriminate 
ten (10) days r a s osure 
not 
l054.2(c) (1) or l054.2{c) (2) or 1054.2(c) (3}, but in no event 
less than ten (10} days before r the prosecuting attorney 
shall se~ve the defendant or the defendant's attorney a 
written notice stating the names and addresses of the tnesses 
upon whom the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut ~~e 




054.2(dl Documents and Tangible Objects. A defendant who per-
sonal or through defense counsel has requested and received 
ing attorney the disclosures scribed Sec-
tion 5 .l(a) (4) shall within a reasonable time, but in no event 
less than (20) days before trial, permit the prosecuting 
attorney to inspect and copy any books, papers, documents, photo-
( motion pictures and video tapes), or tangib 
objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the 
possession of the defendant and which the defendant intends to 
introduce as evidence in chief at the trial. 
ten (10) days after a disclosure under on 
1054.l(d) in no event less than ten (10} days before trial, 
the prosecuting attorney shall serve upon the defendant or the 
defendant's attorney a written notice stating the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses upon wr~m the prosecuting attorney in-
tends to rely to rebut any of the disclosed evidence. 
* 
l054.2(e) ~:o::ice of Withheld Information. If the defendant or 
the defendant's attorney concludes that portions of information 
wi~in Section 1054.2 contain privileged information, then the 
de_ tor t:.e defendant's attorney may withhold such infor.ma-
t prosecuting attorney is notified that privileged in-
not been disclosed. The notification shall state 
the nature of the privilege and L~e identity of the person 
cla the ivilege. 
1054.3. ReGulation of Discovery. 
(a) Continuina Dutv to Disclose. If, after com?li-
ance with these statutes or orders pursuant thereto, a party or 
attorney discovers additional items or information which is sub-
ject to disclosure, the party or attorney shall promptly notify 
the other par or attorney of the existence of such additional 
items or information, and if the additional items or informa on 
discovered ina trial, the court shall also be notified. 
The items or information shall also be promptly disclosed to the 
other party or attorney. 
1054.3 ) Custodv of Ite:7is or Information. The prosecuti at-
torney may maintain possession, custody and control of all s-
ical evidence, and may monitor any inspection, testing or exam-
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defendant's attorney. If request s made 
dant's attorney, the court shall ho such a ring 
outs the presence of the prosecuting attorney. The party or 
sent at the hearing present dence to ca attorney 
A reporter shall be present at the in camera hearing. 
Any transcription of the proceedings at the camera hearing, 
as well as any physical evidence presented at the hearing, shall 
be ordered sealed by the court, and only a court may order access 




) If at any time during course of the proceed-
brought to the attention court that a party 
to wi these dis or an order 
sued pursuant thereto, the court may party to per-
t the discovery of material and information not previously 
disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such order other than 
dismissal as deemed just under ~~e circumstances. 
(2) Willful violation by an attorney of an applicable 
discovery statute or other order issued pursuant thereto may sub-
ject the attorney to appropriate sanctions the court. 
1054.3(g) Costs. All costs of discovery, including copying 
costs, shall be borne by the person or party seeking discovery. 
Nothing in these statutes shall require that eit:her attorney 
prepare a separate list of witnesses or e~~ibits or other in-
formation if the information itself is contained reports or 
items made available to the opposing party or attorney. 
* 
1054.4. Discoverv of Statements of Witnesses Durinc Trial. 
(a) After a witness other the defendant has 
testified on di~cct examination, the court, on motion of a 
par~y who did not call the witness, shall order prosecut-
ing attorney, or the defendant and the defendant's attorney, 
as the case ~~y be, to produce, for the examination and use 
of the moving party, any statement of the wit:'less t!::.at is in 
their possession, custody or control, that relates to the wit-
ness' testimony. 
Ub) Upon delivery of the statement to the moving 
party, the cour-:, upon application of that party, may recess 
the proceedings in the trial for such reas::!'.able period of ti.:';je 
as to allow for the examination of such state~ent for prep-
aration for its use in the trial. 
(c) As used in this section, ''state..":'lent" of a wit-
ness means: 
(1) a written statement made by ~~e witness 
that is signed or othe~ise adopted or 
approved by hi.m; 
(2) a substantially verbatin recital of an 
oral statement made by the witness that 
is recorded contemporaneously with the 
making of the statement, and tr~t is 
contaL~ed in a stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other recording or trans-
cription thereof; 
(3) a statement made a witness to the grand 
jury, however taken or recorded. 
- 10 - -167-
SECTION BY SECTION AN.~LYSIS 
In th analysis, the following format is used: 
1. The ed wording each se on (or in sene 
cases, sections) of the statute is set forth: 
2. The operation of the section and its purpose are 
sta and 
3. The source of the section, if is c ely rela-
1.:ed to a provision of law, is stated. v1here useful the back-
ground section itself is repeated for comparison. Comparisons 
with er states are treated as examples of representative 
statutes, rather than exhaustively. 
* * 
DISCC:':EPY S'T.Z~.TL"TE - PR::J..MBLE/LEG:kSLATIVE PUP.P0SE 
The Legislature finds and declares that t!1e ?urpcse 
of trial in a crim~nal case is the ascertainment of the truth, 
and t just~ce is put at risk w!1enever information or access 
to infor~at~on is withheld which rnav cast licht on the issues. 
The islature further finds and declares that discover./ a::1d 
disclosure of information by the parties to and from eac!1 other 
in advance of trial aids in the ascertainment of the truth. 
The Sur:;,reme Court of Ca2.~fornia h.avins- invited the 
Leaislature's efforts to codifv criminal discovery law, all 
judicially established provisions concerning discovery and 
disclosure in criminal cases, whether by or from the People 
or or fron the defendant, are hereby abrogated. It is t~e 
inte~t of the Legislature that no discovery or disclos~re shall 
occur in criminal cases except as provided by this Act, by 
other express stat~tory provision, or as mandated by the Con-
stitution of the U~ited States or bv the Constitution of the 
State of California. 
The Legislature also finds and declares that recip-
rocal discovery provisions are <:-ssential to t.~e 'Jrderly ascer-
tainment of the truth in criminal cases no less than in civil 
cases and that, to the fullest extent possible under the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Constltution of the 




The preamble is self-explanatory. 
1054.1. Discovery by Defendant. 
(a) Prosecutor's Obligation. If such a request for 
discovery is made by the defendant or his attorney, such request 
shall be made at or after the arraiqnment on t~e Information or 
Indictm~~t. The request shall be made in writing, filed with 
the Superior Court, and served upon the District Attorney's of-
fice. Except as provided in subdivision (d) of this section fer 
matters not subject to disclosure and in Section 1054.3(d) for 
protect orders, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to 
defendant's attorney within ten (10) days after service and rnake 
available for ins?ection and copying: 
(1) the names and addresses of all witnesses 
then known to him and their material written or recorded 
state~ents, within the prosecuting attorney's possession. 
Witnesses means eyewitnesses, percipient witnesses, custo-
dia;:s of material records, and persons whom the prosecl:.ting 
attcrne: then inte;:ds to use in the trial; 
(2) all writte;: or recorded statements and the 
s;;l:stance of any material oral stateme::ts made by the de-
fendant, or r:1ade by a codefenda:-.t or accomplice; 
(3) all rePorts or stater:1e::ts of experts made 
in ccr.nect~on with the particular case, including the re-
su ts of physical or mental examinations and of scientific 
tes~s, experil':1ents or conparisons: 
(4) all books, papers, docurne;:ts, photographs 
(including motion pictures and video tapes), wri ti.ngs, or 
tangible otjects, or copies or portior:s ~~ereof, whic~ are 
material to t~e preparation or presenta~:on of the defense, 
or w~ich t~e prosecuting attorney then intends to use in 
the trial, or which were obtained from or belong to the 
defenda:~t; and 
15) the record of felony convictions of any wit-
ness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the out-
come of the trial. 
If the prosecuti:~g attorney concludes that portions of informa-
tion within Sect:on 1054.l(a) contain privileged information, 
then the prosecuting attor:~ey may withhold s'Jch information if 
the defendant or his attornev is notified t~at privileged infor-
mation has Aot bee;: disclose~. The notificat:on shall state the 
nature of the privilege and the identity of the person claiming 
the privilege. 
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COMMENTS 
Section 1054.l(a) provides information to which the 
defendant is currently entitled under California case law. 
While a defendant is not required by the proposed statute to 
request this information, if he does request the information 
he will be allowed to obtain it without showing cause and he 
will also be obligated to provide reciprocal discovery to the 
extent listed in the statute. 
The request procedure applies only in Superior Court. 
:iscoverv before Superior Court proceedings is governed by 
Section l054.l(e). 
T~ese case holdings were relied upon in the form~:a-
~f 1054.1: 
Prior state~ents of defense witnesses. 
Peocle v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737 11957) 
2. Identity of an info~ant material to guilt or innocence. 
People v. ~cShann, 50 Cal.2d 802 (1958) 
3. Recordings of the defendant's conversations wi~~ police 
and a victim's statement played for tte de~endant durinc 
the conversaticn. 
Vance v. Sucerior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92 (1958) 
4. Written statements of prosecution witnesses. 
Funk v. Sucerior Court, 52 Cal.2d 423 {1959) 
5. Duty to disclose and preserve evidence favorable to the 
defense. 
Peocle v. Hitct, 12 Cal.3d 641 11974) 
6. Recordings of conversations between the defendant and an 
undercover police officer in a solicitation case. 
Cash v. Sucerior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72 (1959) 
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7 Notes used by a prosecution witness to refresh recollection. 
People v. Estrada, 54 Cal.2d 713 (1960) 
B. Trial court discretion concerning the timing of disclosure 
of prosecution witnesses. 
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223 (1963) 
9. Trial court may excise unrelated matters from a witness' 
prior testimony when privileges apply. 
In Re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965) 
10. Discovery and preservation of notes of police officer. 
Peoole v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.2d 733 (1981) 
11. Judicial discretion in formulating discovery rules in the 
absence of legislation. 
Joe Z. v. Suoericr Court, 3 Cal.3d 797 (1970) 
Shively v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.2d 475 (1966} 
Hill v. Suoerior Court, 10 Cal.3d 812 (1974) 
Some of the language in Section 1054.l(a) comes from 
fede=al discovery rules, e.g., the prosecuting attorney's 
"possession, c;.;stody, or control;" Fed.Rule 16(a)(l).(c}. This 
lang~age has been interpreted to include bank records in the 
oossession of the prosecuting attorney, where such records were 
obtained by the government through seizure or process. U.S. v. 
Fanche=, 195 F.Supp. 448 (1961). On the other hand, where the 
documents remain outside the control of the prosecuting attor-
ney's agency, the defense may be required to use a subpoena or 
other legal process to obtain the do...-:...-:n:nts direct1y from the third 
party. Thor v. u.s., 574 F.2d 215 <1978). 
Some of the language in Section l054.l(a) comes from 
the 1970 ABA standards. In particular, ABA Standard 2.l(a) 
provides: 
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2.1 Prosecutor's obligations. 
(a) Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not 
subject to disclosure (section 2.6) and protective orders (sec-
tion 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense 
counsel the following material and information within his 
possession or control: 
(i) the names an~ addresses of persons whom the pro-
secuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hear-
ing or trial, together with their relevant written or re-
corded statements: 
(ii) any written or recorded statements and ~~e sub-
stance of any oral statements made by the accused, or made 
by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one; 
(iii) ~~ose portions of grand jury ~inutes containing 
testimony of the accused and relevant testimony of persons 
whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witr.esses 
at t~e hearing or trial; 
(iv) any reports or state~ents of expe=ts, made in 
cc~nection with the partic~la= case, includi~g res~l~s cf 
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, 
experiments or comparisons: 
(v) any books, papers, documents, photographs or 
tangible objects, which the prosecuting attorney inte~ds 
to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from 
or belong to the accused; and 
{vi) any record of prior criminal convictions of per-
sons who~ the prosecuting attorneyinta~ds to call as wit-
nesses at the hearing or trial. 
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* * * 
l054.l(b) Collateral or Exculpatory Matter Without Request. 
The prosecuting attorney shall without request within a rea-
sonab time of learning of the information disclose to de-
fendant's attorney: 
(1) whether there is any information relating to 
guilt or innocence which has been provided by an informant: 
{2) whether there are any material grand jt.try pro-
ceedings which have not been transcribed: 
(3) whether there has been any electronic surveil-
lance of material conversations to which the defendant was a 
party or of his premises; and 
(4) all substantial material evidence within his 
possession favorable to the defendant, whether relati~g to 
guilt, punishment, or the credibility of a prose=ution witness. 
COH~1EN':'S 
Section 1054.1~) provides fer the automatic disclo-
s~re without request from defense counsel of the following in-
formation: exculpatory information under Bradv and Ferguson, 
and a notice to the defense of the existence of informants, un-
transcribed proceedings, and electronic surveillance. Once such 
a notice has beer. given, then the issue can be resolved by motion 
o!' agreeme:~t. 
~nder California case law, disclosure o: the exist-
e:~ce of surveilla:~ce or lnformant information is particularly 
relevant if it could be exculpatory. People v. Ruthford, 14 
Cal.3d 399 (1975). 
Th~s notice procedure is similar to that currently 
. used in PC 859, which allows privileged information to be wi~~-
held from the defense if the defense is notifie~ that there is 
some privileged i!if ormation which is being •.vi thhe ld: 
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" ... the prosecuting attorney shall, within two calendar 
days, deliver to, or make accessible for inspection and 
copying by, the defendant or counsel, copies of police, 
arrest and crime reports. Portions of such reports con-
taining privileged information need not be disclosed if 
the defendant or counsel has been notified that privi-
leged information has not been disclosed." PC 859 
Similar language appears in ABA Standards 2.l(b) 
and 2.l(c): 
(b) The prosecuting attorney shall inform defense counsel: 
(i) if he has any relevant material or information 
which has been provided by an informant: 
(ii) if there is any relevant grand j~ry testimony 
which has not been transcribed; and 
(iii) if there has been anv electronic surveillance 
(including wiretapping) of c~r.~ersations to which the 
accused was a party or of his premises. 
(c) Except as is otherwise :t:rovidec'! as to protective or-
ders (section 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to 
defense counsel any material or infor~ation within his posses-
sion or contr~l which tends to negate the guilt of the acc~sed 
as to the offe:.se charaed or wo~ld tend to reduce his ounishment 
therefor. ~ -
t 
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* * * 
1054.1(c) Scope. The prosecuting attorney's obligations under 
subdivisions C~l and (b) of this section extend to all items 
or· information to which a defendant is entitled under these 
statutes and which is in the possession of the prosecuting at-
torney or members of the prosecuting attorney's staff. 
COMMENTS 
The phrase "possession, custody or control" is taken 
from the federal rules. F.R.Cr.P. 16(a) (1) (c). If ~~e defense 
can point out other material in the possession of another govern-
mental agency, our ensuing responsibility is to use reasonable 
good faith efforts to make it available. The federal standar1 
for this effort calls for the exercise of due diligence to know 
of such information. 
The ABA standards for this effort are §§2.l(rl}, 2.2 
and 2.4: 
2.1 Prosecutor's obligations. 
(d) The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this 
section extend to material and information in the pcssess1on 
or control of me~~ers of his staff and of anv others who have 
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case 
and who either reoularlv renort or with reference to ~he par-
ticular case ~ave reported to this office. 
2.2 Prosecutor's performance of obligations. 
(a) The prosecuting attorney should perform his o~liga­
tions under section 2.1 as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges against the accused. 
(b) The prosecuting attorney may perform these obliga-
tions in any rr~nner mutually agreeable to himself and defense 
counsel or by: 
(i) notifying defense counsel that material and in-
formatlon, described in general terms, may be inspected, 
obtained, tested, copied or photographed, during speci-
fied, reasonable times; and 
(ii} making available to defense counsel at the time 
specified such material and information, and suitable fa-
cilities or other arrangements for inspection, testing, 
copying and photographing such material and infer-nation. 
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(c) The prosecuting attorney should ensure that a flow 
of information is maintained between the various investigative 
personnel and his office sufficient to place within his posses-
sion or control all material and information relevant to the 
accused and the offense charged. 
2.4 Material held by other governmental personnel. 
Upon defense counsel's request and designation of material 
or information which would be discoverable if in the possession 
or control of the prosecuting attorney and which is in the pos-
session or con~rol of other governmental personnel, the prose-
cuting attorney shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause 
such material to be made available to defense counsel; and if 
t~e prosecuting attorney's efforts are unsuccessful and such 
material or other governmental personnel are subject to the 
jurisdication of the court, the court shall issue suitable sub-
poe:Jas or orcers to cause such material to be ma::le a':al :a::.:e tc 
de~ense counsel. 
Ot~er states have si~llar ::lescriptions of the prosecu-
tor's respcns1=ility: see, e.g., 
Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.1 (d) 
Cc.>:::-.ecticu": Fc..:les o: Cri.rninal Procedure 54-86 Cal 
Florida ?'..lles of Criminal Procedure 3.220 (a) (1) 
Kar.sas S<:at'..ltes §22-3212 11) (a) 
~ebraska Stat'..ltes §29-1914 
~evada Statutes §174,235(1) 
~,;ew York Laws of Criminal Procedure §240.20(2) 
Sout~ Dakota Codified Laws 23 A-13-1!1) 
Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 (a) (l) 
Was~lngt=~ Revised Code §4.7(a) Ill 
Wes<: Virglnia Code § 62-lB-2 
l<'yoming ?;;.les of Criminal Procedure 18 (al (2) 
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* * * 
1054.l(d) Matters Not Subject to Disclosure. 
(1) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required 
of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or 
memoranda to the extent that they contain the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the prose-
cuting attorney or members of his legal staff. 
{2) Statutory Privileges. All existing statutory 
privileges against disclosure are not to be affected by ~~is 
section. 
COM!'1E~"TS 
Section 1054.l(d) establis~es a prosecution work pro-
duct privilege, subject to waiver during the trial. See section 
1054.4. Parallel language is used to protect the defense work 
product under section l054.2(b). 
Informant identity is also protected in t~is section. 
This section, plus t~e preamble to the statute, should make it 
clear that there is no intention to change the current statutory 
procedures rela~ing to disclosure of informant's identity or 
official infor.nation. Evidence Code §§ 1040-1042. 
The parallel ABA standard is 2.6: 
2.6 Matters not subject to disclosure~ 
(a) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required of 
legal research or of records, correspondence, re?orts or menor-
anda to the extent that thev contain the ooinions, theories or 
conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or member? of his legal 
staff. 
(b) Infor::-.ants. Disclosure of an informant's identity 
shall not be required where his identity is a prosecution secret 
and a failure to disclose will not infringe the constitutional 
rights of the accused. Disclosure shall not be denied hereunder 
of the identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearinq or trial. 
(c) National securitv. Disclosure shall ~ot be required 
where it invo:ves a substantial rlsk of grave prejudice to na-
tional security and a failure to disclose will not infringe the 
constituti6nal rights of the accusen. Disclosure shall not thus 
be denied hereunder regarding witnesses or materlal to be pro-
duced at a hearing or trial. 
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* * * 
l054.l(el Discovery Before Superior Court Arraignment. Discov-
ery pursuant to section lOS4.l(e) shall be the exclusive means 
of discovery by the defendant or his attorney prior to the pre-
liminary examination. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose 
and make available for inspection and copying: 
(1) items furnished pursuant to Penal Code sections 
859 and 1430~ 
(2) all substantial material evidence known to the 
prosecuting attorney and within his possession, custody, or 
control favorable to the defendant, whether relating to guilt, 
punishment, or the credibility of a prosecution witness; and 
(3) the results of a line-up when ordered by a court 
where eyewitness identification is a material issue and where 
there exists a reasonable likelih~od of a ~istake~ ide~~ifi:a­
tion that a lineup would tend to resolve. 
COMME~TS 
Sectior. l054.l(e) states a legislative purpose ~~at 
the only pre-preliminary hearing discover] is the material fur-
nished under Pe~al Code sections 859 and 1430, for felonies and 
~isde~eanor charcres, respectively. T~ this material ~ust be 
added the exculpatory material under Bradv and ~e~auscn. 
Hcl::-.a:: v. Suoerior Court, 29 Cal.3d 480 (19811, held 
that courts de have discretion to order pre-prelireinary hearing 
discovery upon a proper showing. By a legislative s:atement 
concerning such discovery, the statute should pre-empt the 
field, much as statutes prevented a pretrial deposition in 
criminal cases. Peoole v. Mu.:;icioal C:ourt (P.unvanl, 20 Cal.3d 
523 11978). 
This section depends on continued rulings that there 
is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, ether 
' 
than for exculpatory material. It is felt that the discovery 
mentioned (arrest, crime and police reports) will be sufficient 
to satisfy any cross exa~ination or confrontation rights as they 
would be interpreted by the courts. 
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1054.2 * * * Disclosure to the Prosecution. 
(a) The Person of the Defendant. 
(1) The prosecuting attorney may require the 
defendant to: 
(A) participate in lineups: 
(B} speak for identification by witnesses; 
(C) be fingerprinted: 
(D) pose for photographs; 
(E) try on articles of clothing; 
(F) permit the taking of specimens of 
material under his fingernails; 
(G) permit the taking of samples of his 
blood, hair an~ other bodily items 
which involve no unreasonable intru-
sion thereof; 
(H) provide specimens of his handwriting; 
(I) submit to a reasonable physical or 
medical examination; 
(Jl submit to a reasonable mental examina-
tion, if a plea of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity has been entered, or 
if notice of intent is given, as de-
scribed by subdivision (c) to rely upon 
a defense related to mental disease, 
mental defec~, mental disorder. intoxi-
cation or other cause tending to negate 
the existence of a mental state essen-
tial to guilt, or to mltigate punishment. 
Statements of tte de!er.dan~ rr~de in t~e 
course of such an examination shall r.at 
be admissible except to disclose the in-
formation on which the examiner based 
his opinion, or to impeach the testimony 
of the defendant given at trial or in a 
hearing related to the case; and 
(K) participa~e in the taking or production 
of other non-~estirnonial evidence. 
!2) Reasonable notice of the time and place of 
any p€rsonal appearance of the defendant reauired for the 
foregoing purposes shall be given by the prosecuting attor-
ney to_the defendant and his attorney. An order admitting 
the defendant to bail cr providing for his release may be 
made c=nditional upon the defennant's appearance for the 
foregoing purposes. 
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(3) Failure of the defendant to comply with 
this section shall result in an instruction to the judge 
or jury hearing the case that such refusal may be con-
sidered as consciousness of nuilt. 
Section 1054.2(a) restates the principle of automa-
tic discovery of non-testimonial evidence. The list is not 
exclusive, to allow for further development of this area of law. 
7his section does not affect a~y investi~ative proce-
dures before the initiation of a criminal complaint. 
Subsection (2) codifies what in 7lost cc.:::-.:::....:s is t:Ce: 
practice: reasonable notice of the taking of sue:: evidence. 
B~t no court order is required under this section, and it is 
r.cped :..~at the codification of t!-.is kind of discc\•ery will re-
sult in fewer opposition motions being filed by the defense and 
in fewer de:r,a~ds on court time for such motions. 
~he final se~tence allows bail to be conditioned on 
a;:: ar ar.ce fer t::e taki:~g of non-test.i.-"'"Cnial evide:1ce, t.~ us 
trea~i~g sue:: ap;::earance with the authority of a court apnear-
ance. 
ABA standard 3.1 provides: 
3.1 ~he person of the accused. 
!al ~ot~~t::standing the initiation of judicial proceed-
in~s, and subject to constitutional limitations, a jud:cial 
officer ~ay req~ire the accused to: 
ti) appear in a line-up; 
Iii) speak for identification by witnesses to an 
offense; 
(iii) be fingerprinted; 
livJ pose for photographs not involving reenactment 
of a scene; 
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(.v} try on articles of clothing: 
(vi) permit the taking of specimen of material 
under his fingernails: 
(vii) permit the taking of samples of his blood, 
hair and ot~er materials of his body which 
involve no unreasonable intrusion thereof; 
(viii) provide specimens of his handwriting; and 
(ix) submit to a reasonable physical or medical 
inspection of his body. 
{b) Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is 
required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the 
ti~e and place of such Appearance shall be given by the prose-
cuting attC",rney to the accused and his counsel. Provision .may 
be made for appearances for such purposes in an order a~uitt~ng 
the accused to bail or providing for his release. 
ABA standard 3.2 states: 
3.2 Medical and scientific reports. 
S'Jbject to constitutional limitations, the trial court may 
require that the prosecuting attorney be infor~ed of and permit-
ted to inspect and copy or photograph any reports or results, or 
tes~incr.v relative t~ereto, of o~vsical or mental ex~~inations 
or of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other 
repcrts or statements of ex?erts which defense counsel intends 
to ~se a~ a hearing or trial. 
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* * 
1054.2(b) Medical and Scientific Reports. A defendant who 
himself or through his attorney has requested and received 
from the prosecuting attorney the disclosures described in 
section 1054.l(a) (3) shall, within a reasonable time, inform 
the prosecuting attorney of and permit the prosecuting attor-
ney to inspect and copy any reports or results, or testimony 
relative t~ereto, of physical or mental examinations or of 
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other 
reports or statements of experts which the de~ense intends 
to use at a hearino or trial. In disclosino such information, 
~~e defendant or defense attorney may request an order, under 
section 1054.3(c) and 1054.3(e) protecting against disclosure 
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of defendant's attorney, members of his staff, or 
other ~ts of ~~e defense, including investigators. 
COWK..ENTS 
Section 1054.2(b) requires the defense, if a request 
is made for medical and scientific evidence from the prosecu-
tic~, to disclose expert materials upon which the defense in-
tends to rely at trial. 
Pr~vision is made for protective orders if privileged 
in!crrnation is contained in the reports, or other items. ~ote 
that eve~ this privilege will be waived by testimonial use of 
the material, under section 1054.4. (Discovery during trial.) 
Federal rule 16(b) (1) {.9) states: 
Reports c: exar.:inat ions and tests. If the defe:~dant 
requests disclosure under subdiv1sicn (a) (1) (C) or (D) 
of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the 
government, the defendant, on reauest of the aover~~ent, 
shall pe~it the government to i~spect and copy or pho-
tograph any results or reports of physical or mental ex-
aminations and of scientific tests or experiments made 
in connection with the particular case, or copies t~ere­
of, wit~in the possession or control of the defendar.t, 
which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in 
chief at the trial or which were prepared by a witness 
whom the defendant intends to call at t~e trial when t~e 
results or reports relate to his testimony. 
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ABA standard 3.2 states: 
3.2 Medical and scientific reports. 
Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court 
may require that the prosecuting attorney be informed of and 
permitted to inspect and copy or photograph any reports or 
results, or testimony relative thereto, of physical or mental 
examinations or of scientific tests, experiments or compari-
sons, or any other reports or statements of experts which 
defense counsel intends to use at a hearing or trial. 
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* * * 
1054.2(c) Witnesses. A defendant who personally or through 
defense counsel has requested and received from the prosecut-
ing attorney the disclosures described in Section 1054.l(a} (1) 
shall within a reasonable time, but in no event less than twen-
ty (20) days before trial, disclose to the prosecuting attorney: 
(1) the names and addresses of witnesses upon whom and 
other evidence upcn which the defendant intends to rely to estab-
lish that the defendant was not present at the time, date, and 
place at which the alleged offense was committed; 
(2) the names and addresses of persons upon whose ex-
pert testimony and defendant intends to reply with respect to 
me~tal disease, mental defect, mental disorder, intoxication or 
other cause tending to negate the existence of a mental state es-
sential to guilt, or to mitigate punishment. Notwithstanding 
any oL~er provision of law, if the notice of intent to rely upon 
expert witnesses given hereunder by a defendant is such as under 
the circumstances to require further trial preparation by the 
prosecuting attorney, a reasonable continuance for that purpose 
shall be granted by the court; 
(3) the names and addresses of persons upon whom and 
other evidence upon which the defendant intends to rely to es-
tablish an affirmative defense, when such evidence does not 
have a tendency to incriminate the defendant. 
Within ten (10) days after a disclosure under Section 
l054.2(c) Ill or l054.2(c) (2) or l054.2rc) (3), but in no event 
less than ten 110) days before trial, the prosecuting attorney 
shall serve upon the defendant or the defenda~t's attorney a 
written notice statino the names and addresses of the ~itnesses 
upon whom the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut the 
testimony of any of the disclosed witnesses. 
COMMFNTS 
Section l054.2(c) provi~es pretrial prcsecu~icn dis-
covery of alibi and expert testimony, if the defe::se requests 
the names, addresses, reports, etc., of ~rosecution witnesses. 
These two areas were selected as the only apparent 
areas of constitutional validity in pretrial prosecuticn dis-
covery in California. Jones v. Suoerior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56 
(19621: Re1nolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 334 (1974}. 
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Notice to the prosecution of such testimony must be 
20 or more days before trial; the prosecution must provide re-
buttal information 10 or more days before trial. Both duties are 
subject to a continuing duty to disclose under section 1054.3(a). 
Federal Rule 12.1 provides the alibi notice· model: 
Rule 12.1 
NOTICE OF ALIBI 
(a) Notice by defendant. Upon written demand of the 
attorney for the government stating the time, date, and 
place at which the alleged offense was committed, the de-
fendant whall serve within ten days, or at such different 
time as the court mav direct, upon the attornev for the 
government a written notice of his intention to offer a 
defense of alibi. Such notice bv the defendant shall state 
the specific place or places at which the defendant claims 
to tave been at the time of the alleged offense and the 
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends 
to rely to establish such alibi. 
(b} Disclosure of information and witnesses. Within 
ten davs thereafter, but in no event less than ten days 
before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the at-
torney for the government shall serve upon the defendant 
or his attornev a written notice statina the names and 
addresses cf the witnesses upon whom the government intends 
to rely to establish the defendant's presence at the scene 
of the alleged offense and any other witnesses to be relied 
on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi wit-
nesses. 
(c) Continuing duty to disclose. If prior to or dur-
ing trial, a party learns of an ad~itional witness whose 
identity, if known, should have oeen included in the infor-
mation furnished under subdivision (a) or (b), the party 
shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney of the 
existence and identity of such additional witness. 
(d) Failure to comply. Upon the failure of either 
party to comply with the requirements of this rule, the 
court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness 
offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or 
presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This rule 
shall net limit the right of the defendant to testify in 
his own behalf. · 
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(e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court 
may grant an exception to any of the requirements of 
subdivisions (a) through (b) of this rule. 
(f) Inadmissibility of withdrawn alibi. Evidence 
of an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later with-
drawn, or of statements made in connection with such in-
tention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding against the person who gave notice of the intentio~. 
Added April 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975; amended July 31, 
1975, Pub.L.94-64, §3(13), 89 Stat.372 . 
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* * * 
1054.2(dl Documents and Tangible Ob~ects. A defendant who per-
sonally or through defense counsel as requested and received 
from the prosecuting attorney the disclosures described in Sec-
tion 1054.l(a) (4) shall within a reasonable time, but in no event 
less than twenty (20) days before trial, permit the prosecuting 
attorney to inspect and copy any books, papers, documents, photo-
graphs (including motion pictures and video tapes), or tangible 
objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the 
possession of the defendant and which the defendant intends to 
introduce as evidence in chief at the trial. 
Within ten (10) days after a disclosure under Section 
1054.l(d), but in no event less than ten (10) days before trial, 
the prosecuting attorney shall serve upon the defendant or the 
defendant's attorney a written notice stating the names and ad-
dresses of the witnesses upon whom the prosecuting attorney in-
tends to rely to rebut any of the disclosed evidence. 
COMHENTS 
Sec~ion 1054.l(d) provides reciprocal disclosure ob-
ligations for documents and other real evidence. The language 
is from Federal Rule 16 (b) (l) (A): 
(A) Documents and tanaible ob~ects. If the defendant 
reques~s disclosure under subdivision (a) (1) (C) or (D) of 
this rule, upon compliance with such request by the govern-
ment, ~~e defendant, on request of the government, shall per-
mit the g-overnment to inspect and copy or photograph books, 
papers, documents, photographs, tang;i.bie objects, or copies 
or port:.o:1s thereof, which are within the possession, custody, 
or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends 
to introd~ce as evidence in chief at the trial. 
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* * * 
l054.2(e) Notice of Withheld Information. If the defendant or 
the defendant's attorney concludes that portions of information 
within Section 1054.2 contain privileged information, then the 
defendant or the defendant's attorney may withhold such informa-
tion if the prosecuting attorney is notified that privileged in-
formation has not been disclosed. The notification shall state 
the nature of the privilege and the identity of the person 
claiming the privilege. 
C0~1ENTS 
Section l054.2(e) provides notice to the prosecution 
if the defense intends to claim a privilege or to withhold as-
sertedly privileged information. This notice, in turn, provides 
the basis for further motions by the prosecuting attorney if de-
sired to obtain a court order verifying the existence cf a priv-
i lege or allowing the excision of the pri '\!i leged ir.f.or.::a :ion. 
This section is parallel to the section which requires 
t:-.e t:rosec:.:tio:: to notify the defe:::se if privileged infor:r..aticn 
~s being withheld. Section 1054.1(a). 
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* * * 
1054.3. Regulaticn of Discovery. 
(a) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If, after compli-
ance with these statutes or orders pursuant thereto, a party or 
attorney discovers additional items or information which is sub-
ject to disclosure, the party or attorney shall promptly notify 
the other party or attorney of the existence of such additional 
items or information, and if the additional items or information 
is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified. 
The items or information shall also be promptly disclosed to the 
other party or attorney. 
Section 1054.3(a) prov~des a continuing duty of dis-
closure, including a duty during trial. More specific duties 
concerning discovery during trial are provided in section 1054.4. 
A continuing duty was felt to be necessary to avoid 
abuse of the discovery system. The standard of "prompt" dis-
closure was meant to insure that quicker discovery occurs after 
the initial compliance by both parties, and as trial preparation 
evolves. 
Sirnilar language is used in Federal Rule 16(c~: 
lc) Continuing auty to disclose. If, prior to or 
during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or 
material previously requested or ordered, which is sub-
ject to discovert or inspection under this rule, he shall 
promptly notify the other party or his attorney or the 
court of the existence of the additional evidence or 
material. 
ABA Standard 4.2 states: 
4.2 Continuing duty to disclose. 
r:, subseauent to comoliance with these standards or 
orders pursuant thereto, a"party discovers additional ma-
terial or information whic~ is subject to disclosure, hP 
shall 'promptly notify the other party or his counsel of 
the existence of such addit1onal material, and if the 
additional material or information is discovered during 
trial, the court shall also be notified. 
-189-
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l054.3(b) Custody of Items or Information. The prosecuting at-
torney rnay maintain possession, custody and control of all phys-
ical evidence, and may monitor any inspection, testing or exam-
ination of such evidence in person or by having a representative 
present. 
Any items furnished to an attorney pursuant to these 
statutes shall remain in the attorney's exclusive custody and 
be used only for the purposes of conducting the attorney's side 
of the case. This rule shall not prohibit counsel from trans-
ferring any items to other substitute counsel. Custody of any 
items or information shall be subject to such other terms and 
conditions as the court may provide. 
The defense attorney may maintain possession, custody, 
and control of all physical evidence produced by t~e defe~se 
pursuant to Section 1054.2, and may monitor any inspection, 
test1ng or examination of such evidence in person or by having 
a representative present. 
Section 1054.3~) provides that opposing counsel has 
the responsibility and ~,e authority for custody of the ~a~er-
ials subject to discovery or exa~ination. This was included to 
prevent client abuses or use for unrelated purposes~ The obli-
sation extends to both parties in the case; sanctions for Vlola-
tions s~ould be part of section l054.3(f). 
The language stems from ABA Standard 4.3: 
4.3 Custodv of materials. 
Any materials furnished to an attorney pursuant to 
these standards shall remain in his exclusive custody and 
be used only for the purnoses of conductinq his side of 
the case, and shall be subject to such other terms a~d 
conditions as the court may prov1de. 
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1054.3(c) Protective Orders. Upon a showing of good cause, the 
court may at any time order that specified disclosures be denied, 
restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropri-
ate provided that all items and information to which a party or 
attorney is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit the 
party's attorney to make beneficial use thereof. "Good cause" 
includes threats to the safety of a victim or witness, possible 
loss or destruction of evidence, and threats to the integrity 
of the case. 
COMHENTS 
Section 1054.3(c) gives the court the latitude tore-
strict disclosure for "cause". The limitation is that the tim-
of disclosure must be in time to make use of the material. 
The source of this language is 1970 ABA Standard 4.4: 
4.4 Protec~ive orders. 
Cpon a showing of cause, the court may at any time 
order that specified disclosures be restricted or deferred, 
or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that 
all matieral and information to which a party is entitled 
must be disclosed in time to permit his counsel to make 
beneficial use thereof. 
The de:fini tion of "good cause" is a troublesome fea-
ture. The alternative is to try to list all possible "causes" 
which could justify restrictions on disclosure, including priv-
ileges of varic~s types, personal safety reasons, or perhaps 
some unar.ticipa~ed reasons that would justify restrictions on 
disclosure. This statement of "good cause" may provide a con-
stitutionally saving feat~re, although one would hope that the 
phrase "good ca'.::.se" would not be interpreted so broadly as to 
negate any sigr.~ficant discovery. 
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Federal Rule l6(d) (1) uses the phrase "sufficient 
showing": 
(d) Regulation of discovery 
(1) Protective and modifying orders. Upon a suffi-
cient showing the court may at any time order that the dis-
covery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or 
make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a 
party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, 
in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an or-
der granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the 
entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed a~d pre-
served in the records of the court to be made available to 
the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
The 1970 ABA comments refer to intimidation of wit-
nesses, or harm tc witnesses, or thwarting an on-going i~vesti-
gation. The 1978 ABA comMents refer to witness or victi~ th=ea~s, 
possible loss or destruction of evidence, or threats to the in-
tegrity of the case. All co~~~ments are in agreement that only 
exce?tional circumstances are wi n th provision. 
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l054.3(d) Excision. When portions of items or information are 
discoverable under these statutes, and other portions are not 
discoverable, the nondiscoverable portions may be excised by 
order under subdivision (c) of this section. Items or informa-
tion excised pursuant to judicial order shall be ordered sealed 
by the court, and only a court may order access to the sealed 
contents. 
CO}II(t.~ENTS 
Section 1054.3(d) provides the practical remedy of 
excision of privileged or non-disclosable matter, while requir-
ing the disclosure of the balance of the informa~ion. 
This section is also based on the 1970 ABA Standards. 
The record is preserved for appeal purposes, a standard feature 
whe~ dealing with privileged information of any sort. The pre-
servation is also suggested in the 1970 ABA Standards: 
4.5 Excision. 
hTien some parts of certain material are discoverable 
~~der these standards, and other parts not discoverable, 
as much of thematerial should be disclosed as is consistent 
with the standarJs. Excision of certain material and dis-
closure of the balance is preferable to withholding the 
whole. Material excised pursuant to judicial order shall 
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court, to be 
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sent evidence to show cause. 
A reporter shall 
Any transcription of the 
be present at the in camera hearing. 
as well as any physical evidence 
be ordered sealed by the court, and 
to its contents. 
at camera hearing, 
ted at the hearing, shall 
a court may order access 
Section 1054.3(e) prov des for ::arr.era proceedi.:1ss 
when necessary to show that non-d sc ure or restricted disclo-
sure should be ordered or al 
the 1970 ABA Stan 
4.6 In camera proceed s. 
Cpon re~uest of any 
showing of cause for denia 
or portion of such showing 
ore shall be made of such 
section also stems from 
rson, the court may permit any 
re ation or disclosures, 
be made in camera. A rec-
an order granting relief fol 
If the court enters 
a showing in camera, the 
be sealed and preserved 
available to the 
entire record of such 
in the records of the cour 
a?pellate court in the 
Federal Rule 16 (d) (1) also ing by a judge 
Although there s lifornia a threshhold 
ngs are allowed, such 
a showing is usually min 1. 
This draft would retain a requirement that the moving 
party show that in camera proceeding.s ·are "reasonably necessary". 
While this allows considerable discretion to the trial court, 




(1) If at any the course of the proceed-
ings it is brought to the court that a party 
has failed to comply with discovery statutes or an order 
issued pursuant thereto, court order such party to per-
mit the discovery of material tion not previously 
disclosed, grant a continuance, such order other than 
dismissal as deemed just under tances. 
(2) Willful violat 
discovery statute or other or 
je~t the attor~eJ to 
attorney of an applicable 
pursuant thereto ffiay sub-
ens by the court. 
Section 1054.3(f) provides sanctions for viola-
tions of the discovery statute or any orders relating to the 
dis::::8ver:'· Sa:-.c:ions are :::!:::.·:·:.8 r"ecessary to prevent abuses. 
~his sanction section des very general remedies 
!or v:c:a~:~~s. Many other state ave general sanction sec-
t~ons. See, e.g., Ver~ont P~ e of nal Proced~re 12.1 (c). 
Cthe!: states soecifi 1 ts cf sanctions, but 
alsc cften include a general s ct on t allo~s the trial 
court to fashion a particular re~e See, e.g., Arizona Rules 
lor da Pules cf Cri~inal Proce-
dure 3.22IJ). ~ebraska Statutes §29-1919, ~evada Statutes 
§174.295, ~ew York Laws on Cr 
vania Statutes §305(d , 
Rules cf Crimi~al Procedure 1 
The second half of 
conte~?t as a sanction, tho 





a Laws 13 A-13-1 7 , i<Jyom.i.ng 
section designed to include 
tai ly fines or other reme-
- to the extent that 
96-
constitutional provis s or prosecutor-
ial immunity are not 
The 1970 ABA 
4.7 Sanctions. 
(a) If at any time dur course of the 
proceedings it is brought to the atten of the 
court that a party has failed to comply with an 
applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursu-
ant thereto, the court may order such to permit 
the discove of material informat not previ-
ously disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such 
other order as deems just under the circumstances. 
(b) Willful violations by counsel of an applic-
able discovery rule or an order issued p~rsuant there-
to may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the 
court. 
Federal Rule 16 (d) ( 2 J provides a sanction: 
(2) Failure to comp with a t. If at any time 
during the course of the proceed is brought to the 
a~tention of the court that a par failed to comply 
with this rule, the court may rty to perm~t 
t~e discovery or in ction, grant a nuance, or pro-
hibit the pa from cueing evidence not sclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems ust under the 
circurnsta;,ces. The court may specify the time, lace and 
-~anner of making the discovery and inspection may pre-
scribe sue~ terms and condit s as are ust. 
1054.3(g) Costs. All costs of discovery, including copying 
costs, shall be borne by the person or party seeking discovery. 
Nothing in t."lese statutes shall reauire that either attorney 
prepare a separate list of witnesses or exhibits or other in-
formation if the information itself is contained in reports or 
items made available to the opposing party or attorney. 
COMMENTS 
Section 1054.3(g) clarifies ~"le allocation of costs 
involved in discovery. Furthermore, the section makes it clear 
that the statute does not require any additional documents or 
lists, beyond reports that are currer.tly available. 
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a na case 
t 
ce a tness takes the st any pre-
vious!y recorded statements that tnes to the 
4 
testimony elicited on direct examination or cross-examination 
become subject to disclosure to the party who did not call that 
witness. Should such statements, as defined in §1054.4(c), exist, 
the court has the power to grant a recess, of reasonable length, 
in order that the moving party may examine such statements and 
prepare for their use in trial. While such recesses may dis-
rupt the continuity of the proceedings, it is hoped that in prac-
tice such statements will be turned ever prier to the witness' 
taking the stand as has been the practice in the federal courts 
under F.R.Cr.P. 26.2. 
sr.ould the non-moving party claim t!i.at parts of t'"le 
witness' recorded statement do not relate to t!i.e testimony elic-
ited of that witness, or that certain privileges apply, or that 
such statements contain sensitive information t!i.e revealing of 
which would cause harm, sect s 1054.3 (c) (d) and (e) which reg-
ulate protective orders, excision, and i~ camera inspection wo~ld 
apply. Furthermore, §1054.3(£) which is concer?led ·with sanctior:s 
for non-compliance would regulate any problems arising from re-
fusals to provide such statements. Sanctions under §1Q54.4 would 
include the court's striking the witness' testimony should the 
non-::tcving party refuse to comp with its terms. 
Section 1054.4 is based almost entirely on Rule 26.2 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 26.2 was adcp~ed 
by Congress on Apr~l 30, 1979, ann became effective on Decer.~er 1, 
1980. The Rule was adopted as a response to the decision of t~e 
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 
-200-
- 43 -
225 (1975) [Notes of Advisory Committee on es]. In Nobles, 
a case involving a claim of wrongful to a of 
bankrobbery, defense counsel to his s-
tigator on the stand to impeach a government witness based on 
statements the witness had allegea made to the investigator 
at a time closer to the occurrence of the offense. The court 
upheld the trial court's ruling de counsel d not 
call the investigator to the stand until he complied with a 
request from the attorney for the government to allow hL~ to 
examine the statements allegedly made to the investigator. Rule 
26.2, the:1, combined the decision in Nobles with language from 
the ~encks Act. A copy of Rule 26.2 attached infra. 
Although §1054.4 provides for a new proced~re in dis-
coverl as far as California is concerned, it is very similar to 
the type of discovery order at iss~e in 
Cal. 3d 43 Cl981), in which the court dec ined to 
secutorial discovery procedures, inviting the is ture to 
perform this function instead. Framed i~ li t of the current 
case la~, it is bel d net to of nd any of t~e defendan 's 
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TO OBJECT TO VENUE IN 
ci 1 cases 
administrator or judge to rev 
Statute 
REPLACE JURY IN COMPLEX LITIGATION 
CASES 
civi litigation cases could be heard by a panel of 
or j laypersons with expertise in the area. 
matters can often be too difficult for laypersons to 








RULING IN LAW AND MOTION 
Bill 781 (198 1983 session) • This 
passed by the Assembly Committee on the 
by Senate Committee. The proposed 
California lawyers at the 1981 
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